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Abstract  A historical study of metaphysical interpretations is presented. A megascopic revalidation is offered 
providing responses and resolutions of current inconsistencies and existing contradictions in present-day 
quantum theory. As the core of this study we present an independent proof of the Goldstone theorem for a 
quantum field formulation of molecules and solids. Along with phonons two types of new quasiparticles appear: 
rotons and translons. In full analogy with Lorentz covariance, combining space and time coordinates, a new 
covariance is necessary, binding together the internal and external degrees of freedom, without explicitly 
separating the centre-of-mass, which normally applies in both classical and quantum formulations. The generally 
accepted view regarding the lack of a simple correspondence between the Goldstone modes and broken 
symmetries, has significant consequences: an ambiguous BCS theory as well as a subsequent Higgs mechanism. 
The application of the archetype of the classical spontaneous symmetry breaking, i.e. the Mexican hat, as 
compared to standard quantum relations, i.e. the Jahn-Teller effect, superconductivity or the Higgs mechanism, 
becomes a disparity. In short, symmetry broken states have a microscopic causal origin, but transitions between 
them have a teleological component. The different treatments of the problem of the centre of gravity in quantum 
mechanics and in field theories imply a second type of Bohr complementarity on the many-body level opening 
the door for megascopic representations of all basic microscopic quantum axioms with further readings for 
teleonomic megascopic quantum phenomena, which have no microscopic rationale: isomeric transitions, Jahn-
Teller effect, chemical reactions, Einstein-de Haas effect, superconductivity-superfluidity, and brittle fracture. 
We demonstrate how the megascopic extension of the microscopic theory deals with the various paradoxes, such 
as the arrow of time, the Jordan-von Weizsäcker problem, to explain classicality, Santilli's "no reduction 
theorem", the Schrödinger cat paradox and Wigner's friend, and the Kauzmann paradox of residual entropy. 
Only the Copenhagen interpretation seems to be able to incorporate telicity via megascopic mirroring of each of 
its basic axioms, and in that way does confront the abovementioned paradoxes.  
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1. Introduction 
 
Quantum theory was at first formulated and construed within the framework of the 
Copenhagen School. This interpretation was a result of long years of intensive exploration of 
the microworld answering one of the greatest scientific paradoxes of all times: on the one 
hand maintaining classical concepts in the description of experimental results, and on the 
other hand to build a novel perception of the microworld, the latter not the world of reality as 
we know from Newton’s equations of the macroworld, but rather the abstract world of 
Aristotelian potentiality. The primary consequences of this conception were indeterminism 
and complementarity, which were introduced for the first time in science. Since classical 
physics has influenced philosophy for centuries, leading to such extreme views as mechanical 
materialism, it was indeed difficult for many scientists at first to accept the Copenhagen 
interpretation in its entirety. There were numerous unsuccessful attempts to explain 
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microprocesses in a deterministic way by means of hidden parameters. The sharpest 
discussions proceeded between Bohr and Einstein, which culminated in the most ingenious 
objection of Einstein, known as the EPR paradox [1]. Later Bell discussed this paradox and 
proved what is known today as Bell's theorem [2]. Based on this insight, subsequent 
experimental tests fully confirmed the validity of all quantum mechanical predictions also in 
concert with the celebrated Copenhagen interpretation. 
The initial work of Bohr and later realized as the Copenhagen interpretation basically 
concerned the hydrogen atom, but how to continue? What about molecules, crystals, liquids, 
and other forms of macroscopic matter? Do we understand them as well, too? Detailed many 
body treatments were developed during the last half century, recommending how to deal with 
complex systems composed of elementary particles. These many body treatments have one 
common feature: they respect one classical rule, i.e. knowing the physical law of motion of 
the smallest parts, we can unambiguously predict the motion of the whole. Although the 
majority of scientists believe this, one may still ask: is this really true? We have of course no 
reason to doubt this belief, yet what is in full accordance with our deep-rooted experience, we 
might still find such examples or paradoxes that convince us otherwise. Unfortunately such 
examples and paradoxes do exist, although they usually are considered only to be of 
peripheral interest. Nevertheless this will be the topic of the presented article.  
One may ask whether the Copenhagen interpretation is bad, as Einstein and all 
supporters of hidden parameter schemes tried to prove, or whether the elementary particle 
equations are at fault? Of course, no! On the contrary, the Copenhagen interpretation was 
formed in a very accurate, tangible and original way. However the simple characteristics of 
the hydrogen atom, did not reveal the whole truth about a many-body quantum system 
alongside yielding an inappropriate relationship between the micro-, the macro- and the 
mega-world. As will be demonstrated in this paper, there is also the controversial problem 
regarding the occurrence of the alleged quantum jumps, which have no origin in the original 
Copenhagen microscopic formulation. Hence this article will promote a so-called ‘second 
quantum floor’ describing megascopic quantum phenomena, in contrast to the ‘first floor’, 
defined by the standard description of microscopic phenomena within the Copenhagen 
interpretation. We will in addition expound, which heretofore being unexplained or even 
misinterpreted, upon the phenomena that belong to this ‘second floor’. 
 
2. The clamped-nuclei paradox 
 
Let us start with the simplest formulation of the many-body problem based on the 
Schrödinger equation. Solving it exactly is in practice impossible, and therefore its simplified 
solution known as the Born-Oppenheimer (B-O) approximation [3] is widely used. Quite 
recently Sutcliffe & Woolley [4] offered an extensive historical justification of the 
 3 
development of quantum theory, in particular the quantum chemical solution of Schrödinger’s 
equation, discussing the applicability as well as the limitations of Potential Energy Surfaces 
(PES) in quantum chemistry. As conclusion they wrote: „This qualitative modification of the 
internal Hamiltonian, the extra choice of fixed nuclear positions in the 'electronic' 
Hamiltonian, is ad hoc in the same sense that Bohr's quantum theory of the atom is an ad hoc 
modification of classical mechanics. An essential feature of the answer is put in by hand. We 
know that both modifications have been tremendously useful and our point is not that 
something else must be done in practical calculations on molecules. The point is how the 
successful description of molecules involving the clamped-nuclei modification at some stage 
can best be understood in terms of quantum mechanics. In the case of the Bohr atom the 
resolution of the inconsistency in mechanics applied to the microscopic realm was achieved 
quite quickly with the formulation of quantum mechanics; in the molecular case, no such 
resolution is at present known.” 
In other words, we have enough numerical verifications available, but what we need, is 
the elucidation why the clamped-nuclei modification works so well. Their statement is an 
imperative challenge to everybody. In passing we should not forget that two scientific sub-
disciplines, quantum chemistry and solid state physics, are mostly dependent on the B-O 
approximation, making them two sand-castles. This begs the question: What can we expect: 
the confirmation of the B-O approximation that satisfies our desire for perfection – or a 
disclosure of something new that goes beyond our contemporary knowledge of physics and 
chemistry? We will contend in this paper that the latter is closer to the truth. 
What about the objection that we can avoid all the above mentioned problems by 
solving the Schrödinger equation exactly. I quote from Monkhorst's article [5] an analogous 
critique of the above mentioned PES concept: „The BO approximation is strictly valid only 
near the multidimensional PES minimum. On the other hand, the BH (Born-Huang) treatment 
inspired the thinking that the entire PES is usually valid to describe the dynamics of a 
molecule, including dissociation into various fragments, i.e., chemical reactions. However, 
this view is only acceptable if the PES-associated wave functions interact only weakly for all 
nuclear configurations. It is usually quite impossible to verify this, and most consumers of the 
PES concept assume it. Their only ‘‘defense’’ is the adiabatic nature of a molecular wave 
function, where the electronic wave functions adjust ‘‘instantaneously’’ to the evolving 
nuclear configuration. In fact, this view is central to the teachings of quantum chemistry.” 
Monkhorst also describes his coupled-cluster method for the solution of the system of 
electrons and nuclei on the same footing, completely evading the B-O approximation: 
„Therefore, when the need arises to address the limitations of the PES, it seems valuable to 
remove it entirely from the toolbox of the molecular scientist. One option is the molecular 
coupled-cluster (MCC) method I formulated 10 years ago [6]. This method takes a very 
atomic view of a molecule: instead of fixing the nuclei as in the BO approximation, the 
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electrons and nuclei are both described quantum-dynamically within a centrosymmetric shell 
structure. The coupled-cluster method, duly generalized, is used to describe the correlation 
among all particles.” 
Being aware of the practical computational limitations of this exact method, he adds: 
„Even though the MCC method seems attractive, and (I hope) computationally tractable once 
implemented, it can be only practical for small molecules. I cannot see how the PES concept, 
and its attendant molecular structure ideas, will be superseded with this method for large 
molecules. Its qualitative appeal, its semiquantitative success, and its deep roots in the 
chemists’ minds will keep the PES as real as it is now.” 
The reasons given above is most likely why most of chemists prefer calculations based 
on the B-O approximation. As far as the error caused by this calculation, on the adiabatic 
level the Born-Huang (B-H) ansatz [7] is applied, and as Kutzelnigg proved [8], the B-H 
ansatz fully compensates for this error. Note however that Kutzelnigg's proof indicates only 
the numerical equivalence, and solely on the adiabatic level. There are no objective 
equivalences between the exact solution of the Schrödinger equation and solutions based on 
the whole of the B-O approximation and B-H ansatz at all, even on the adiabatic level. 
Fortunately, a small number of scientists were inspired by Monkhorst's idea, and 
performed exact calculations of some of the simplest molecules. Cafiero & Adamowitz wrote 
[9]: „The model of the molecule… is quite similar to an atom, as has been noted by 
Monkhorst [5]. We have the analogue of the nucleus with the heavy particle at the center of 
the internal coordinate system, and we have the analogues of electrons in the internal 
particles. The main difference between this model and an atom is that the internal particles in 
an atom are all electrons and in the molecular atom or atomic molecule the internal particles 
may be both electrons and nuclei (or, as we should more correctly say, pseudo-particles 
resembling the electron and the nuclei). Formally this difference manifests itself in the 
effective masses of the pseudo-particles and in the way the permutational symmetry is 
implemented in the wave function.” 
And further looking at the conclusion from their calculations: „Since in the nonadiabatic 
treatment we have included the nuclei in the wave function, we must determine the molecular 
structure by calculating expectation values of the distances between the nuclei. Since the 
operators representing the internuclear distances… do not commute with the Hamiltonian…, 
we cannot measure these distances exactly for stationary states of the system. Furthermore, 
since the ground state is spherically symmetric, we cannot gain additional information from 
the wave function such as the expectation values of the x, y, z coordinates of any of the 
particles, since these will average out to zero in all cases. Lastly, the expectation values for 
the distances between any two particles in each subset of identical particles (including the 
distance to the particle at the origin, if that particle belongs to the subset) will be equal. This is 
a widely known fact for electrons, i.e., due to antisymmetry, or indistinguishability, all of the 
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electrons are on average at the same distance from each other, as well as from each nucleus in 
the molecule. That this same fact applies to nuclei is, perhaps, less known.” 
These first calculations of their kind gave us a remarkable insight into the actual 
differences between the exact and the clamped-nuclei approaches. The exact solution 
communicates the concept of the "molecular atom or atomic molecule", where we can only 
see one undivided isolated composite object, while we are unable to say anything more about 
the individual molecules involved in such a system. The hierarchy elementary particles → 
atoms → molecules doesn't exist here as we know it from the B-O approximation; instead it is 
replaced with the reduced hierarchy elementary particles → molecular atoms or atomic 
molecules. The exact solution leads always to a full symmetry picture of the molecule, and 
the indistinguishability principle, valid for nuclei as well, doesn't allow any "symmetry 
breaking", such as e.g. an isomerism. As Sutcliffe & Woolley state: „The Isolated Molecule 
model doesn't capture isomerism, nor optical activity.” It is indeed a pity that exact solutions 
are so complex that till now they have only been tested on very small systems, i.e. up to ten 
particles, electrons and nuclei included. It would be very interesting to test them on something 
bigger at least on the simplest Jahn-Teller [10] systems. It seems that the indistinguishability 
of the nuclei and their shell nature, no J-T symmetry breakings are possible at all, cf. the case 
of isomerism, and that we will obtain fully symmetrical solutions for the ground states. 
Although standard theories of the J-T effect [11,12] go beyond the B-O approximation and 
are nonadiabatic, they are nevertheless all of clamped-nuclei type. 
Thus we can see that even exact solutions of Schrödinger’s equation do not yield the 
full picture of all quantum chemical phenomena. Yet we cannot avoid the clamped-nuclei 
concept in the B-O approximation, leading to a serious paradox: how can an approximation 
produce results that by no means follow from the exact solution? What is the nature of the B-
O model when it is not viewed as an approximation? Where is the true origin of the clamped-
nuclei concept, allowing the description of individual molecules? This is indeed a quantum 
paradox, since we don't know any classical analogies. How do we reach the B-O 
approximation? Perhaps by simply transgressing the law of nature due to the hierarchical way 
of quantization - first the electrons are quantized and the nuclei remain classical, and then 
they are quantized a posteriori. But quantum mechanics demands simultaneous quantization, 
regardless how heavy the nuclei are compared to the electrons. Sutcliffe & Woolley ask: „The 
interesting question is how to get from the quantum theory of an Isolated Molecule to a 
quantum theory of an individual molecule by rational mathematics.” The problem is thus, on 
"what" quantum theory the mentioned rational mathematics do apply. If we understand 
quantum theory as quantum mechanics based on the original Copenhagen interpretation, 
employing the Schrödinger equation for particles in the many-body systems, we find no 
answer. The input of electrons and nuclei in the mechanical Schrödinger equation exhibits a 
full symmetry regarding both types of particles. As we will see in this paper, many-body 
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systems are running in dual mode, and we need to search the answer not under the mechanical 
pattern, but under the field concept where simultaneous quantization can be performed. 
The concepts "isolated system" and "individual system" are well defined in the classical 
world, but only the first one has a similar meaning in the microworld, whereas the second one 
needs a radical redefinition on the quantum level. However, in speaking about elementary 
particles as "individual systems", there is no problem. The problems start when we try to 
apply this concept to composite systems like molecules or crystals. 
In regard to the phenomena mentioned above, the explanation calls for the concept of 
clamped-nuclei, but, as just said, this concept, from the viewpoint of an exact quantum 
mechanical many-body formulation, does not work. The Copenhagen interpretation must be 
incomplete in this respect. 
 
 
3. The paradox of time irreversibility 
 
The fundamental problem of both classical and quantum physics is still the question of 
the arrow of time. Why does time have a direction?  
A half century ago, Santilli, then a nuclear physicist, stated, what he called a no-
reduction theorem [13]: „A macroscopic irreversible system cannot be consistently reduced to 
a finite number of elementary constituents all in reversible conditions and, vice versa, a finite 
number of elementary particles all in reversible conditions cannot consistently characterize a 
macroscopic irreversible system.” He further said, claiming that he has discussed this problem 
with Heisenberg and Dirac and that none of the quantum theory founders knew the answer: 
„The above theorem establishes that irreversibility originates at the most ultimate structure of 
nature.” Till now the scientific community does not seem to take this paradox seriously, 
nevertheless Santilli continues: „During the 20th century it was generally believed that the 
irreversibility over time of our macroscopic environment was "illusory" (sic) because, when 
macroscopic events are reduced to their elementary particle constituents, irreversibility 
"disappears" (sic) and one recovers nice elementary particles in the reversible conditions 
necessary for the applicability of special relativity, quantum mechanics and quantum 
chemistry.” Although he was correct with the formulation of the "no reduction theorem", he is 
certainly wrong with his later interpretation. His approach is to introduce the so-called "Lie-
admissible algebras" for the construction of irreversible equations of the microworld, 
seemingly giving up the concept of reversible quantum equations. As a consequence the 
macroscopic limit of his irreversible equations will lead also to classical irreversible 
expressions, e.g. replacing the standard Newtonian laws, unravelling puzzles arising from his 
earlier theorem once and for all. In doing so he does not object to microscopic irreversibility 
even when no irreversible equations are needed. This appears justified since any intervention 
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during measurement is an irreversible act, causing the reduction of the wave function of the 
system, ultimately in agreement with microscopic irreversibility. Yet he destroys the 
philosophical logic of a consistent quantum philosophical microscopic view simply for the 
limited purpose to explain macroscopic irreversibility. A better alternative would be to accept 
the incompleteness of quantum theory as stated by the Copenhagen interpretation, rather than 
rewriting physics in its entirety. 
Looking into the history of quantum mechanics, Bohr initially described the Heisenberg 
principle of uncertainty as a purely epistemic problem. In this context there is no problem to 
accept the "objective reality" in the macroscopic limit. But today we know that the principle 
of uncertainty is also ontological, and there is unfortunately no classical limit relating to some 
"objective reality", even if, on the macroscopic scale, "objective potentiality" still persists. 
This raises the question: how to relate the various forms of the macroscopic level of 
"objective potentiality" into one reality. The problem is that classical physics describes events 
at the scale of continuous time. On the contrary, quantum equations cannot describe any 
event, since they arise only after outside intervention, i.e. after a measurement which can lead 
to irreversible processes. However, there are also many irreversible processes, e.g. chemical 
reactions that occur independently on any observer, i.e. without any specific measurement 
process. Consequently, if there is no macroscopic ontological limit of quantum laws that 
applies to the microworld, then there must exist yet another type of events, that occurs on the 
macroscopic level, which are responsible for the time irreversibility, but have no roots in the 
original Copenhagen School. This is of fundamental importance, since if and when we find 
this, until now unknown type of events, we will recover the concept of unitary 
transformations as pertaining to reversible equations on both the microscopic as well as the 
macroscopic levels. 
Classical physics recognizes reversible processes as the primary ones along with the full 
reversibility on the time axis, whereas irreversible processes violates this symmetry with the 
arrow of time oriented only in the "forward" direction. This stance also carries over in 
microscopic quantum theory. Santilli recognized the ascending order of irreversibility, but 
nevertheless made an inaccurate inference in the assumption of irreversibility conceiving 
reversibility as a constricted limit. There are essentially no irreversibility in the primary 
equations of physics, which leads us to explore deep-seated formulations that might reveal 
precise relations between reversibility/irreversibility allowing solutions that provide the 
proper characteristics depending on the case at hand. Therefore the classical concept of the 
"arrow of time" becomes inadequate in the quantum world and without such readings the 
Copenhagen interpretation remains incomplete. 
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4. Bohm's five prophetic statements 
 
Bohm is largely known for his attempts to invigorate the theory of hidden parameters, 
originally formulated by de Broglie as the contentious pilot-wave theory, adding the well-
known conception of the famed quantum potential [14]. However, this appears to lead 
nowhere. The theory of hidden parameters cannot be helpful for a solution of the 
incompleteness problem associated with the Copenhagen interpretation. Nevertheless, as is 
less known, thirty years after he published his new version of non-local hidden parameters, 
Bohm arrived at five important critical conclusions regarding the aforementioned lack of 
completeness. He himself never found the resolution, since his own Bohmian Mechanics 
indeed suffers from the same shortcomings as the Copenhagen interpretation, believing that it 
will be answered in the future by some new modifications of the hidden variable idea. As can 
be seen, it is easier to be critical rather than finding the correct solution. 
These five critical points of Bohm are of extraordinary relevance, because neither the 
Copenhagen interpretation nor any other rendering is able to cope with them, to take their 
ideas in to consideration fulfilling their requirements. I will cite them all and give my 
reflections and detailed remarks below. The first four are taken from his book Wholeness and 
the Implicate Order [15], the last fifth from his dialogue with the biologist Sheldrake [16]. 
The first quote runs: 
1. „Nevertheless, in most of the work that is being done in physics today the notions of 
formative and final cause are not regarded as having primary significance. Rather, law is still 
generally conceived as a self-determined system of efficient causes, operating in an ultimate 
set of material constituents of the universe (e.g. elementary particles subject to forces of 
interaction between them). These constituents are not regarded as formed in an overall 
process, and thus they are not considered to be anything like organs adapted to their place and 
function in the whole (i.e. to the ends which they would serve in this whole). Rather, they 
tend to be conceived as separately existent mechanical elements of a fixed nature.” 
Here Bohm discerns two categories of causes - efficient and final, according to the 
ancient classification introduced by Aristotle. Nature is full of phenomena based on final 
causes, but unfortunately the science of physics (classical, relativistic or quantum) is unable to 
incorporate them and represent them in some form of meaningful equations. What is even 
worse, physicists often do not recognize final causes at all treating the relevant phenomena as 
they would be induced by efficient causes. A nice example is the spontaneous symmetry 
breaking. Since it is believed that nothing in nature is spontaneous, physicists not seeing any 
explicit efficient cause, they call such symmetry breakings "spontaneous" imparting adverse 
formulations of such phenomena that are based on this type of symmetry violation. We will 
discuss this problem in more detail below.   
The second statement reads: 
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2. „When it comes to the informal language and mode of thought in physics, which 
infuses the imagination and provokes the sense of what is real and substantial, most physicists 
still speak and think, with an utter conviction of truth, in terms of the traditional atomistic 
notion that the universe is constituted of elementary particles which are 'basic building blocks' 
out of which everything is made. In other sciences, such as biology, the strength of this 
conviction is even greater, because among workers in these fields there is little awareness of 
the revolutionary character of development in modern physics. For example, modern 
molecular biologists generally believe that the whole of life and mind can ultimately be 
understood in more or less mechanical terms, through some kind of extension of the work that 
has been done on the structure and function of DNA molecules. A similar trend has already 
begun to dominate in psychology.” 
The quantum physics community, as understood today by a vast majority of physicists, 
constitutes an unluckily fulfilment of the materialistic ideas of Democritus. As concerns 
ancient Democritus' atomism, the concepts of quantum physics differs little or not at all from 
classical mechanics. In fact the great men of classical physics (Newton, Leibniz, Laplace and 
others) sincerely believed that if someone gives them the laws of motion for all existing 
constituents of matter, they could predict the motion of the whole universe. No matter how 
much the laws of motion of elementary particles in quantum physics are profoundly 
dissimilar, both mathematically and philosophically, to the laws of classical physics, yet by 
introducing complementarity and uncertainty no one dares to contest any unambiguousness in 
the formulation of many-body quantum equations. As a result many physicists, particularly 
cosmologists, believe in the existence of a wave function describing the whole of the 
universe, one of the first and main anticipation in the Everett relative state interpretation [41]. 
Bohm's conclusion is absolutely correct, and we will prove here that the conventional many-
body formulation in quantum physics is ambiguous as well, and that microscopic quantum 
laws are not the ultimate and unique platform for understanding all natural phenomena.  
The third citation becomes: 
3. „So fragmentation is in essence a confusion around the question of difference and 
sameness (or one-ness), but the clear perception of these categories is necessary in every 
phase of life. To be confused about what is different and what is not, is to be confused about 
everything… The question of fragmentation and wholeness is a subtle and difficult one, more 
subtle and difficult than those which lead to fundamentally new discoveries in science. To ask 
how to end fragmentation and to expect an answer in a few minutes makes even less sense 
than to ask how to develop a theory as new as Einstein's was when he was working on it, and 
to expect to be told what to do in terms of some programme, expressed in terms of formulae 
or recipes.” 
This is indeed a very important objection. We will demonstrate a relation between 
Bohm's dilemma of wholeness versus fragmentation and the problem of isolated versus 
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individual as formulated by Sutcliffe & Woolley. The microscopic quantum world simply 
does not match our concepts of individual or fragmented, albeit these words have clear and 
well-defined meanings on the classical level. And further it is most astonishing to compare 
how the authors mentioned characterize this problem and evaluate its complexity. Bohm 
emphasized that the challenge is more difficult than the problem of relativity confronting 
Einstein, while Sutcliffe & Woolley emphasized that it is harder to solve than the problem of 
quantum theory for Bohr. 
The fourth excerpt reads: 
4. „Here, we may hope to get some clues by considering problems in a domain where 
current theories do not yield generally satisfactory results, i.e. one connected with very high 
energies and very short distances. With regard to such problems, we first note that the present 
relativistic quantum field theory meets severe difficulties which raise serious doubts as to its 
internal self-consistency. There are the difficulties arising in connection with the divergences 
(infinite results) obtained in calculations of the effects of interactions of various kinds of 
particles and fields. It is true that for the special case of electromagnetic interactions such 
divergences can be avoided to a certain extent by means of the so-called 'renormalization' 
techniques. It is by no means clear, however, that these techniques can be placed on a secure 
logical mathematical basis. Moreover, for the problem of mesonic and other interactions, the 
renormalization method does not work well even when considered as a purely technical 
manipulation of mathematical symbols, apart from the question of its logical justification. 
While it has not been proved conclusively, as yet, that the infinities described above are 
essential characteristics of the theory, there is already a considerable amount of evidence in 
favour of such a conclusion.” 
This is entirely a quantum field problem. Quantum mechanical patterns, derived from 
the classical Hamilton-Jacobi formalism, doesn't seem to lead to any similar difficulties. The 
question is rather, whether an analogical quantization of the classical electro-magnetic field 
Langrangian will provide us with the full quantum field pattern, especially when it is used in 
closed systems such as nuclei in quantum chromodynamics. Note that original field patterns 
of quantum electrodynamics represent only the scattering process of a few free particles in 
vacuum. We will here analyze these inconsistencies in applying such a limited pattern to 
bound-state massive systems like molecules and crystals. 
The final Bohm quotation contains the exchange with Sheldrake: 
5. Bohm: 'How is time to be understood?' Now, in terms of the totality beyond time, the 
totality in which all is implicate, what unfolds or comes into being in any present moment is 
simply a projection of the whole. That is, some aspect of the whole is unfolded into that 
moment and that moment is just that aspect. Likewise, the next moment is simply another 
aspect of the whole. And the interesting point is that each moment resembles its predecessors 
but also differs from them. I explain this using the technical terms 'injection' and 'projection'. 
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Each moment is a projection of the whole, as we said. But that moment is then injected or 
introjected back into the whole. The next moment would then involve, in part, a re-projection 
of that injection, and so on in-definitely.” 
Sheldrake: „But don't you get time in physics when you have a collapse of the wave 
function?” 
Bohm: „Yes, but that's outside the framework of quantum physics today. That collapse 
is not treated by any law at all, which means that the past is, as it were, wiped out 
altogether… You see, the present quantum mechanics does not have any concept of 
movement or process or continuity in time; it really deals with one moment only, one 
observation, and the probability that one observation will be followed by another one…” 
In short the question is whether those "injections", promoted by Bohm, would be able to 
solve the problem of time in quantum mechanics? And further what are those “injections” and 
what do they represent, and how could we formulate them by rigorous mathematics? They 
should first of all represent quantum jumps in a similar way as "projections". We also know 
that "projections" are the results of our conscious observations of the quantum systems, but if 
"injections" are quantum jumps as well, how do we observe and measure them? Is it possible, 
that some complementation or extension of the Copenhagen interpretation could finally lead 
to an ontological justification of those "injections", yet without having any epistemic access to 
them? In other words, is there some, until now unknown, kind of quantum jumps in nature, 
which can neither be explained on the basis of present-day quantum theory, nor directly 
measured, and perhaps with no microscopic origin at all? As already said, this will be the 
permeating topic of our paper, where in particular we will show how Bohm's "injections" will 
be closely related to the  time reversibility/irreversibility problem of Santilli. 
 
 
5. The paradox of Schrödinger's cat 
 
This is the well-known paradox from the time when Einstein and Schrödinger 
exchanged arguments regarding the indeterministic features of the newly conceived quantum 
theory. Nevertheless today, against the background of the mentioned incompleteness of the 
Copenhagen interpretation, many alternatives are being developed with Schrödinger's cat 
playing an important testing role. J. D. Norton, he well-known historian of physics, highlights 
the significance in the following terms [17]: „This paradox of the Schrödinger's cat is the 
most vivid expression of a lingering problem in the foundations of quantum theory. In the last 
two decades especially, there has been a huge amount of work devoted to finding variations to 
standard quantum theory or just new ways to think about the same theory that avoid this 
problem. There is no consensus on which approach is the correct one or even if some sort of 
repair is needed.” 
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Norton describes the history of the Schrödinger's cat problem, which followed shortly 
after the appearance of the famous EPR paradox [1] in March 1935: „In the aftermath of this 
paper, Einstein and Schrödinger exchanged letters in which they aired their common concerns 
about quantum theory. In that correspondence, Einstein put to Schrödinger what we now see 
is an early version of the cat paradox. He outlined a "crude macroscopic example" in a letter 
to Schrödinger of August 8, 1935: "The system is a substance in chemically unstable 
equilibrium, perhaps a pile of gunpowder that, by means of intrinsic forces, can spontaneously 
combust, and where the average life span of the whole setup is a year. In principle this can 
quite easily be represented quantum-mechanically. In the beginning the ψ-function 
characterizes a reasonably well-defined macroscopic state. But, according to your equation, 
after the course of a year this is no longer the case at all. Rather, the ψ-function then describes 
a sort of blend of not-yet and of already-exploded systems. Through no art of interpretation 
can this ψ-function be turned into an adequate description of a real state of affairs; [for] in 
reality there is just no intermediary between exploded and non-exploded."[18]” 
As can readily be seen, Santilli's paradox previously mentioned, is a remake of the old 
gunpowder pile account due to Einstein, as both paradoxes deal with the factual irreversibility 
of chemical reactions. As we know that Einstein was not successful with his famed EPR 
objection, this time he did formulate a problem still unresolved. 
Norton continues [17]: „Erwin Schrödinger published his "cat" thought experiment in a 
lengthy paper in the November 29, 1935, issue of the journal Die Naturwissenschaften. Here's 
the entirety of his original account: "One can even make quite ludicrous examples. A cat is 
enclosed in a steel chamber, together with the following infernal machine (which one must 
secure against the cat's direct reach): in the tube of a Geiger counter there is a tiny amount of 
a radioactive material, so small that although one of its atoms might decay in the course of an 
hour, it is just a probable that that none will. If the decay occurs, the counter tube fires and, by 
means of a relay, sets a little hammer into motion that shatters a small bottle of prussic acid. 
When the entire system has been left alone for an hour, one would say that the cat is still alive 
provided no atom has decayed in the meantime. The first atomic decay would have poisoned 
it. The ψ-function of the total system would yield an expression for all this in which, in equal 
measure, the living and the dead cat (sit venia verbo ["pardon the expression"]) blended or 
smeared out. The characteristic of these examples that an indefiniteness originally limited to 
atomic dimensions gets transformed into gross macroscopic indefiniteness, which can then be 
reduced by direct observation. This prevents us from continuing naively to give credence to a 
"fuzzy model" as a picture of reality. In itself this contains nothing unclear or contradictory. 
There is a difference between a blurred or unsharply taken photograph and a shot of clouds 
and mist."” 
Due to the Schrödinger's cat narrative, the scientific community were divided: some 
believed that living and dead cats are really in the state of a quantum superposition until the 
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moment of a conscious measurement, others claimed that the cat had to be either alive or dead 
yet before the box was opened. Carpenter & Anderson further analysed the laboratory thought 
experiment with the following conclusion [19]: „The implications arising from the 
“Schrödinger’s cat” thought experiment have led some authors to argue that observation of a 
measurement by a conscious observer is required to collapse quantum wave-functions. Here 
we combine Schrödinger’s experimental paradigm with a system for splitting the information 
about the quantum state between two observers, thereby allowing distinct outcomes to be 
recorded without either observer knowing the state of the measured quantum event. Our 
results imply that to collapse a quantum wave-function, measurement alone, rather than 
conscious observation of a measurement, is sufficient.” 
The last objection made by Einstein against the Copenhagen interpretation was 
published in his Reply to Criticisms in 1949 [18], which runs in analogy with Schrödinger’s 
cat argument: „As far as I know, it was E. Schrödinger who first called attention to a 
modification of this consideration, which shows an interpretation of this type to be 
impracticable. Rather than considering a system which comprises only a radioactive atom 
(and its process of transformation), one considers a system which includes also the means for 
ascertaining the radioactive transformation — for example, a Geiger-counter with automatic 
registration-mechanism. Let this latter include a registration-strip, moved by a clockwork, 
upon which a mark is made by tripping the counter. True, from the point of view of quantum 
mechanics this total system is very complex and its configuration space is of very high 
dimension. But there is in principle no objection to treating this entire system from the 
standpoint of quantum mechanics. Here too the theory determines the probability of each 
configuration of all its co-ordinates for every time instant. If one considers all configurations 
of the coordinates, for a time large compared with the average decay time of the radioactive 
atom, there will be (at most) one such registration-mark on the paper strip. To each coordinate 
configuration corresponds a definite position of the mark on the paper strip. But, inasmuch as 
the theory yields only the relative probability of the thinkable co-ordinate-configurations, it 
also offers only relative probabilities for the positions of the mark on the paper strip, but no 
definite location for this mark.” 
Yet again, cf. the case of gunpowder pile, Einstein’s critique was justifiable, and hence 
there exists until now no resolution to this paradox. Nevertheless, for Einstein the only way 
out was the acceptance of the statistical interpretation of quantum mechanics, which today is 
not the accepted majority standpoint. „One arrives at very implausible theoretical 
conceptions, if one attempts to maintain the thesis that the statistical quantum theory is in 
principle capable of producing a complete description of an individual physical system. On 
the other hand, those difficulties of theoretical interpretation disappear, if one views the 
quantum-mechanical description as the description of ensembles of systems.” [18] 
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As the Schrödinger’s cat has inspired many new interpretations of quantum theory, 
Schreiber in his Master of Science thesis, made an extensive comparison of them and wrote a 
very nice parody "The Nine Lives of Schrödinger's Cat" [20] where he describes the fate of 
the poor cat in the nine most popular alternative interpretations. In his conclusion, he says: 
„Discussion: The orthodox interpretation works well in practice but is ambiguous and 
therefore unacceptable. Bohr’s epistemological views are also somewhat vague and require 
classical physics to be assumed. For those who are satisfied with epistemology, the 
decoherent histories approach admirably ties down any ambiguity or vagueness. It may be 
used to recover classical physics. Those who would like to see an ontological model of the 
world must look elsewhere. Neither many-world nor many-minds provide such models. The 
idea that the mind causes collapse does but the model is problematic. Bohm’s interpretation 
does seem to work although it is rather awkward, especially in the context of quantum field 
theory. The best hope at the moment for an ontological theory is that the world’s state 
collapses according to some fixed set of consistent histories. However, no clear criterion has 
emerged for the appropriate set of histories. Finally, there are approaches which involve not 
interpretation of quantum mechanics but modification. These approaches have not been 
considered here. The most successful of these is the stochastic scheme of ‘GRW’ (this scheme 
was put in a very nice form by Bell) although it is not without its problems. Several other 
attempts have involved introducing non-linear terms in the Schrödinger equation but none of 
these seems to work.” 
Schreiber then ends with his final anticipation - what should be done, but it never was: 
„Final word: Quantum mechanics is a theory lacking an ontological picture of the world. The 
search for such an ontology has been long, hard and appallingly haphazard. It is time that the 
entire programme was defined and analysed in a systematic and uniform mathematical way. 
Strange as this idea may seem, I am convinced that it is possible. When this programme is 
completed, theoretical physicists will finally be able to put the cat out and take a well-earned 
rest.” 
For Norton as well as for Schreiber, none of the present known interpretations is fully 
acceptable [17]: „My own feeling is that none of these responses is satisfactory… However, if 
there are new physical laws that would resolve the measurement problem, we can be pretty 
sure that they are quite exotic and not produced by a small adjustment in our existing theories. 
For, if these small adjustments are there to be found, eight decades of work by many of the 
brightest minds in quantum physics has failed to find them. Nonetheless, this "new, as yet 
unknown, physics" response is the one that all the other responses have to beat. Ask each of 
them, is this response more plausible than the "new physics" response? In each case, I answer 
no.” 
The two aforementioned conclusions suggest that we have to take on an apparent 
challenge searching for a radical new ontology and a new physics, based on deductive 
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reasoning and rigorous mathematics. As we will show in this paper, this "new physics" 
imparts neither some new artificial topological spaces beyond the Hilbert space, nor some 
speculative multidimensional superstring proposals. All we need, should be to find nature’s 
hidden laws, which have not yet been discovered  and not yet revealed. 
 
 
6. What is the Copenhagen interpretation? 
 
The Copenhagen interpretation reflects a standard reference of our philosophical and 
physical views of quantum theory, yet there are remarkable differences of perspectives 
regarding the perception and understandings between the actual founders of quantum physics. 
Recognizing that the Copenhagen interpretation may not be complete, it will be valuable to 
remind the reader of the most important stances before starting to make any attempts to 
construct a more general theory. 
Schlosshauer and Camilleri [21] takes up the unresolved disagreements between Bohr 
and Heisenberg: „In order to meaningfully speak of observation in quantum mechanics, Bohr 
concluded, “one must therefore cut out a partial system somewhere from the world, and one 
must make ‘statements’ or ‘observations’ just about this partial system” [22]… Bohr’s 
epistemological demand for a “cut between the observed system on the one hand and the 
observer and his apparatus on the other hand” also became a key theme of Heisenberg’s 
thinking. However, for Heisenberg, the object–instrument divide was coincident with the 
quantum–classical divide… It is important to realize that Heisenberg’s views on the cut were 
somewhat at odds with Bohr’s own view of the problem. Indeed, in an exchange of 
correspondence in 1935 Heisenberg and Bohr argued the point without resolution. Some 
twenty years later Heisenberg would report that “Bohr has emphasized that it is more realistic 
to state that the division into the object and rest of the world is not arbitrary” and that the 
object is determined by the very nature of the experiment [23]. In a letter to Heelan in 1975, 
Heisenberg also explained that he and Bohr had never really resolved their disagreement. 
Heisenberg remained convinced “that a cut could be moved around to some extent while Bohr 
preferred to think that the position is uniquely defined in every experiment” [24].” 
Heisenberg's argument for the arbitrary position of the cut reads as follows: „The 
dividing line between the system to be observed and the measuring apparatus is immediately 
defined by the nature of the problem but it obviously signifies no discontinuity of the physical 
process. For this reason there must, within certain limits, exist complete freedom in choosing 
the position of the dividing line [25].” 
Heisenberg's quantum-classical divide is also supported by von Weizsäcker, who tries 
to relate irreversibility and classicality: „Having thus accepted the falsity of classical physics, 
taken literally, we must ask how it can be explained as an essentially good approximation 
[when describing objects at the macrolevel]… This amounts to asking what physical 
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condition must be imposed on a quantum-theoretical system in order that it should show the 
features which we describe as “classical.”… I am unable to prove mathematically that the 
condition of irreversibility would suffice to define a classical approximation, but I feel 
confident it is a necessary condition [26].” 
The position of an arbitrary cut was also shared by von Neumann [27]. He suggested 
that the entangled state of the object and the instrument collapses to a determinate state 
whenever a measurement takes place. So what finally causes such a collapse seems to be the 
mind of the observer. Other physicists also argued the latter boundary, i.e. the observer's 
consciousness, such as London [28], Peierls [29], Wigner [30], etc.  
The philosopher Jan Faye, discusses, in his Stanford Encyclopedia article [31], the 
ambiguities, significances and implications of the Copenhagen interpretation, in particular 
Howard's and Henderson's careful analyses: „Don Howard [32] goes as far as concluding that 
“until Heisenberg coined the term in 1955, there was no unitary Copenhagen interpretation of 
quantum mechanics.” The term apparently occurs for the first time in Heisenberg [33]. In 
addition, Howard also argues that it was Heisenberg's exposition of complementarity, and not 
Bohr's, with its emphasis on a privileged role for the observer and observer-induced wave 
packet collapse that became identical with that interpretation. Says he: “Whatever 
Heisenberg's motivation, his invention of a unitary Copenhagen view on interpretation, at the 
center of which was his own, distinctively subjectivist view of the role of the observer, 
quickly found an audience”. This audience included people like Bohm, Feyerabend, Hanson, 
and Popper who used Heisenberg's presentation of complementarity as the target for their 
criticism of the orthodox view.” 
Furthermore he says: „Recently, Henderson [34] has come to a similar conclusion. He 
makes a distinction between different versions of Copenhagen interpretations based on 
statements from some of the main characters. On one side of the spectrum there is Bohr who 
did not think of quantum measurement in terms of a collapse of the wave function; in the 
middle we find Heisenberg talking about the collapse as an objective physical process but 
thinking that this couldn't be analyzed any further because of its indeterministic nature, and at 
the opposite side Johann von Neumann and Eugene Wigner argued that the human mind has a 
direct influence on the reduction of the wave packet. Unfortunately, von Neumann's dualistic 
view has become part of the Copenhagen mythodology by people opposing this 
interpretation.” 
Wigner seems to be the last contributor of the philosophical conception of quantum 
theory, known today as the orthodox Copenhagen interpretation. Let us take a closer look on a 
more detailed study of Wigner's writings, such as the preprint of Primas and Esfeld [35], 
where Wigner's original definition of the measurement process reads: 
„[The reduction of the wave packet] takes place whenever the result of an observation 
enters the consciousness of the observer – or, to be even more painfully precise, my 
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consciousness, since I am the only observer, all other people being only subjects of my 
observations… The measurement is not completed until its result enters our consciousness. 
This last step occurs when a correlation is established between the state of the last measuring 
apparatus and something which directly affects our consciousness. This last step is, at the 
present state of our knowledge, shrouded in mystery and no explanation has been given for it 
so far in terms of quantum mechanics, or in terms of any other theory.” [30] 
Accordingly Primas & Esfeld exhibit Wigner's attempt to avoid the position of 
excessive subjectivity allowing the person's mind to be in a state of superposition, figuratively 
known under the name of Wigner's friend.  
Moreover they continue: „Wigner’s main argument for his view is that it is “difficult to 
accept the possibility that a person’s mind is in a superposition of two states… We ourselves 
never have felt we were in such superpositions.” [36] In this context, Wigner discusses the 
famous “paradox of Wigner’s friend”: If one observer describes another observer who 
observes something like a von Neumann chain and if the first observer describes this whole 
process in the terminology of quantum mechanics, he will end up with ascribing a 
superposition of different states of consciousness to the second observer. Wigner avoids this 
paradox by maintaining that quantum theory does not apply to consciousness so that there are 
no superpositions of different states of consciousness. A state reduction occurs at the level of 
the friend’s consciousness [37]… Wigner’s proposal is a move away from the Copenhagen 
idea that the quantum state represents knowledge available to a community of communicating 
observers, who have a common knowledge that is useful for making predictions about their 
combined future experiences. Wigner suggests that each conscious being is able to collapse 
one single objective quantum state, regardless of whether the information is actually 
physically shared. It is a move away from an essentially subjective pragmatic interpretation 
toward a more objective absolute one.” From his later years Wigner’s view matures in that he 
expresses a hope that a more general theory will be developed in the future, while being 
unsatisfied with the present incompleteness of his interpretation. In [38] it is cited: „In his 
later papers, Wigner expressed his “desire for a less solipsistic theory” but only in last papers 
did he consider the consequence of solipsism as a sufficient reason to repudiate his earlier 
views… At the end of a paper published in 1977, Wigner expresses the hope “that quantum 
mechanics will also turn out to be a limiting case, limiting in more than one regard, and that 
the philosophy which an even deeper theory of physics will support, will give a more concrete 
meaning to the word ‘reality’, will not embrace solipsism, much truth as this may contain, and 
will let us admit that the world really exists.” [38]” 
But what does this hope really mean in a more "realistic" description of the material 
world? Is it identical with Einstein’s belief, quote – unquote: „Es gibt so etwas wie den 
‘realen Zustand’ eines physikalischen Systems, was unabhängig von jeder Beobachtung oder 
Messung objektiv existiert und mit den Ausdrucksmitteln der Physik im Prinzip beschrieben 
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werden kann.“ [40]? Primas & Esfeld [35] are convinced that the majority of contemporary 
scientists share this view with Einstein. Even if they are right, this is clearly not a good sign, 
since it means the comeback of 19th century materialism when classical physics fulfilled all 
requirements of "objective reality" as inferred above by Einstein. 
The authors further polemize with Wigner, quoting some of their most interesting 
disagreements with him: „Wigner never discussed spontaneously broken symmetries, which 
are nowadays on all levels of physics, from elementary particle physics to molecular and solid 
state physics, of utmost importance… On the other hand, Wigner mostly analysed fictitious 
isolated systems with a finite number of degrees of freedom whose infinite environment he 
assumed to have a negligible effect. Yet, the interactions of an object system with its 
environment can have dramatic qualitative effects such as dressing, symmetry breakdown, 
and the emergence of qualitatively new properties. It is well known that the coupling of small 
molecular systems with the environment can lead to symmetry breakings which are of great 
biological significance such as molecular chirality.” 
Moreover: „Curiously for a scientist with an excellent background in chemistry, Wigner 
denies the objective reality of molecular chirality: “It should be admitted, first that the 
concept of the positions of atoms continues to be a useful concept but it has turned out to be 
an approximate one. It is useful under certain condition but it is not difficult to produce 
situations in which it is meaningless. A particular striking example is an optically active 
organic molecule in its normal state. This is neither right handed, nor left handed – in fact, the 
atoms have no clearly defined positions with respect to each other, not even approximately.” 
[39]” 
 – and: „Wigner showed much courage in relating the then unresolved questions of the 
measurement problem to the much deeper problem of consciousness. In view of this very 
unorthodox proposal it is astonishing that Wigner was very reactionary with respect of the 
dogmas of orthodox quantum mechanics. In contrast to von Neumann himself, he took the old 
von-Neumann codification of quantum mechanics as authoritative and not to be questioned. 
Much of the efforts to interpret the meaning of this codification and to prove no-go theorems, 
such as the insolubility of the measurement problem or the impossibility of a quantum theory 
of individual objects, are physically irrelevant since they are based on a codification of 
quantum mechanics that is valid only for strictly closed systems with finitely many degrees of 
freedom.”   
– and: „It is hard to believe that Wigner did not recognize the importance of the many 
possible physically inequivalent representations of the canonical commutation relations and 
the associated symmetry breakings for our understanding of molecular, mesoscopic, and 
macroscopic phenomena.” 
So where is the problem? Wigner knew of course what he was talking about. However, 
his final challenge for a more "realistic" theory does not meet the above mentioned 
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counterarguments at all. Yet the incompleteness of the orthodox Copenhagen interpretation 
does not mean that it should be wrong, its incompleteness rather imparts a possible 
incompleteness of the concepts it is dealing with. It will be shown in this article that we must 
tackle the very incompleteness of our knowledge of (i) time irreversibility, (ii) the symmetry 
breaking, and (iii) the role of the environment and (iv) the quantum definition of individual 
objects. This means, that we cannot confront the incomplete orthodox interpretation by means 
of a reasoning based on incompletely defined concepts. In other words: these concepts must 
first be carefully re-examined before we can even start to construct any proposal regarding 
how to deal with an improved Copenhagen interpretation. 
 
7. The paradox of quantum decoherence 
 
In 1980 a novel decoherence program started to emerge, based on Everett's PhD thesis 
from 1957. Everett first summarised the Copenhagen interpretation in its final von Neumann - 
Wigner form [41]: „We take the conventional or “external observation” formulation of 
quantum mechanics to be essentially the following: A physical system is completely 
described by a state function ψ, which is an element of a Hilbert space, and which furthermore 
gives information only to the extent of specifying the probabilities of the results of various 
observations which can be made on the system by external observers. There are two 
fundamentally different ways in which the state function can change: 
Process 1: The discontinuous change brought about by the observation of a quantity 
with eigenstates φ1, φ2, · · · , in which the state ψ will be changed to the state φj with 
probability |(ψ, φj)|2. 
Process 2: The continuous, deterministic change of state of an isolated system with time 
according to a wave equation ∂ψ/∂t = Aψ, where A is a linear operator. This formulation 
describes a wealth of experience. No experimental evidence is known which contradicts it.” 
Everett questioned the whole process of measurement - the problem already well-known 
at the time - namely the fact that the von Neumann view did only fit a certain type of 
measurement but is not able the explain all of them: „Von Neumann showed how to treat a 
special class of approximate measurements by the method of projection operators. However, a 
general treatment of all approximate measurements by the method of projections operators 
can be shown to be impossible… von Neumann’s example is only a special case of a more 
general situation. Consider any measuring apparatus interacting with any object system. As a 
result of the interaction the state of the measuring apparatus is no longer capable of 
independent definition. It can be defined only relative to the state of the object system. In 
other words, there exists only a correlation between the two states of the two systems. It 
seems as if nothing can ever be settled by such a measurement.” [41] 
Furthermore Everett concentrated only on a set of measurement problems that differs 
from the von Neumann class, i.e. those excluding observers with a conscious mind and taking 
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only into the consideration devices in the role of "observers". Quoting: „Not all conceivable 
situations fit the framework of this mathematical formulation. Consider for example an 
isolated system consisting of an observer or measuring apparatus, plus an object system. Can 
the change with time of the state of the total system be described by Process 2? If so, then it 
would appear that no discontinuous probabilistic process like Process 1 can take place. If not, 
we are forced to admit that systems which contain observers are not subject to the same kind 
of quantum-mechanical description as we admit for all other physical systems. The question 
cannot be ruled out as lying in the domain of psychology. Much of the discussion of 
“observers” in quantum mechanics has to do with photoelectric cells, photographic plates, and 
similar devices where a mechanistic attitude can hardly be contested. For the following one 
can limit himself to this class of problems, if he is unwilling to consider observers in the more 
familiar sense on the same mechanistic level of analysis.” [41] 
Up to this point the Everett's conclusion is certainly correct. But what about his proposal 
for a generalization of von Neumann's method based on projection operators? One should 
perhaps anticipate some generalizations where observers with a conscious mind together with 
the devices in the role of "observers" should be put side by side in some wider context. But in 
contrast he simply attempts to remove "Process l" from the Copenhagen postulates. In 
consequence it means to get rid of two axioms, i.e. the Born rule and the von Neumann - 
Wigner rule, downgrading the Born rule, not as an axiom but as an emergent rule from 
"Process 2". Everett finally arrives at his own eccentric and surreal interpretation of quantum 
mechanics, known now as the MWI (many-worlds interpretation): „We thus arrive at the 
following picture: Throughout all of a sequence of observation processes there is only one 
physical system representing the observer, yet there is no single unique state of the observer 
(which follows from the representations of interacting systems). Nevertheless, there is a 
representation in terms of a superposition, each element of which contains a definite observer 
state and a corresponding system state. Thus with each succeeding observation (or 
interaction), the observer state “branches” into a number of different states. Each branch 
represents a different outcome of the measurement and the corresponding eigenstate for the 
object-system state. All branches exist simultaneously in the superposition after any given 
sequence of observations.” [41] 
One can assume that Everett’s understanding was inspired by Mach's principle of 
psychophysical paralysis [42] which otherwise also might have inspired Einstein in his theory 
of relativity. Everett assigns a similar role and position to the observer as ocurring in 
Einstein's theory of relativity. But there is one significant difference: Whereas in the theory of 
relativity the observer can be a "body without soul", quantum theory does not allow this in 
general. For instance the subject (the observer with conscious mind) and the object (the 
physical word) are not completely interchangeable, since there always must remain 
"something" from the object as well as from the subject. Goethe was not only a great poet but 
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a great mystic as well. Once he said: „Alles, was im Subject ist, ist im Object und noch etwas 
mehr. Alles, was im Object ist, ist im Subject und noch etwas mehr.“ [43] And just this is the 
reason why the external reality hypothesis (ERH) should not be valid any more in quantum 
physics, which incorporates the roles of both - object and subject, in contrast with classical 
physics that concentrates fully only on the external material world. ERH was reformulated by 
Tegmark [44] as follows: „There exists an external physical reality completely independent of 
us humans.” Hence Tegmark still believes in its validity and claims, and, if it is true, it is a 
sufficient condition for the justification of the MWI interpretation. 
The MWI interpretation has recently inspired many physicists in their efforts to explain 
classicality as an emergent property of open quantum systems induced by their environments. 
This is best known as the quantum decoherence program. Zurek [45] introduced a new 
vernacular to describe the process of wavefunction collapse as well as elucidate the 
emergence of classical descriptions of reality appearing from quantum descriptions viz. 
einselection, the latter standing for environment - induced superselection. Although an 
excellent idea, it was inaptly set into the framework of the Everettian MWI. Such a concept 
will not work since it leads to a circular argument and therefore was rejected by a large part of 
the scientific community. Kastner [46] did performe a detailed analysis of this circularity 
quote, unquote: „In attempting to derive irreversible macroscopic thermodynamics from 
reversible microscopic dynamics, Boltzmann inadvertently smuggled in a premise that 
assumed the very irreversibility he was trying to prove: ‘molecular chaos.’ The program of 
‘Einselection’ (environmentally induced superselection) within Everettian approaches faces a 
similar ‘Loschmidt’s Paradox’: the universe, according to the Everettian picture, is a closed 
system obeying only unitary dynamics, and it therefore contains no distinguishable 
environmental subsystems with the necessary ‘phase randomness’ to effect einselection of a 
pointer observable. The theoretically unjustified assumption of distinguishable environmental 
subsystems is the hidden premise that makes the derivation of einselection circular. In effect, 
it presupposes the ‘emergent’ structures from the beginning. Thus the problem of basis 
ambiguity remains unsolved in Everettian interpretations.” 
It's surprising how many physicists, seeing the difficulties with the wave function 
collapse and the von Neumann - Wigner interpretation, yet jump happily into the above-
mentioned decoherence program, not realizing the circularity of all these problems. For 
instance, before we can start to speak about some environmental subsystems, we must first 
attend to the third of Bohm's objections - wholeness versus fragmentation - discussed in 
section 4. Since quantum mechanics deals with isolated subsystems, hence we must decipher 
the puzzle formulated by Sutcliffe & Woolley, i.e. the isolated versus the individual, as 
considered in section 2. This is crucial to understanding the origin of ‘emergent’ structures, 
which if not will be falsely presupposed in the MWI interpretation, as Kastner correctly did 
notice. Only then can we begin a reasonable examination about the true meaning of Zurek's 
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einselection. In passing one notes that Zurek later came forward with another promising idea, 
which he called quantum Darwinism [47] as a part of universal Darwinism. The thesis of 
universal Darwinism claims that Darwinian processes are not confined to biology and can be 
applied in other scientific branches. The Darwinian algorithm consists of three parts: 1) 
random variation in mutations or recombinations; 2) selection of the fittest variants; 3) 
heredity of these features in offsprings. 
Darwin worried about randomness in the variation, since in his time classical physics 
determinism prevailed in philosophy and random processes descending from indeterministic 
principles were impermissible. This is not a problem today, when quantum physics has 
revealed such a principle. On the other hand, Darwin did not worry about the selective 
process, although he was convinced that it must be of a teleological origin, but in this case he 
was not in conflict with contemporary science. Exact sciences such as physics simply were 
and still are not able to incorporate teleology in an authentic, precise logical and mathematical 
manner, but at the same time it cannot be denied. In contrast to indeterminancy, which is 
opposite to determinancy, teleology is not opposite to causality (the opposite of "causal" is 
"acausal"). 
In a historical perspective Darwin was a teleologist. Lennox, for instance, shows in his 
paper [48] that Darwin uses the term 'Final Cause' consistently in his Species Notebook, the 
Origin of Species and also afterwards, and that evolution - as conceived by Darwin - is the 
result of mutations arising by chance and the selection which is teleological in nature. Here 
Lennox also quotes from the correspondence between Darwin and his close friend and 
colleague Asa Gray: „In an appreciation of Charles Darwin published in Nature in 1874, Asa 
Gray noted “Darwin's great service to Natural Science” lies in bringing back Teleology “so 
that, instead of Morphology versus Teleology, we shall have Morphology wedded to 
Teleology”. Darwin quickly responded, “What you say about Teleology pleases me especially 
and I do not think anyone else has ever noticed the point.”… Francis Darwin and T. H. 
Huxley reiterate this sentiment. The latter wrote that “…the most remarkable service to the 
philosophy of Biology rendered by Mr. Darwin is the reconciliation of Teleology and 
Morphology, and the explanation of the facts of both, which his view offers.”” 
Only a few biologists seem at present to be aware of the true meaning of teleology, at 
least  to the extent that was understood and expressed by Darwin. Today the majority of them 
appears quite confused. We can find many absurd propositions, such as "artificial selection is 
teleological and natural selection is not, since in the latter there is no intentional choice." 
Teleology is defined as downward causation or the final cause, and is quite independent of the 
fact whether there is some intentions behind or not. As examples one might mention two 
examples of statements from prominent biologists: a) the famous evolutionary biologist Ernst 
Mayr, although introducing a more explicit terminology, e.g. teleonomic processes as those 
owing its goal-directedness to the influence of an evolved program, expressed  [49]: 
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„adaptedness… is an a posteriori result rather than an a priori goal-seeking”, b) Madrell [50]: 
„the proper but cumbersome way of describing change by evolutionary adaptation may be 
substituted by shorter overtly teleological statements for the sake of saving space, but this 
should not be taken to imply that evolution proceeds by anything other than from mutations 
arising by chance, with those that impart an advantage being retained by natural selection.” 
One might wonder how much these attitudes of teleology of contemporary biologists really 
agrees with Darwin’s original view. 
The opinions and attitudes of most physicists regarding teleology are both negative and 
ignorant. In contrast Bohm (cf. the first objection mentioned in the section 4) warns us that 
disrespecting teleological principles prevent the construction of a full quantum theory. What 
is most surprising indeed, is that the teleology problem appeared for the first time already in 
classical physics. For instance Maxwell became immediately aware of it, when he studied the 
work of Boussinesq, Cournot, and St Venant dealing with the solution of hydrodynamic 
equations. Maxwell was fascinated by the occurrence of singular points leading to complete 
unpredictability of future states.  
On 26 February 1879, he wrote a letter to Charles Darwin's half-cousin Francis Galton 
[51]: „Do you take any interest in Fixed Fate, Free Will &c. If so Boussinesq [of hydro 
dynamic reputation] 'Conciliation du véritable déterminisme mécanique avec l'existence de la 
vie et de la liberté morale' (Paris 1878) does the whole business by the theory of singular 
solutions of the differential equations of motion… There are certain cases in which a material 
system, when it comes to a phase in which the particular path which it is describing coincides 
with the envelope of all such paths may either continue in the particular path or take to the 
envelope (which in these cases is also a possible path) and which course it takes is not 
determined by the forces of the system (which are the same for both cases) but when the 
bifurcation of path occurs, the system, ipso facto, invokes some determining principle which 
is extra physical (but not extra natural) to determine which of the two paths it is to follow. 
When it is on the enveloping path it may at any instant, at its own sweet will, without exerting 
any force or spending any energy, go off along that one of the particular paths which happens 
to coincide with the actual condition of the system at that instant… But I think Boussinesq's 
method is a very powerful one against metaphysical arguments about cause and effect and 
much better than the insinuation that there is something loose about the laws of nature, not of 
sensible magnitude but enough to bring her round in time.” 
One must admire Maxwell's brilliant insights observing how he mentions teleological 
principles: principle which is extra physical but not extra natural; principle acting without 
exerting any force or spending any energy! Certainly, classical physics was unable to 
incorporate such a principle, but it begs the question: Is it possible to accomplish this task in 
quantum physics? Unfortunately most physicists are reluctant to tackle the problem, perhaps 
being victims of "causal fundamentalism", a wording  introduced by Norton [52]: „Nature is 
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governed by cause and effect; and the burden of individual sciences is to find the particular 
expressions of the general notion in the realm of their specialized subject matter.”  
Norton continues with a pessimistic feeling of vanity and emptiness that hovers over the 
current debate on the subject of teleology: „Aristotle described four notions of cause: the 
material, efficient, final and formal; with the efficient and final conforming most closely to 
the sorts of things we would now count as a cause. The final cause, the goal towards which a 
process moves, was clearly modelled on the analogy between animate processes and the 
process of interest. In the seventeenth century, with the rise of the mechanical philosophy, it 
was deemed that final causes simply did not have the fundamental status of efficient causes 
and that all science was to be reconstructed using efficient causes alone. Although talk of final 
causes lingers on, this is a blow from which final causes have never properly recovered.” 
Here lies a profound challenge for all of us. Until the teleological principle is adequately 
implemented in the mathematical formalism of quantum theory, the whole program of 
quantum decoherence, based on universal Darwinism, suggests nothing more than many years 
of squandering time. It imparts, e.g. that the von Neumann - Wigner interpretation can never 
be removed and that the causal Born rule cannot be replaced by einselection, the latter being 
inspired by teleological Darwinian adaptedness. Instead, the Born and einselection rules 
should coexist side by side, but first after the true teleological meaning and quantum origin of 
the einselection have been revealed. 
 
 
8. The paradox of free will 
 
What is meant by the notion of free will? Does free will really exist at all? Observe that 
in the era of classical physics it was generally accepted that all things in the universe do 
evolve in a strictly deterministic manner, and hence there was obviously no room for any 
justification of a free will. But what happened after the arrival of quantum mechanics, and the 
knowledge of the indeterministic laws of quantum physics? Is this agreement sufficient to 
give a reasonable explanation of free will? As will be seen below, the problem of a proper 
understanding of our free will still remains. 
The information philosopher, Robert Doyle summarizes, in his 2011 book "The Scandal 
in Philosophy" [53], in great detail the whole history of opinions of famous philosophers and 
scientists on the topic of free will. He maintains that there prevails a sceptical view regarding 
possible satisfactory free will explanations, which he calls the "standard argument against free 
will" [53]: „The standard argument has two parts. 1) If determinism is the case, the will is not 
free. We call this the Determinism Objection. 2) If indeterminism and real chance exist, our 
will would not be in our control. We could not be responsible for our actions if they are 
random. We call this the Randomness Objection. Together, these objections can be combined 
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as a single Responsibility Objection, namely that no Free Will model has yet provided us an 
intelligible account of the agent control needed for moral responsibility.” 
From the standpoint of a historical retrospective analysis, it seems that only the two-
stage model could be a true candidate for the explanation of free will. This two-stage model 
consists of two processes: the process of random alternatives followed by the selection 
process of one choice. Doyle writes in his book that this idea appeared for the first time in 
1884 and that it was formulated by William James. As a psychologist he felt no problem in 
denying determinism in the psychological domain of free will: „The stronghold of the 
determinist argument is the antipathy to the idea of chance… This notion of alternative 
possibility, this admission that any one of several things may come to pass is, after all, only a 
roundabout name for chance.” [54] 
It is interesting to note how physicists in general accepted the two-stage model. The first 
reaction came from Poincaré, at the time when quantum indeterminism had not yet arrived. 
Hence he does not refer to the laws of physics, concentrating mostly on the role of our 
unconscious mind as a source of random combinations and possibilities, but also on our 
conscious mind where the definite process of validation occurs [55]: „It is certain that the 
combinations which present themselves to the mind in a kind of sudden illumination after a 
somewhat prolonged period of unconscious work are generally useful and fruitful 
combinations… All the combinations are formed as a result of the automatic action of the 
subliminal ego, but those only which are interesting find their way into the field of 
consciousness… A few only are harmonious, and consequently at once useful and beautiful, 
and they will be capable of affecting the geometrician's special sensibility I have been 
speaking of; which, once aroused, will direct our attention upon them, and will thus give them 
the opportunity of becoming conscious… In the subliminal ego, on the contrary, there reigns 
what I would call liberty, if one could give this name to the mere absence of discipline and to 
disorder born of chance.” 
The physicist, Sir Roger Penrose shares the synoptical view of the two-stage model with 
Poincaré, particularly as concerns the role of our unconscious and conscious minds [56]: „In 
relation to this, the question of what constitutes genuine originality should be raised. It seems 
to me that there are two factors involved, namely a 'putting-up' and a 'shooting-down' process. 
I imagine that the putting-up could be largely unconscious and the shooting-down largely 
conscious. Without an effective putting-up process, one would have no new ideas at all. But, 
just by itself, this procedure would have little value. One needs an effective procedure for 
forming judgements, so that only those ideas with a reasonable chance of success will survive. 
In dreams, for example, unusual ideas may easily come to mind, but only very rarely do they 
survive the critical judgements of the wakeful consciousness. In my opinion, it is the 
conscious shooting-down (judgement) process that is central to the issue of originality, rather 
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than the unconscious putting-up process; but I am aware that many others might hold to a 
contrary view.” 
A similar description of the two-stage model was also promoted by Compton [57]: „A 
set of known physical conditions is not adequate to specify precisely what a forthcoming 
event will be. These conditions, insofar as they can be known, define instead a range of 
possible events from among which some particular event will occur. When one exercises 
freedom, by his act of choice he is himself adding a factor not supplied by the [random] 
physical conditions and is thus himself determining what will occur.” Compton was the first 
physicist, who discussed openly the relationship between free will and the quantum 
indeterminism and the randomness on the first stage of the two-stage model, i.e. what Penrose 
calls the 'putting-up' process. On the other hand, he was very pessimistic about the scientific 
explanation of the second stage - the act of choice, or Penrose's 'shooting-down' process. 
It is notable that present-day quantum physics is still incomplete and unable to create a 
paradigmatic background for the justification of the second stage of free will [57]: „Let me 
then summarize how a physicist now views man's freedom. It is not from scientific 
observation that we know man is free. Science is incapable of telling whether a person's acts 
are free or not. Freedom is not something that one can touch or measure. We know it through 
our own innermost feelings. The first essential of freedom is the desire to attain something 
that one considers good. But desire lies outside the realm of science — at least outside of 
physics. You can't locate desire as somewhere in space. Similarly our recognition that within 
limits we can do what we try to do is not a matter of measurement or of external observation. 
It is a matter of immediate awareness. There is nothing in such awareness of freedom that is 
inconsistent with science. Freedom does, however, involve the additional determining factor 
of choice, about which science tells us nothing.” 
The citation above means that quantum theory, based on standard interpretations such as 
the orthodox Copenhagen view, forms only a necessary, but not a sufficient foundation for the 
explanation of the free will. This circumstance is clearly confirmed by Flanagan [58]: „Free 
actions, if there are any, are not deterministically caused nor are they caused by random 
processes of the sort countenanced by quantum physicists or complexity theorists. Free 
actions need to be caused by me, in a non-determined and non-random manner… I am open 
to there being genuine ontological indeterminacy at both the quantum level and the level of 
neural processing. But the attempt to gain free will from indeterminacy at the quantum level 
or at the level of global brain processes is a bad idea. The last thing anyone wants is for free 
will to be the result of random causal processes.” 
It is fetching to learn that Flanagan’s representation of "non-determinism and non-
randomness" as the main characteristics of free actions, appears under the name "adequate 
determinism" in Doyle's Cogito model [53]: „Free will is a combination of microscopic 
randomness and macroscopic adequate determinism, in a temporal sequence - first chance, 
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then choice. Creative thoughts come to us freely. But our actions come from our adequately 
determined wills. Randomness is the "free" in free will. Adequate determinism explains the 
"will" in free will.” One can understand adequate determinism as something indeterministic in 
principle, but unlike the laws of microscopic physics, it must not be random. Doyle thinks that 
a macroscopic ensemble, which statistically restrains randomness, fulfils this requirement. 
But our decisions are not statistical in character, since we often have to decide in a binary 
style such as "either - or". Moreover, our decisions have teleological traits, while the fortitude 
of macroscopic physics has nothing to do with it. One might think that Doyle is not aware of 
the incompleteness of quantum theory and therefore tries to explain free will at any cost, by 
only using the traditional understanding of quantum physics. The issue of adequate 
determinism must be solved exclusively on the quantum level. However, up til now, presently 
known interpretations of quantum theory are not capable of dealing with phenomena, which 
are simultaneously non-deterministic and non-random. 
One notes that Compton's discussion of the closeness between quantum indeterminism 
and randomness in free will finally did convince Popper, who originally denied any influence 
of microphysical laws upon the psychological domain of free will. Besides, the similarity of 
the two-stage models, used in Darwin theory and in the concept of free will, caused a radical 
change of Popper's attitude towards natural selection, which he at first deemed to be a 
"tautology" making it unfalsifiable. In his 1977 Darwin Lecture, Darwin College Cambridge, 
Popper confessed his change of mind [59] by stating: „The selection of a kind of behavior out 
of a randomly offered repertoire may be an act of choice, even an act of free will. I am an 
indeterminist; and in discussing indeterminism I have often regretfully pointed out that 
quantum indeterminacy does not seem to help us; for the amplification of something like, say, 
radioactive disintegration processes would not lead to human action or even animal action, 
but only to random movements. This is now the leading two-stage model of free will. I have 
changed my mind on this issue. A choice process may be a selection process, and the 
selection may be from some repertoire of random events, without being random in its turn. 
This seems to me to offer a promising solution to one of our most vexing problems, and one 
by downward causation.” 
This formulation anticipates the concept of unification of a single two-stage model that 
holds both for Darwinism and free will. Eccles and Popper [60] formulate the view as: „New 
ideas have a striking similarity to genetic mutations. Now, let us look for a moment at genetic 
mutations. Mutations are, it seems, brought about by quantum theoretical indeterminacy 
(including radiation effects). Accordingly, they are also probabilistic and not in themselves 
originally selected or adequate, but on them there subsequently operates natural selection 
which eliminates inappropriate mutations. Now we could conceive of a similar process with 
respect to new ideas and to free-will decisions, and similar things. That is to say, a range of 
possibilities is brought about by a probabilistic and quantum mechanically characterised set of 
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proposals, as it were – of possibilities brought forward by the brain. On these there then 
operates a kind of selective procedure which eliminates those proposals and those possibilities 
which are not acceptable to the mind.” 
Although one might, in such a way, achieve a unification of nature’s laws of biology 
and psychology, there still remains a fundamental problem: There appears a void or lack of a 
hitherto unravelled fundamental natural law in science in general and quantum theory in 
particular, which is mandatory for a proper understanding and justification of the second part 
of two-stage model. This is the conundrum of the selection process in biological evolution 
and the choice process in the psychology of free will. Contemporary quantum theory allows 
only an explanation of the first part of two-stage model, which is not sufficient for a free will 
justification. In fact this is exactly in line with Bohr's opinion [61]: „To connect free will 
more directly with the limitation of causality in atomic physics, as it is often suggested, is, 
however, entirely foreign to the tendency underlying the remarks made here about biological 
problems.” Bohr knew that quantum physics gives no answer to the selection process (the 
second part of two-stage model), and he therefore only called upon the recognition of  
relevant psychological experiences [61]: „To illustrate the argument, we may briefly refer to 
the old problem of free will. From what has already been said it is evident that the word 
volition is indispensable to an exhaustive description of psychical phenomena, but the 
problem is how far we can speak about freedom to act according to our possibilities. As long 
as unrestricted deterministic views are taken, the idea of such freedom is of course excluded. 
However, the general lesson of atomic physics, and in particular of the limited scope of 
mechanistic description of biological phenomena, suggests that the ability of organisms to 
adjust themselves to environment includes the power of selecting the most appropriate way to 
this purpose. Because it is impossible to judge such questions on a purely physical basis, it is 
most important to recognize that psychological experience may offer more pertinent 
information on the problems.” 
Bohr's statement above represents a synoptical vision, cf. the one of Eccles and Popper, 
unifying the principles behind biological and psychical phenomena. However, the problem of 
the second part of the two-stage model must indeed have a solution within a satisfactory 
extension of the present understanding of quantum theory, originally formulated for the 
description of inanimate nature, but such a solution does not yet exist on the level of quantum 
physics as restricted by the Copenhagen interpretation. 
 
 
9. The paradox of the Meissner effect 
 
The strange phenomenon of superconductivity was coined by Heike Kamerlingh Onnes 
in his two ground breaking papers [62], describing the complete disappearance of electrical 
resistance of mercury observed in 1911 by his assistant Gilles Holst at the Leiden research lab 
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later known as the Kamerlingh-Onnes laboratory. Since then superconductors have been 
regarded as ideal conductors with zero resistance. The first theoretical articles on the subject 
of superconductivity, by Becker, Heller and Sauter [63], reflected this ideal conductivity, 
deriving the relation between the current and the electrical field, replacing Ohm’s law in 
normal conductors. Starting with the expression for current 
 (9.1) 
where e is the electron charge, n the density of superconducting carriers and v the superfluid 
velocity, and further using Newton law for the carriers with mass m, they obtained the final 
expression, Becker’s law 
 (9.2) 
From (9.2) the expulsion of the magnetic field from superconductors can be predicted 
assuming that the external magnetic field was switched on after cooling below the critical 
temperature. However, if the order of these events was altered, the magnetic field was 
expected to remain inside the superconductor without any change. The subsequent experiment 
by Meissner and Ochsenfeld [64] brought a huge surprise, i.e. real superconductors, unlike 
ideal conductors, expelled the magnetic field from their interior even in the presence of a 
constant field with the succeeding transition into the superconducting state. The Meissner 
effect is hence in strong contradiction with Becker's law, since a constant field cannot produce 
any electromotive force bringing superconducting carriers in motion. 
Two years later the so-called London equations were derived by Heinz and Fritz 
London [65] yielding phenomenological equations in compliance with the Meissner effect. 
First by using Faraday’s law 
 (9.3) 
they rewrote the Becker's equation (9.2) in its curl form 
 
 (9.4) 
and then integrating it over time 
 (9.5) 
putting the integration constant to zero as a specific ansatz for true superconductors, where 
the London equation (9.5) replaces Ohm’s law in conductors. Applying Ampere’s law 
 (9.6) 
this equation can be written in the form 
 (9.7) 
where λ stands for the London penetration depth 
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 (9.8) 
 
The London equation (9.5) differs from the Becker's one (9.4) in one small detail: an 
ansatz in the form of zero integration constant, corresponding to the simple but important fact, 
that real superconductors, in contrast to ideal conductors, exhibits no memory effects.  
An similar distinction is observed for the case of rotating objects, i.e. both ideal 
conductors and superconductors exhibit the same behavior, if they are accelerated below the 
critical temperature. Becker & al. [63] derived the relation between the angular velocity w and 
a generated magnetic field in the interior of ideal conductor. Substituting for v in Eq. (9.1) i.e. 
 
 (9.9) 
 
one obtains from the Becker's equation (9.4) after integration the final relation 
 
 (9.10) 
 
If an ideal conductor is first accelerated and subsequently cooled, instead of (9.10) after the 
integration, we get only the trivial solution with B equal to zero. Related to the Meissner 
effect, Fritz London [66] predicted an analogous effect also for rotating superconductors, 
where the Becker's relation (9.10) holds for superconductors regardless of its history, i.e. 
including the case when acceleration occurred first, followed by the cooling. London's 
derivation of Eq. (9.10) is based on a direct substitution in his Eq. (9.5), so that the generated 
magnetic field would always be the same, independent of the order of the acceleration and the 
cooling events. The generated magnetic moment is called the London moment. London's 
prediction for rotating superconductors was for the first time experimentally verified in 1964 
by Hildebrandt [67]. 
It is intriguing to ask whether London's ansatz to Becker's equations is necessary? 
Alternatively, can we have an ansatz-free classical description of superconductors with an ab-
initio derivation of the London equations based solely on the laws of classical mechanics and 
classical electrodynamics? This question has in fact divided the scientific community into two 
camps. For instance equation (9.5) was elegantly derived by de Gennes [68] by minimizing 
the total energy. He wrote the expressions for the kinetic energy and the energy of magnetic 
field: 
 (9.11) 
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 (9.12) 
Using Ampere’s law (9.6) the total energy reads 
 
 (9.13) 
 
and by minimizing this expression with respect to B he got 
 
 (9.14) 
which is exactly the London equation (9.7). This derivation was recapitulated by Essén and 
Fiolhais quoting [69]: „The conclusion of de Gennes is clearly stated in his 1965 book [68] 
(emphasis from the original): "The superconductor finds an equilibrium state where the sum 
of the kinetic and magnetic energies is minimum, and this state, for macroscopic samples, 
corresponds to the expulsion of magnetic flux." In spite of this, most textbooks continue to 
state that "flux expulsion has no classical explanation" as originally stated by Meissner and 
Ochsenfeld [64] and repeated in the influential monographs by Fritz London [66] and Nobel 
laureate Max von Laue [70].“ They continue with a list of authors preferring classical 
derivations of the Meissner effect [69]: „Many other authors have also reached the conclusion 
that the equilibrium state of a superconductor is in fact the state of minimum magnetic energy 
of an ideal conductor. Some of these are, in chronological order, Cullwick [71], Pfleiderer 
[72], Karlsson [73], Badía-Majós [74], Kudinov [75], and Mahajan [76]. For example, 
Cullwick writes "The well-known Meissner effect in pure superconductors is shown to be an 
expected rather than an unexpected phenomenon...". " And finally quoting [69]: „The reader 
may get the impression from our investigations above that we consider superconductivity to 
be a classical phenomenon. Nothing could be further from the truth... Since quantum physics 
must lead to classical physics in some macroscopic limit, it must be possible to derive our 
classical result from a quantum perspective. What we want to correct is the mis-statement that 
the Meissner effect proves that superconductors are "not just perfect conductors." According 
to basic physics and a large number of independent investigators, the specific phenomenon of 
flux expulsion follows naturally from classical physics and the zero resistance property of the 
superconductors — they are just perfect conductors.“ 
Summarizing this is the paradox of the Meissner effect. We have two camps of 
physicists - the first follows Meissner and London, and claims, that superconductivity in 
contrast to ideal conductivity has no classical explanation, and that quantum physics is 
necessary for its explanation. The second camp on the other hand identifies superconductors 
with perfect classical conductors. Who is right? A personal answer might appear shocking: no 
one! Perhaps a more correct resolution of this dilemma, caused by the two factions of 
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physicists, might open the door for an understanding of the true nature of superconductivity, 
helping us to find accurate equations and precise descriptions and explanation. 
As one can see, Becker's and London's equations are almost identical except one small 
but important difference: the latter ones have no history, indicating that causality is broken. 
Now, does some archetype of causality breaking occur in classical physics? Yes, it does and it 
refers back to Norton’s dome, described in Ch. 3 "A-causality in Classical Physics", Ref. [52]: 
„The dome sits in a downward directed gravitational field, with acceleration due to gravity g. 
The dome has a radial coordinate r inscribed on its surface and is rotationally symmetric 
about the origin r = 0, which is also the highest point of the dome. The shape of the dome is 
given by specifying h, how far the dome surface lies below this highest point, as a function of 
the radial coordinate in the surface, r. For simplicity of the mathematics, we shall set h = 
(2/3g)r3/2. (Many other profiles, though not all, exhibit analogous a-causality.)“ Norton’s 
dome has two kinds of solutions. The first one is trivial and describes the situation where the 
mass simply remains at rest at the apex for all time: 
 
 (9.15) 
The second corresponds to another large class of unexpected solutions. For any radial 
direction the following equations hold: 
 
 (9.16a) 
 (9.16b) 
where T is an arbitrarily chosen, positive constant. 
For this reason, the paradox associated with the Meissner effect appears to be of the 
same origin as the Norton dome paradox. From the point of view of classical physics ideal 
conductors and superconductors represent one common Norton-dome-like system with two 
solutions: one causal for ideal conductivity with the trivial solution, and one teleonomic for 
superconductivity, allowing the application of the principle of energy minimum reminiscent 
of de Gennes’ derivation of London’s equation. It is really a curiosity of classical physics, that 
both solutions - causal and telic - are still entirely consistent with the mathematics of 
Newton's laws of motion. Unfortunately, the teleological features of superconductivity have 
not yet been revealed, so a true understanding of this phenomenon has remained concealed. 
The Nobel Laureates Ginzburg and Landau elaborated the description and the structure 
of the classical phenomenological description of superconductors by simulating the free 
energy F in terms of a complex order parameter Y [77]: 
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which after minimizing with respect to variations in the order parameter Y and the vector 
potential A leads to the celebrated Ginzburg-Landau equations. Eq. (9.17), where a, b are 
phenomenological parameters, contains both quadratic and biquadratic functions of the order 
parameter, forming the well-known Mexican hat, which is similar to the Norton dome, albeit 
being fully Lipschitz continuous. Actually, the solution of Eq. (9.17) based on the 
minimization process corresponds to the acausal Norton dome solution (9.16). 
Returning to the controversy, related to the interpretation of the Meissner effect, it is 
true that both camps believe in the universal validity and consequences of Bohr’s 
correspondence principle, i.e. that provided ideal conductors are (are not) identical with 
superconductors in classical physics, they are (are not) identical in quantum physics as well, 
and vice versa. Adding the fact, that superconductivity has a teleonomic component, Bohr’s 
correspondence principle does not hold in this case, since quantum physics, at least in its 
Copenhagen version, is solely causal. This limitation of the Copenhagen interpretation was 
confronted by Bohm in his first critical point discussed in section 4. The consequences of this 
ignorance are significant. As already stated, quantum physics cannot deal with teleological 
phenomena implying that it, in view of what has been said above, cannot explain 
superconductivity. It can hence only describe superconductors and distinguish them from 
ideal conductors. Taking the point further, it cannot realize telicity in the superconducting 
phenomenon, indicating that the only possibility to describe superconductors within quantum 
physics would be to regard them as insulators. Of course, the official attitude of physicists 
today is different and the majority still believes that superconductivity is essentially explained 
within the framework of quantum physics. Nonetheless, such calculations were not fully 
logical since they conflated the classical teleological Norton-dome-like potentials with 
microscopic quantization procedures. 
So we reach a fascinating conclusion: Classical physics does not distinguish 
superconductors from ideal conductors (it views them as one system with two possible 
solutions - one teleological, one causal), whereas quantum physics on the other hand does not 
distinguish them from insulators (since the Bohr principle of correspondence cannot be 
applied to teleological phenomena). We bring forward now three other confirmations that 
contemporary quantum physics, based on the Copenhagen interpretation, cannot really 
explain superconductivity. 
Quantum theory of superconductivity must necessarily explain the Meissner effect. But 
it was never done: either in the first officially accepted microscopic BCS theory [78], or in 
any of its clones or replacements. The problem is that the electromotive forces described by 
Faraday's law of induction are equal to zero in stationary conditions of the Meissner effect, 
whereas the existing theories do not suggest any other electric forces needed to accelerate the 
electrons until the steady state supercurrent described by the London equation is achieved. 
Many physicists were inspired by this problem, and in the last decade we have observed 
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several attempts to solve it, but such solutions go beyond the boundaries of contemporary 
classical or quantum physics. E.g. Kozynchenko [79] proposed a way out that requires an ad-
hoc reformulation of the laws of classical electrodynamics for superconductors. On the other 
hand, Hirsch [82] did submit another solution, transcending ad-hoc laws of quantum physics. 
As he wrote many notable and significant articles devoted to this topic, we will quote and 
discuss some of them below. 
In his paper "The origin of the Meissner effect in new and old superconductors" Hirsch  
[80] summarizes the position of all contemporary theories of superconductivity particularly 
regarding their inability to explain the Meissner effect: „In a somewhat circular argument, a 
‘conventional’ superconductor is defined to be a superconductor described by BCS theory. In 
addition there are by now at least 10 different classes of materials that are generally believed 
to be ‘unconventional’, i.e. not described by BCS theory... And certainly there is no single 
‘unconventional mechanism’ proposed to describe all unconventional superconductors: new 
mechanisms are being proposed that apply specifically to one family only, e.g. the cuprates, 
or the iron pnictides, or the heavy fermion superconductors. However all superconductors, 
whether conventional or not, exhibit the Meissner effect. I argue that BCS theory cannot 
explain the Meissner effect, so it cannot explain any superconductor. Furthermore, none of the 
unconventional mechanisms proposed to explain ‘unconventional’ superconductivity has 
addressed the question of how to explain the Meissner effect. I argue that none of these 
mechanisms describe any superconductor because they cannot explain the Meissner effect.“ 
The problem of the transition into the superconducting state after cooling is not the only 
one. For instance, what goes on when, beyond the critical temperature, a superconductor 
becomes conductor again. What happens with the momentum of the supercurrent? Hirsch, in 
his paper "The disappearing momentum of the supercurrent in the superconductor to normal 
phase transformation" [81] writes: „A conundrum that didn’t exist before was thus created by 
Meissner’s discovery: if there are no collision processes that dissipate Joule heat in the 
superconductor-to-normal transition in the presence of a magnetic field, what happens to the 
mechanical momentum of the disappearing current? The kinetic energy of the current is 
‘stored’ in the normal state electronic state, but its momentum is not. Of course the only 
possible answer is that the momentum of the current is transmitted to the body as a whole. But 
what is the physical mechanism by which this transfer of momentum happens with no energy 
transfer and no energy dissipation? Surprisingly this basic and fundamental question has 
never been asked (nor answered) in the extensive literature on superconductivity since 1933 
(213,616 papers according to the Web of Science).“ 
In the author’s opinion, Hirsch is absolutely right, as far as the two statements given 
above. Does it mean that the Meissner effect and superconductivity have no quantum physical 
solutions? Hirsch thinks that they have, and revives in his work "The Bohr superconductor" 
[82] some old ideas from the pre-BCS era. He shows that any superconductor, described 
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classically, is equivalent to a system of charge carriers rotating in the whole bulk in orbits of 
radius 2λ. He presents several ways of solution; the simplest and most transparent is the 
following: The total angular momentum of the Meissner current in a long cylinder of radius R 
and height d with applied magnetic field parallel to the cylinder axis can be written in the two 
equivalent forms 
 
 (9.18) 
where the first expression describes the angular momentum of the supercurrent flowing within 
λ of the surface, and the second one describes the angular momentum of all the charge carriers 
in the bulk in their orbits of radius 2λ. The angular momentum of each electron in its circular 
orbit yields 
 (9.19) 
From these results Hirsch infers: „It is natural to conclude that electrons reside in such orbits 
even in the absence of an applied magnetic field, as opposed to assuming that the 2λ orbits are 
somehow ‘created’ by the applied field... It should be noted that the hypothesis that 
superconducting electrons reside in large orbits was made by several researchers in the pre-
BCS era [83–85].“ 
At this point a serious problem appears, i.e. when the classical concept of mesoscopic 
orbits is quantized (for details of the derivation of quantum equations see the original paper). 
This forces Hirsch to declare that such a solution exceeds the rules of quantum physics: „The 
Bohr atom starts from some simple assumptions and deduces that the angular momentum of 
the electron in Bohr orbits is quantized in integer units of ħ... Similarly we point out here that 
from some simple assumptions it can be deduced that electrons in superconductors reside in 
mesoscopic orbits with orbital angular momentum ħ/2... The fact that the orbital angular 
momentum in these orbits in the superconductor is found to be a half integer rather than an 
integer multiple of ħ is very remarkable. The correct interpretation of this finding could have 
profound implications. We have suggested that it indicates an intrinsic double-valuedness of 
the electron wavefunction, in contradiction with conventional quantum mechanics. Other less 
radical interpretations may be possible.“ Hirsch closes his paper, expressing his desire to find 
the wavefunction, that will obey the above mentioned concept of mesoscopic electron orbits: 
„What we are proposing is that the correct wavefunction of the superconductor, when it is 
found, will necessarily show physical properties consistent with the picture provided by 
quantized 2λ orbits with angular momentum ħ/2 and the associated macroscopically 
inhomogeneous charge distribution. The BCS wavefunction does not.“ 
No one up to now has been lucky to discover such a wavefunction, including Hirsch 
himself. According to Bohr’s principle of correspondence, this wavefunction must exist being 
derived ab initio from first principles, i.e. only from the knowledge of the Schrödinger 
equation taking into account a certain number of nuclei and electrons. One should note that 
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superconductors are crystals with the same discrete translational symmetry as other solids, yet 
from a mathematical point of view it is impossible to find some type of "rotational symmetry" 
leading to the solution of mesoscopic circle orbits. How is it possible to unravel such a 
puzzle? The answer is simple repeating the statement that Bohr’s principle of correspondence 
for superconductors is broken and quantum physics is unable to explain them. 
Continuing the focus will be set on the problem of rotating superconductors, especially 
on the relation between the magnetic field and the angular velocity (9.10). The obvious 
question befalls: what type of mass m does appear in this equation? Is it a bare or an effective 
electron mass? Hirsch argues in his paper "The London moment: what a rotating 
superconductor reveals about superconductivity" [86] and quotes a huge number of 
experimental work dealing with measurements of both the low-Tc as well as the high-Tc  
superconductors. The results confirm without exception the validity of using the bare electron 
mass in the Eq. (9.10). Hirsch continues: „BCS theory does not describe any change in the 
character of the electronic states other than the pairing correlations, and the electric current in 
the normal state is carried by carriers with effective mass m* rather than bare mass m, so BCS 
theory is in disagreement with experiment. Furthermore, BCS theory attributes the pairing of 
the carriers to the electron-phonon interaction, which is completely inconsistent with the 
evidence that superfluid carriers become free of interactions with the ionic lattice.“ 
Hirsch further proposes the concept of mesoscopic orbits as a possible solution for the 
mass problem in the London moment. As already mentioned, no one has found any 
microscopic wave function describing such mesoscopic orbits, since it is impossible to derive 
from the mathematical aspects of crystal symmetry. Does there exist some microscopic 
explanations in favor of the bare mass? Naturally one cannot avoid the universal concept of 
Bloch states for the description of carriers, and it does not matter if these carriers are paired or 
unpaired. If they represent original electrons or are replaced by polarons, bipolarons etc., we 
will always arrive at the effective mass which contradicts the experimental facts of the bare 
mass in the London moment. For the third time we conclude that Bohr’s principle of 
correspondence is broken for superconductors and quantum physics is unable to explain them. 
Finally we turn our attention to the experimental constituent in Eq. (9.1). While the 
macroscopic current is measurable, the density and velocity of carriers are not. In his last 
paper [87] Hirsch proposes a method for the velocity measurement: „Experimentally the 
speed of the supercurrent in superconductors has never been measured and has been argued to 
be non-measurable, however we point out that it is in principle measurable by a Compton 
scattering experiment. We predict that such experiments will show that superfluid carriers 
respond to an applied magnetic field according to their bare mass, in other words, that they 
respond as free electrons, undressed from the electron-ion interaction, rather than as Bloch 
electrons.“ 
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If superconductivity is going to have a microscopic explanation, Hirsch’s request is 
absolutely legitimate. The velocity of carriers in superconductors must be measurable in the 
same manner as in conductors. Does this indicate that experimental physicists are lazy, 
incompetent or badly equipped? Certainly not! They must have deeper reasons why such 
measurements are infeasible. Hence, for the fourth time we conclude that for superconductors  
Bohr’s principle of correspondence is broken and quantum physics is unable to explain them. 
Since the discovery of high-Tc superconductivity dozens, of various microscopic 
theories have been proposed. Every theory starts from some effective Hamiltonian, from 
which the macroscopic phase of the supercurrent should be derived.. To the present day there 
is no agreement among scientists, which one is natural, correct, proper, exact or authentic. 
Every theory attempts to see something in place of the supercurrent carriers. We argue that a 
true microscopic theory must not see anything, i.e. must describe superconductors as 
insulators, because the explanation of teleological traits in the phenomenon of 
superconductivity goes beyond quantum physics as being limited by the Copenhagen 
interpretation. 
In this section we have discussed various attempts to explain and understand the 
Meissner effect, requiring always some ad hoc extension beyond either the classical or the 
quantum physical formulation. Moreover, if looking at any author, who tries to find some 
causal origin of the Meissner effect, one always see huge complicated drawings of possible 
mechanisms along with long causal chains. One can interminably ask what is behind the 
specification of the first link of the chain and what is its own cause. Such drawings remind us 
of medieval designs for the construction of a perpetuum mobile. 
However, the problem of so-called teleological phenomena is quite different. Its 
characteristics are not ad hoc only for the Meissner effect and superconductivity. As we will 
demonstrate in the next section, it has played an enormous role in understanding the 
electroweak and the strong interactions, and, as we have mentioned in section 5, it also 
concerns Universal Darwinism. From here it has inspired quantum decoherence and, as 
outlined in section 6, contributed to the elucidation of our decisions in the problem of free 
will. Phrased differently, in the Meissner effect we have encountered a teleological principle, 
which exceeds the domains of superconductivity and solid state physics in general and, in an 
astonishing way, reaches three major provinces of the world; inanimate nature, animate 
nature, and psychology. 
 
 
10. The paradox of Higgs bosons 
 
As we have seen the teleological principle has not been acknowledged as a compelling 
argument for the understanding of the phenomenon of superconductivity, which led the 
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scientific community to accepting causal quantum-physical explanations such as the BCS 
theory. This did impact the construction of elementary particle mechanisms, which, to a high 
degree, were inspired by the BCS theory of superconductivity. The most famous example is 
the celebrated Higgs mechanism, incorporated in the Standard model, with the aim to explain 
how particles in the electro-weak interaction gain their mass. Since teleological phenomena 
violate Bohr’s principle of correspondence, it is not surprising, when Comay [88], after a 
careful analysis of Higgs equations, came to the conclusion that they violate the Bohr 
principle as well. Comay's analysis is based on well-known cornerstones such as the 
variational principle, special relativity, Maxwellian electrodynamics and the fundamental 
elements of quantum field theory. Additionally, Comay insists on the necessity to test every 
quantum-physical equation, according to a wider sense of Bohr's correspondence principle, 
stated by the present version of Wikipedia as: „The term is also used more generally, to 
represent the idea that a new theory should reproduce the results of older well-established 
theories (which become limiting cases) in those domains where the old theories work.” 
Three basic testings of the quantum-physical equations are mentioned, i.e. the equation 
for the action 
 (10.1) 
the Euler-Lagrange equation of the Lagrangian density L 
 
 
(10.2) 
and the Hamiltonian density H, obtained from the Lagrangian density L by means of the 
Legendre transformation 
 (10.3) 
Comay [88] made four main contentions against the quantum theoretical consistency of the 
Higgs mechanism. Using units, ħ = c = 1, the Higgs boson Lagrangian density writes in the 
following compact form: 
 (10.4) 
 
where  is the scalar function of the Higgs boson, m denotes the Higgs mass and OT denotes 
other terms (cubic etc.). 
The first Comay argument avers: The action S in Eq. (10.1) is a dimensionless Lorentz 
scalar, while the Lagrangian density L in (10.1) and (10.4) is a Lorentz scalar whose 
dimension is [L‒4]. Hence, the first term of (10.4) proves that the dimension of the Higgs 
function  is [L‒1]. Since the density of a quantum particle is given in terms of its wave 
function 
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 (10.5) 
the Schrödinger density satisfies the continuity equation, with the dimension of the wave 
function is [L‒3/2]. The difference in dimensions between the Higgs and the Schrödinger 
functions indicates that Higgs theory does not have a non-relativistic limit. This is an 
inconsistency in the broader sense of  Bohr's correspondence principle. 
The second Comay argument reads: The Higgs function  is a scalar function whose 
dimension is [L‒1]. Hence, the product  is a scalar with dimension [L‒2]. On the other 
hand, the density is the zeroth component of a 4-vector whose dimension is [L‒3]. Hence, the 
product  does not represent the density of the Higgs boson. This is another inconsistency 
of the Higgs theory with the Bohr's correspondence principle. 
The third Comay argument says: Examining the Euler-Lagrange equation of the Higgs 
boson, one finds, applying Eq. (10.2) to Higgs Lagrangian density (10.4), the following 
equation for : 
 (10.6) 
 
The Euler-Lagrange equation of the particle's Lagrangian density must agree with the 
fundamental quantum mechanical equation, the Schrödinger equation, which is a first order 
differential equation with respect to the time variable. But the Euler-Lagrange equation of the 
Higgs boson is a second order differential equation with respect to the time variable. Hence, 
the Bohr's correspondence principle is violated again. 
The fourth Comay argument yields: Applying (10.3) to (10.4), one obtains for the Higgs 
Hamiltonian density 
 
 (10.7) 
 
The first term in (10.7) proves that the Higgs Hamiltonian must depend on a time-derivative 
of the Higgs function . This is yet another inconsistency of Higgs theory in relation to the 
broader sense of Bohr's correspondence principle, since the Schrödinger Hamiltonian is 
independent of the time derivatives of the wave function. 
Further arguments can be found in Comay's original paper, e.g. the analysis of the Higgs 
energy-momentum tensor that depends quadratically on its mass m contradicting its classical 
correspondence of linear dependency on the mass. Comay himself views the main problem of 
Higgs theory by the fact that Higgs equation belongs to the Klein-Gordon family. He cites 
Dirac's opinion on this issue [89]: „I found this development quite unacceptable. It meant 
departing from the fundamental ideas of the non-relativistic quantum mechanics, ideas which 
demanded a wave equation linear in ¶/¶t. It meant abandoning the whole beautiful 
mathematical scheme for the sake of introducing certain physical ideas.” In fact Comay at last 
appeals: „The present work provides further arguments that support Dirac's opinion... The 
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quite large numbers of contradictions of the Higgs boson theory which are described in this 
work make a basis for the expectation that this theory will be abandoned.” 
In fact physicists usually do concentrate on the problem of renormalizability of field 
theories, yet it seems that the significance of Comay's results is the proof of a total failure of 
Bohr’s principle of correspondence in relation to the Higgs mechanism. It has remained 
unnoticed or fully ignored by the scientific community. Comay's analysis focuses on the final 
stage of the long-termed development of the Higgs mechanism in its resulting equations. It is 
clear that one have to find the crucial mistake in the whole process proving that quantum 
physics must be "on guard" as regards the principle of causality, and further not allowing the 
incorporation of the teleological "Mexican hat" potential into the quantum equation. This will 
prohibit the Higgs equation to follow from “true” quantum physics. We will begin with a brief 
recapitulation of the history from the main papers, the ideas of which were later used in the 
formulation of the Higgs mechanism, continuing with the simplest example of the Abelian 
version of the mechanism, which is now regarded as the model for the explanation of the 
phenomenon of superconductivity. 
As we have mentioned in the  previous section, the Mexican hat in a classical setting 
was for the first time adopted into a macroscopic formulation of superconductivity in 1950 by 
Ginzburg and Landau [77], leading to a spontaneous breaking of symmetry. The first accepted 
microscopic theory of superconductivity [78], the BCS model from 1957 did not mention the 
Mexican hat at all and was derived without any reference to any symmetry violations. The 
ideas leading to the phenomenological Ginzburg-Landau theory including the Mexican hat 
were for the first time translated into quantum field theory in 1961 by Nambu and Jona-
Lasinio [90]. However, during the same year, serious problems surfaced when Goldstone 
formulated his theorem [91] stating: „The spontaneous breaking of a continuous symmetry 
can be associated with a massless and spinless particle, the so called Nambu-Goldstone 
boson“. The Goldstone theorem, proved one year later by Goldstone, Salam and Weinberg 
[92], disqualified the Nambu–Jona-Lasinio model. Since it is difficult to find, from the 
general proof [92], the particles that could serve as ‘Goldstone bosons’, it was believed that 
the application of spontaneous symmetry violations in field theory, such as the model of 
Nambu and Jona-Lasinio, would be impossible. 
In the same year, 1962, Schwinger [93] proposed the possibility of combining mass 
with gauge fields. It caused an immediate revival of the old gauge theories from 1954 of Yang 
and Mills [94], dealing with an extension of the concept of gauge theory considered for 
Abelian groups used in quantum electrodynamics, to non-Abelian groups, in an attempt to 
explain strong interactions. In order to preserve gauge invariance, the Yang–Mills field must 
only give rise to massless particles. One year later, Anderson being inspired by the Goldstone 
theorem, Schwinger's idea and the Yang-Mills theory, wrote an article [95] about the possible 
violation of Goldstone’s theorem in superconductors: „Schwinger has pointed out that the 
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Yang-Mills vector boson implied by associating a generalized gauge transformation with a 
conservation law... does not necessarily have zero mass... We show that the theory of plasma 
oscillations is a simple nonrelativistic example exhibiting all of the features of Schwinger's 
idea... The boson, which appears as a result of the Goldstone theorem and has zero 
unrenormalized mass, is converted into a finite-mass plasmon by the interaction with the 
appropriate gauge field, which is the electromagnetic field.” In his article Anderson suggested 
that a similar process in particle physics could be responsible for giving mass to Yang-Mills 
gauge bosons, further adding: „It is likely, then, considering the superconducting analogue, 
that the way is now open for a degenerate-vacuum theory of the Nambu type without any 
difficulties involving either zero-mass Yang-Mills gauge bosons or zero-mass Goldstone 
bosons. These two types of bosons seem capable of “cancelling each other out” and leaving 
only finite mass bosons.” It is symptomatic that Anderson's statement became the hint that 
soon led to the development of the Higgs mechanism. 
It is straightforward to work out the derivation of the Abelian Higgs equations for 
superconductors, which the reader can find in most current textbooks dealing with the Higgs 
mechanism. The Langrangian density is formulated in a quantum version of the classical 
Ginzburg-Landau theory, with quadratic and quartic powers of the potential, imitating the 
Mexican hat. 
 (10.8) 
where F and D are defined by means of the electromagnetic potential A and the charge q: 
 
 (10.9) 
The complex field (x), simulating the Mexican hat, may then be expressed by means of two 
real fields η(x) and ξ(x) and a real number v: 
 (10.10) 
The Lagrangian density (10.8) then takes the form: 
 
 (10.11) 
where OT stands for cubic and quartic terms. The terms between the second square brackets 
represent a massive scalar particle with mass mη = (-2)1/2µ. The third term is a massless scalar 
particle. The occurrence of this particle was inferred from the shape of the Mexican hat 
potential with the degree of freedom connected to the angular displacement. A motion in this 
direction does not face any resistance since the energy in the adjacent state is the same. This 
field is therefore massless and was identified with the Goldstone boson. 
After the application of the gauge transformation for the electromagnetic field 
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 (10.12) 
with the specific substitution for θ(x) 
 (10.13) 
one arrives at the final Abelian Higgs equation for the Lagrangian density 
 
 (10.14) 
The Higgs theory contains no massless particles, since the field ξ(x) has entirely 
disappeared. The gauge symmetry, unlike any global symmetry, does not lead to massless 
Goldstone bosons, but instead ends up with a massive gauge field. The final Lagrangian 
contains only a massive gauge boson A´µ(x) (first part) and a massive component of the Higgs 
field η(x) (second part). The first part is viewed as the quantum representation of the classical 
London equation (9.7) and is usually interpreted as the formation of massive photons inside 
superconductors. 
Starting the examination of the Higgs mechanism with Anderson’s original paper [95], 
we will pay special attention to the last sentence in the following quote: „I should like to close 
with one final remark on the Goldstone theorem. This theorem was initially conjectured, one 
presumes, because of the solid-state analogues, via the work of Nambu and of Anderson. The 
theorem states, essentially, that if the Lagrangian possesses a continuous symmetry group 
under which the ground or vacuum state is not invariant, that state is, therefore, degenerate 
with other ground states. This implies a zero-mass boson. Thus, the solid crystal violates 
translational and rotational invariance, and possesses phonons;...” 
One may ask whether Anderson, in view of what has been said here, really appreciated 
the content of the Goldstone theorem? Quasiparticles, representing collective oscillations in 
condensed matter were known long before the Goldstone theorem was formulated. When it 
was proved, it was sometimes easy to assign them to Goldstone bosons and corresponding 
broken symmetries, and sometimes not. For instance, magnons in ferromagnets are Goldstone 
bosons descending from broken rotational symmetry, or longitudinal phonons in liquids are 
Goldstone bosons of the broken Galilean symmetry. But what about solids? Anderson claims, 
that "the solid crystal violates translational and rotational invariance, and possesses phonons". 
However, not so, phonons are the consequence of a broken Galilean symmetry, and further, 
which Goldstone bosons correspond to the broken translational and rotational symmetry in 
crystals? Unfortunately one can find no answers to this question in Anderson's papers. 
One might try to find an answer to the question: what are the Goldstone bosons in solids 
in Wikipedia. A recent reply reads: „In solids, the situation is more complicated; the 
Goldstone bosons are the longitudinal and transverse phonons and they happen to be the 
Goldstone bosons of spontaneously broken Galilean, translational, and rotational symmetry 
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with no simple one-to-one correspondence between the Goldstone modes and the broken 
symmetries.” 
Although Wikipedia occasionally must be taken with a grain of salt, the sentence “No 
simple one-to-one correspondence between the Goldstone modes and broken symmetries” is 
surprising! Since the Goldstone theorem is a complement of Noether’s first  theorem, the 
claim is equivalent to saying that the conservation laws for linear and angular momentum may 
not be in a simple one-to-one correspondence with translational and rotational symmetry. 
Consequently a unique and unambiguous one-to-one correspondence between the Goldstone 
modes and spontaneously broken symmetries in solids must necessarily exist! The conclusion 
must be that phonons in solids do not represent the full set of Goldstone bosons, and some 
bosons are still missing. It is better if we in the future would add this issue to the list of 
unsolved problems of quantum physics rather than sweeping it under the carpet. 
Principally we should concentrate our energies on hunting for the lost Goldstone bosons 
in solids. Supposing that a solid is composed of N nuclei, the whole system has 3N degrees of 
freedom. The quantum mechanical treatment eliminates 6 degrees associated with the centre 
of mass, and the remaining 3N - 6 degrees after the Galilean symmetry breaking represent the 
vibrational modes, the phonons. At the first sight it seems that the violation of translational 
and rotational invariance has no counterpart in the form of the existence of the corresponding 
Goldstone bosons. One may ask whether this is really true. Does the quantum field share the 
centre of mass separation with quantum mechanics considering the same system? The answer 
is no. We will provide a proof in the next section and show: first, qualitatively the appearance 
of the 6 lost Goldstone bosons, and second, quantitatively their contributions to the quantum 
field equations together with the experimental evidence. It means that every solid composed 
of N nuclei has precisely 3N spontaneously broken symmetries with the exact correspondence 
to the emerging 3N Goldstone bosons. This rule holds universally, regardless of the size of N, 
i.e. if it is small or great, if it represents finite molecule or infinite crystal, and irrespective of 
the solid character, i.e. if it is insulator, conductor, semiconductor, or superconductor. 
Returning to Eq. (10.10) where the field ξ(x) relates to the degrees of freedom 
connected with the angular displacement in the Mexican hat. The field corresponding to the 
Lagrangian density in Eq. (10.11) results in a massless scalar particle that was identified with 
the Goldstone boson, or is it really so? As just said above, every solid produces exactly 3N 
Goldstone bosons. Thus the massless scalar particle descending from the field ξ(x) cannot 
really be a Goldstone boson! It rather looks like the following. Instead of loosing six authentic 
Goldstone bosons in the solid suddenly one imposter Goldstone boson pops up in the 
superconductor. Thus we end up with the illusive equation (10.11) without the chance to 
discuss the rest of the Higgs equations which became misleading as well. This should be the 
end of Anderson's textual description about the gauge bosons eating the Goldstone bosons, on 
the basis of which the anticipated Higgs mechanism was created. 
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We will close this section with a philosophical consideration of the Higgs mechanism. 
One of the best reflections I have found was written by Earman [96]: „Higgs further showed 
that the gauge could be chosen so that the Goldstone bosons are suppressed and that in this 
“unitary gauge” the new field had acquired a mass. As the semi-popular presentations put it, 
“Particles get their masses by eating the Higgs field.” Readers of Scientific American can be 
satisfied with these just-so stories. But philosophers of science should not be. For a genuine 
property like mass cannot be gained by eating descriptive fluff, which is just what gauge is. 
Philosophers of science should be asking the Nozick question: What is the objective (i.e. 
gauge invariant) structure of the world corresponding to the gauge theory presented in the 
Higgs mechanism? ...consider the following three-tiered dilemma. First tier: Either the gauge 
invariant content of the Higgs mechanism is described by local quantum fields satisfying the 
standard assumptions of Poincaré invariance, local commutativity, spectrum condition, etc. or 
not. If not, then the implementation of the Higgs mechanism requires a major overhaul of 
conventional QFT. If so, go to the second tier. Second tier: Either the gauge invariant system 
admits a finite dimensional Lie group as an internal symmetry group or not. If so, Noether’s 
first theorem applies again. But (since the other standard assumptions are in place) 
Goldstone’s theorem also applies and, hence, Goldstone bosons have not been suppressed 
after all. If not, go to the third tier. Third tier: Either the gauge invariant system admits no 
non-trivial symmetries at all or else it admits only discrete symmetries. In either case 
Goldstone bosons are quashed. In the former case spontaneous symmetry breaking is not an 
issue since there is no symmetry to break. In the latter case it is possible that the discrete 
symmetry is spontaneously broken. But the usual argument for symmetry breaking using the 
conserved Noether current does not apply. And while it is possible that some completely 
different sort of construction will demonstrate the spontaneous breakdown of the 
hypothesized discrete symmetry there are no extant demonstrations that have more than a 
hand waving force.” 
If we compare our analysis of the Goldstone theorem with the Earman's multi-tier 
reflection, it is obvious that the whole chain ends at the second tier, i.e. the Goldstone bosons 
have not been suppressed after all. The rest is nothing but metaphysics. In fact Higgs named 
his Nobel lecture "Evading the Goldstone theorem" [97], but this was no evasion rather a total 
misreading of this theorem. Anderson's stimulating paper [95] was indeed an incorrect 
marking, misleading Higgs and his co-authors on a lost course. 
 
 
11. The paradox of the centre of mass of quantum systems 
 
In this section we will show an independent proof of the Goldstone theorem for 
condensed matter, molecules and solids. Since the original Goldstone-Salam-Weinberg proof 
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[92] is admittedly the most general, it is not, for the purpose of this study, sufficiently 
transparent regarding the fundamental question of the one-to-one correspondence between 
broken symmetries and associated massless and spinless bosons. The problem of translational 
and rotational symmetry violations in solids is a nice example. 
Solid state physics has adopted some adequate patterns from quantum electrodynamics. 
The quantum field electron-photon Feynman diagrammatic technique has found many 
successful applications in solid state electron-phonon treatments. Many years ago, when I 
finished my studies in solid state physics, I did start to work in a quantum chemistry 
department. In this environment quantum field methods are not so often exercised in 
comparison to its use in solid state physics, and moreover mostly on the fermionic electron-
hole level. At that time I was familiar with the works of Czech emigrants Paldus and Čížek, 
who were inspired by Goldstone's revision [99] of Brueckner’s many-body theory [98] with 
the solution expressed in a manner that avoids the problem of unlinked clusters, introducing 
Goldstone's diagrammatic electron-hole mechanism into quantum chemistry [100]. 
The goal of my PhD thesis [101] was to introduce, in a diagrammatic treatment, the full 
electron-phonon interactions into quantum chemistry, i.e. to elaborate the mathematical 
framework for second quantization of the full electron-vibrational Hamiltonian. Goldstone’s 
theorem was at first beyond my interest, since it was mostly discussed in the domain of 
elementary particle physics, but hardly not mentioned at the time in solid state physics and 
quantum chemistry. As a result, I thought that electron-phonon mechanisms really constituted 
a complete description of solids, i.e. exactly how we learned in school as it was described in 
all textbooks. 
Let us start with the full Hamiltonian of the system of nuclei and electrons in second 
quantization electron-hole formalism, as it is conventionally used in quantum chemistry. 
 (11.1) 
Here TN stands for kinetic energy of nuclei, ENN for nuclear potential energy, hPQ for one-
electron matrix elements and for two-electron matrix elements. The terms ENN and hPQ 
can be expanded in the Taylor series 
 (11.2) 
 (11.3) 
where and are nuclear potential and one-electron terms for fixed (equilibrium) nuclear 
coordinates. In full analogy with the effective electron-phonon solid state Hamiltonian 
 
 (11.4) 
we can rewrite the Hamiltonian (11.1) in a complete second quantization form for electronic 
and as well as vibronic modes: 
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 (11.5) 
where B and  represent the coordinate and momentum oscillator operators. If we require 
that these and all following equations to be applicable to both quantum chemistry and solid 
state physics, we need to introduce a cross-platform notation for B and , viz  
and . In quantum chemistry  holds, while in solid state physics one assumes 
that for any vibrational mode r there exists corresponding mode ř that fulfills the identity 
. Comparing this notation with the usual solid state notation the simple transition 
 is supposed. 
The potential energy of the motion of the nuclei is defined through the quadratic part of 
the internuclear potential plus some additive term representing the self-consistent influence of 
the electron-nuclear potential 
 (11.6) 
 
In the adiabatic limit the kinetic energy Ekin is identical to the kinetic energy of the nuclei TN. 
If we want to include the nonadiabatic case in our treatment, it is necessary to incorporate a 
new additive kinetic term originating from the kinetic energy of electrons. The resulting 
kinetic energy of the system has the form 
 
 (11.7) 
 
so that the vibrational part of the total Hamiltonian can be expressed as 
 
 (11.8) 
 
where the kinetic and potential energies are given by 
 
 (11.9) 
 (11.10) 
 
Finally we get the well-known vibrational Hamiltonian 
 
 (11.11) 
 
Then the total Hamiltonian of the system reads: 
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(11.12) 
 
However there is one obstacle here. The Hamiltonian (11.12) cannot be directly used for 
quantum chemical calculations like the Hamiltonian (11.4) in solid state physics. Both are in 
the form of a "crude" representation, to be precise, the representation with fixed nuclear 
positions. Although this makes no problems in solids, where only valence and conducting 
bands are to be taken into account, in molecular calculations all electrons must be 
incorporated, including also the inner shell ones. Unfortunately direct application of the 
Hamiltonian (11.12) leads to a divergent series expansion. 
Nevertheless there is a straightforward way to solve this difficulty, namely one must 
find a suitable renormalization where all the divergent terms vanish. Instead of the original 
electrons and bosons (vibrational modes or phonons) we introduce a new set of fermionic and 
bosonic operators, with the transformed Hamiltonian optimized on the Born-Oppenheimer (B-
O) level for adiabatic molecules. 
The most general quasiparticle transformation, which "simulates" the B-O 
approximation, can be introduced in the following form: 
 
            (11.13) 
with the unitary conditions 
 
         (11.14) 
For nonadiabatic systems we add to the previous Q (coordinate)-dependent transformation yet 
another P (momentum)-dependent one: 
 
            (11.15) 
with the unitary conditions 
 
         (11.16) 
The successive application of both transformations, adiabatic and nonadiabatic ones is 
equivalent to the unitary transformation of the whole Hamiltonian 
 
 (11.17) 
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Note that I have preferred quasiparticle transformations to unitary transformation of the 
Hamiltonian for the sake of greater transparency. Incidentally, Fröhlich used a similar unitary 
transformation in his derivation of the effective two-electron interaction [105] that was later 
incorporated into the BCS theory: 
 
 (11.18) 
 
For details of the derivation of the field equations, as based on the quasiparticle 
transformations (11.13-16), see the book [102]. For a long time I considered this theory to be 
essentially correct. To sum up, there were four well-known formulae, one in quantum 
mechanics, and three in quantum field theory, which could have been rederived in exact 
agreement: 
 
1) the Pople's equations for the ab-initio calculation of vibrational frequencies [103] 
2) the Fröhlich's expression for the correction of the ground state energy [104,105] 
3) the Fröhlich's effective two-electron interaction [105] 
4) the Lee-Low-Pines polarons and their self-energy [106] 
 
During the numerical tests in 1998 the abovementioned theory totally failed in the 
calculations of the first correction beyond the B-O approximation, i.e. the adiabatic correction 
known as the Born-Huang ansatz [7]: 
 
 (11.19) 
This was a great disappointment for me. In order to directly compare the field formula for the 
adiabatic correction with the mechanical Born-Huang ansatz, I did rewrite the latter into its 
field form. In the adiabatic case the N-electron function can be expanded as a single 
Slater determinant though the one-electron functions : 
 (11.20) 
The function can be expanded in terms of the coefficients , dependent on the 
nuclear coordinates, and the orthonormal set of one-electron wavefunctions defined in the 
equilibrium position : 
 (11.21) 
 
In the following work we will use the following notation for the spin-orbitals: I, J, K, L – 
occupied; A, B, C, D – virtual (unoccupied); P, Q, R, S – the arbitrary ones. One obtains then 
a very simple expression for the Born-Huang ansatz (11.19) 
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 (11.22) 
 
where stands for the nuclear mass and a for the Cartesian coordinates. 
It is now useful to proceed from the Cartesian to the normal coordinate system using the 
following transformation 
 (11.23) 
One wants to substitute for in (11.22), so we need to know the inverse matrix . From  
 (11.24) 
 Eq. (11.22) can be expressed in normal coordinates as 
 
 (11.25) 
 
The matrices α and β have dimension 3N x 3N. The first one diagonalizes the potential energy 
 
 (11.26) 
resulting in 3N – 5 or 3N – 6 vibrational frequencies (the first holds for diatomic molecules) 
and the 5 or 6 accounting for zero energy. On the other hand, the second matrix diagonalizes 
the kinetic energy 
 (11.27) 
 
with all 3N nonzero values: aside the 3N – 5 or 3N – 6 vibrational modes we have 2 or 3 
nonzero values for rotational modes and 3 nonzero values for translational ones.  So the final 
field expression for the Born-Huang ansatz reads: 
 
 (11.28) 
 
It is now evident that all electron-vibrational and electron-phonon field theories fail 
beyond the B-O approximation, because they do not pass the Born-Huang test. In Eq. (11.28) 
they are only able to justify the first term that consists of vibrational modes, but they are 
unable to arrive at the second and third terms dealing with rotational and translational quanta. 
The electron-phonon mechanism has its roots in the B-O approximation, where only the 
diagonalization procedure (11.26) of the potential energy via the α matrices is relevant. 
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Therefore, in this specific case the quantum field can only share with quantum mechanics the 
centre-of-mass (COM) separation of the external and the internal degrees of freedom. 
Even though I immediately discovered this serious problem of the quantum field 
formulation after the 1998 numerical tests, I have hesitated for many years to publish the 
revised version of employing quantum field theories for condensed matter systems such as 
molecules and solids. Naturally I did not want to make a fool of myself by claiming that there 
are some new particles in physics, and that there is a new type of covariance in the quantum 
field, binding together the internal and external degrees of freedom in a way similar to the 
way Lorentz covariance binds together space and time. Finally I did present this topic in 
Cambridge in 2010, and this lecture was published in 2012 [107]. 
Without any knowledge of the Goldstone theorem, we can see that the existence of 3N – 
5 or 3N – 6 massless spinless bosons - vibrations/phonons – results from Eq. (11.26). The rest 
of the massless spinless bosons which I have called rotons and translons, follows from Eq. 
(11.27). However, the complete lack of interest from the scientific community in this topic 
has indeed been astonishing, but the reason may be quite banal. Whenever I speak with solid 
state physicists, they all admit that they have always thought that the adiabatic approximation 
is synonymous with the B-O approximation and that they see no difference between them, but 
it is in actual fact the almost negligible difference between them that generates the 5 or 6 lost 
Goldstone bosons! As a consequence the original concept of the electron-vibrational field 
theory [102] must be abandoned and replaced by a new field theory with two major upgrades: 
The first upgrade: Eqs. (11.9-10) for the potential and the kinetic vibrational energies, 
must be rewritten using a complete set of 3N Goldstone bosons - phonons, rotons and 
translons - in agreement with the Born-Huang field transcription (11.28). We shall call these 
bosons hyperphonons or hypervibrations. 
 
 (11.29) 
 (11.30) 
 
Defining the hyper-vibrational double-vector: 
 
 (11.31) 
 
we get covariant expressions for the boson part of the hyper-vibrational Hamiltonian with 
respect to all 3N Goldstone modes: 
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 (11.32) 
 
Instead of the original total Hamiltonian (11.12) we obtain 
 
 
 
 
(11.33) 
 
The second upgrade: We will apply the same quasiparticle transformations (11.13-16) 
as in the original electron-vibrational concept, but with entirely different interpretation. In full 
analogy with Lorentz covariance, binding together space and time coordinates, we introduce a 
new covariance, binding together the internal and external degrees of freedom, i.e. Eqs. 
(11.13-16) will comprise all 3N degrees of freedom without the mechanical COM separation. 
We will denote the quality of this unitary transformation as the field COM covariance. 
Here we will only sketch the derivation, since it is, however, very time-consuming. 
Details of the derivation have been given in previous work [107]. The final formula for the 
change of the ground state energy has a surprisingly simple analytical form: 
 
 (11.34) 
where the summation refers to virtual spin-orbitals A, occupied spin-orbitals I, and all hyper-
vibrational modes r, rÎ{V,R,T}. The coefficients c resp.  are related to the adiabatic and the 
non-adiabatic transformation, respectively, and determined by the set of equations 
 
 (11.35) 
 (11.36) 
where u are the coefficients of the electron-hyperphonon interaction, ε0 are one-electron 
energies, and v0 two-electron potential energies. Finally the set of equations in the second 
order of the Taylor expansion results in the ab-initio self-consistent equations for hyper-
vibrational frequencies  and , namely for the unknown potential and kinetic matrix 
elements in the Eqs. (11.6-7) and in the total Hamiltonian (11.33): 
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The fermionic one-particle correction  is more complex and therefore we select only 
those terms which are decisive for excitation mechanism 
 
 
 
 
(11.39) 
The first part (11.39) is of a pure one-fermion origin and has a non-diagonal form. The second 
part is a vacuum value of type  and/or  of the mixed fermion-boson 
terms, where the bosonic part is of the quadratic form of coordinate and/or momentum 
operators. 
We can now demonstrate the simplest applications of these general equations where the 
field COM covariant theory reduces to the classical mechanical COM separation limit, i.e. 
 and only the Goldstone bosons descending from the Galilean broken symmetries - 
vibrations/phonons - are taken into consideration. We will present the limits of the four 
examples leading up to Pople's equations, Fröhlich's ground state energy correction and the 
effective two-electron Hamiltonian, and the Lee-Low-Pines polarons. These four cases were 
particularly mentioned as they immediately follow from the pure electron-vibrational theory 
[102]. We start with the four cases and continue with three more related to the Born-Huang 
ansatz. 
1) Pople's equations for the ab initio calculation of vibrational frequencies [103]: 
From the Eqs. (11.35) and (11.37) in the adiabatic limit, where the coefficients  equal zero 
we get 
 
   (11.40) 
 (11.41) 
 
One observes that Ref. [103] contains these equations, not in the MO (molecular orbital) 
basis, but for programming purposes in the LCAO (linear combination of atomic orbitals) 
basis of "moving" atomic orbitals that follow the adiabatic "motion" of the nuclei. Both 
approaches are fully equivalent; the MO basis notation is simpler and shorter, and therefore 
more suitable for a theoretical treatment, whereas the LCAO basis is more practical in 
numerical calculations. One can look at the equations (11.35-38) as a generalization of Pople's 
CPHF equations [103] for the case of a general field COM covariant theory, which includes 
also the case of the break-down of the B-O approximation. 
2) Fröhlich's expression for the correction to the ground state energy [104,105]: 
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Neglecting two-electron terms, the formula for the change of the ground state energy (11.34) 
takes the following explicit simple form: 
 (11.42) 
 
After a changeover from a quantum chemical to a solid state physics notation, one obtains 
exactly the same result as originally derived by Fröhlich [104] from perturbation theory and 
then rederived by him again on the basis of the unitary transformation (11.18) [105]. 
 
 (11.43) 
 
In his first paper [104] Fröhlich tried to interpret the new state as a superconducting one, since 
the optimization of the occupation factors fk yields a decrease of the total energy. But as soon 
the experimental verification of the existing gap appeared Fröhlich, in response in his second 
paper [105] admittedly rederived this result once more, but this time laying stress on the 
effective two-electron terms resulting from electron-phonon interactions as a possible source 
of the gap formation. He did publish it as a challenge that somehow, by means of a true many-
body treatment, going beyond the Hartree-Fock approximation, the expected gap would be 
achieved. 
3) Fröhlich's effective two-electron interaction (Fröhlich Hamiltonian) [105]: 
The electron-hyper-vibrational Hamitonian in the electron-vibrational limit leads to the 
following result for the effective two-electron interaction [107]: 
 
 (11.44) 
In solid state notation this sum reads (r®q; P®k+q,s ; Q®k’,s’; R®k,s ; S®k’+q,s’): 
 
 (11.45) 
In comparison to the expression obtained by Fröhlich, known as the Fröhlich Hamiltonian 
 
 
(11.46) 
one can see that both expressions are equivalent, but not exactly identical. As the coordinate 
and momentum operators do not commute, the Hamiltonians (11.17) and (11.18) lead to a 
slightly different expression for the Fröhlich effective two-electron interaction. This type of 
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ambiguity of the Fröhlich Hamiltonian was extensively discussed by Lenz and Wegner [109] 
by means of continuous unitary transformations. 
4) Lee-Low-Pines polarons and their self-energy [106]: 
Neglecting two-electron terms in the equation (11.39), one obtains a simple analytical 
expression for the fermionic one-particle excitation energies 
 
 
 
 
(11.47) 
 
and in the solid state notation (r®q; P®k,s ; R®k-q,s ;  I®k-q,s with the occupation 
factor fk-q) 
 
 (11.48) 
 
The electron energies  with the corrections (11.48) represent the quasiparticles/polarons 
that were originally derived via the Lee-Low-Pines transformation [106]. The first part of 
(11.48) refers to individual polarons, whereas the second part represents correlations 
originating from the effective field of other polarons. 
The previous examples were based on a simplistic model of the electron-
vibrational/electron-phonon Hamiltonian, taking only Galilean broken symmetries from the 
Goldstone theorem into account. Investigating the consequences of including all Goldstone 
bosons, descending from all three types of symmetry breakings in condensed matter, our 
attention will be focused on three most interesting and important examples: the Born-Huang 
ansatz, and ground state energy and excitation spectra of the B-O degenerate systems 
[107,108]. 
5) The Born-Huang ansatz [7]: 
In the adiabatic limit, which means that all non-adiabatic coefficients  will be equal to zero, 
the change of the ground state energy (11.34) yields the adiabatic correction 
 
 (11.49) 
that is exactly identical with the Born-Handy ansatz (11.28). We see that only the field COM 
covariant theory can pass the test of the Born-Huang ansatz. Noting that the roton terms in 
(11.49) has nothing to do with the energies of the rotational degrees of molecular freedom as 
well as the translon terms with the de Broglie wave of the translational freedom of the whole 
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system, the contribution of roton and translon quanta occurs even if the molecule or crystal is 
completely in rest and does not rotate or move. 
6) The ground state energy of the B-O degenerate systems: 
Let us consider the complete non-adiabatic and field COM covariant case, where we only 
omit two-electron terms in order to obtain transparent analytical expressions: 
 
 (11.50) 
 
which in the form of the sum of vibrational, rotational and translational parts finally reads 
 
 
 
 
(11.51) 
 
After the rewriting Eq. (11.51) in solid state notation one obtains 
 
 
 
 
(11.52) 
 
where o denotes the optical branches and c, v the conducting and the valence bands 
respectively. This is a fascinating result. It demonstrates how the true quantum field, 
respecting fully the Goldstone theorem, copes with the B-O degenerate systems such as J-T 
molecules and superconductors: the superposition principle for degeneracy removal is simply 
bypassed, since rotons and translons are actually responsible for symmetry breaking. In a 
superconductor, such symmetry breakings produce several geometrically different symmetry 
broken states, and split the original half-occupied conducting band of a conductor into two 
bands - one fully occupied valence band and one empty conducting band. 
7) The excitation spectra of B-O degenerate systems: 
Looking at the degeneracy removal and a gap formation in the B-O degenerate systems, we 
will only take the diagonal form in Eq. (11.39) into account. Further we neglect the second 
part of this equation, which does not depend on the electron distribution defined by the 
occupation/virtual states as does the first part. After omitting of two-electron terms we get: 
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The diagonal form of the J-T one-particle excitation expression (11.53) is fully justified in 
solid state physics where translational symmetry is supposed. Since we have two bands, in 
solid state notation the one-particle Hamiltonian (11.53) reads 
 
 
 
 
(11.54) 
 
 
 
(11.55) 
 
leading to two sets of one-particle corrections, one set for the valence band electronic 
corrections and the latter set for the conducting ones. 
Taking notice of the inner-band frequencies that are not involved in the ground 
state energy equation, but are present in one-particle correction terms, these terms are the 
same as those in the Fröhlich’s Hamiltonian (11.46), i.e. the denominators of them can 
achieve both positive and negative values. On the other hand the terms with inter-band optical 
frequencies are optimized by means of equation (11.52), and therefore the negative 
denominators will be prevailing. This will result in negative values of and positive 
values of . Of course, from the general form of the equations (11.54-55) one cannot 
uniquely predict the existence of a gap. Not all conductors might become necessary 
superconductors at absolute zero. It depends on many factors but the most important factor is 
the bandwidth. It is clear from (11.54-55) that the narrow bands (high TC superconductors) 
result in greater gaps than broad bands (low TC superconductors). 
We have presented here an independent proof of the Goldstone theorem with a one-to-
one correspondence between broken symmetries and associated massless and spinless bosons 
in condensed matter, such as molecules and solids, and we have found the lost bosons, i.e. the 
rotons and the translons. We have shown that a field theory based only on phonons is 
insufficient for the description of B-O degenerate states such as J-T systems and 
superconductors where the general field COM covariant theory, incorporating all Goldstone 
bosons - phonons, rotons and translons is unavoidable. The Born-Huang ansatz plays the 
same role for the field COM covariance as the Maxwell equations do for Lorentz covariance. 
One small question remains: Is the Born-Huang ansatz experimentally credible to the 
same extent as the Maxwell equations? If so we can authorize the formulation of a new type 
of field covariance. It was the merit of Handy [110] and many others, that thousands of Born-
Huang ansatz calculations and their comparison with experimental data were performed, since 
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for a long time a reasonable doubt prevailed regarding the equivalency of these results, and 
those of the exact quantum mechanical COM separation and the Born-Huang ansatz as the 
first correction to the B-O approximation. Kutzelnigg therefore renamed the Born-Huang 
ansatz as the Born-Handy ansatz [8]: „Handy and co-workers have never claimed to have 
invented the ansatz referred to here as the "Born-Handy ansatz", but they certainly convinced 
a large audience that this ansatz is of enormous practical value, even if it has not been 
completely obvious why it leads to correct results. Handy and co-workers realized that the 
difficulties with the traditional approach come from the separation of the COM motion (and 
the need to define internal coordinates after this separation has been made). They therefore 
decided to renounce the separation.” 
Once the Born-Huang (Born-Handy) ansatz was experimentally confirmed, we have 
subsequently experimental evidence of the lost Goldstone bosons - rotons and translons - as 
well. Their role in quantum systems is quite curious. Their contribution to the corrections of 
the ground state energy is already significant in small molecules like hydrogen molecule with 
only one vibrational mode and the five lost Goldstone boson modes, and is even several times 
greater than the contribution of the pure vibrations. The bigger the molecule, the lesser effect 
have these rotons and translons. In most of solids, with a huge amount of phonons, such as 
conductors, semiconductors or insulators, the effect of the six rotons/translons becomes 
negligible and the electron-phonon field theory is sufficient. However, in B-O degenerate 
systems suddenly a surprise appears. We have arrived at the same formula for the ground 
states of finite as well as infinite systems, both molecules and crystals, in the case of a B-O 
electronic degeneracy. However, Goldstone bosons arising from the violation of rotational 
and translational symmetries, rotons and translons, produce singularities in the original 
symmetrical positions, and the system is forced to avoid them, removing the degeneracy in an 
effectively one-particle manner at new asymmetric positions. This principle unifies the 
formation of the ground states of J-T molecules and superconductors, showing the way how 
quantum field formulations deals with virtual degeneracies originating from approximative B-
O solutions. They are profoundly different from real degeneracies, where the principle of 
superposition takes place after the removal by some external perturbation (Stark or Zeeman 
effect). Quantum field theories simply do not share the centre of mass defined in quantum 
mechanics but solves the centre of mass problem "on its own". 
If the lost Goldstone bosons - rotons and translons - are responsible for the mechanism 
of the formation of quantum states with spontaneously broken symmetries, it means, that the 
spontaneous symmetry breaking (SSB) was only phenomenologically described by classical 
physics, but it was completely misunderstood on the quantum level. We will continue with the 
analysis of the SSB in the next section. 
 
 
12. The paradox of spontaneous symmetry breaking 
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Goldstone’s theorem implies a quantum field reformulation of the J-T effect which is 
also valid for superconductors [107]: "Molecular and crystallin entities in a geometry of 
electronically degenerate ground states are unstable at this geometry except for the case when 
all matrix elements of the electron-rotational and electron-translational interactions equal 
zero." When I published this definition [107], I did not, at first, realize that it was a direct 
consequence of the Goldstone theorem, and secondly I did look upon it as an alternative to the 
official quantum mechanical definition. Later I saw that only the field J-T definition should be 
correct, since it leads to a truly broken symmetry for the ground state.  
The official mechanical definition starts with the clamped-nuclei concept of the B-O 
approximation (see section 2), whereas the exact mechanical solution, based on the 
Monkhorst-Cafiero-Adamowitz shell method for nuclei, leads to no symmetry breaking since 
the nuclei can be delocalized. On the other hand, the BCS theory of superconductivity is a 
quantum field theory where a Bloch-type field is used that does not respect the Goldstone 
theorem, and therefore the BCS theory cannot be correct. Yet the Bloch field was successfully 
applied to insulators, conductors, and semiconductors, but from the perspective of materials 
with B-O degenerate ground states and broken symmetries, such a field will be crippled and 
not usable. In such a case it permits linear superpositions of degenerate states, as it was 
originally described in the BCS paper [78]: „The normal phase is described by the Bloch 
individual-particle model. The ground state of a superconductor, formed from a linear 
combination of normal state configurations in which electrons are virtually excited in pairs of 
opposite spin and momentum, is lower in energy than the normal state by amount that is 
proportional to the average (ħω)2, which is consistent with the isotope effect. A mutually 
orthogonal set of excited states, in one-to-one correspondence with those of the normal phase, 
obtains by specifying the occupation of certain Bloch states and by using the rest to form a 
linear combination of virtual pair configurations.” 
It is interesting to observe that, the BCS paper [78] does not mention any symmetry 
breakings. Four decades later, Weinberg wondered how Bardeen, Cooper, and Schrieffer 
could not see it [111]: „A superconductor is simply a material in which electromagnetic gauge 
invariance is spontaneously broken. This is not the way that most experts have historically 
thought about superconductivity. Early phenomenological theories were known to violate 
electromagnetic gauge invariance, but this was regarded as more annoying than enlightening. 
Broken symmetry is never mentioned in the seminal paper by Bardeen, Cooper, and 
Schrieffer [78] that first gave us a microscopic theory of superconductivity. Anderson [95] 
subsequently stressed the important role of broken symmetry in superconductors, but even 
today most textbooks explain superconductivity in terms of detailed dynamical models, with 
broken symmetry rarely mentioned.” 
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Looking closely at the structure of the BCS theory, there is no asymmetry input/output, 
and hence there was absolutely no reason for Bardeen, Cooper, and Schrieffer to discuss any 
violations of symmetry. But we have already seen above that using the correct field, fully 
respecting the Goldstone theorem, the microscopic theory for superconductors will yield true 
asymmetric ground states, which are geometrical in accordance with the J-T effect. It means, 
that superconductors also share the common spontaneous symmetry breaking (SSB) with the 
J-T molecules. The quantum chemist and expert on the J-T effect, Isaac Bersuker came 
exactly to the same conclusion, writing in his book [112]: „Moreover, since the JTE has been 
shown to be the only source of spontaneous distortion of high-symmetry configurations, we 
come to the conclusion that the JTE is a unique mechanism of all the symmetry breakings in 
condensed matter.” Bersuker further restated the prominence and role of the J-T effect in 
connection with the discovery of high-Tc superconductivity [112]: „The next significant 
resurgence of interest in the Jahn–Teller effect is related to the late 1980s and is still 
continuing. It was triggered by one of the most important Nobel Prize discoveries in physics 
of our times inspired by the Jahn–Teller effect: the high-temperature superconductivity. As 
explained by the authors of this discovery, ‘‘the guiding idea in developing this concept was 
influenced by the Jahn–Teller polaron model’’ (J.G. Bednorz and K.A. Müller, in Nobel 
Lectures: Physics, Ed. G. Ekspong, World Scientific, Singapore, 1993, p. 424).” 
Since the mechanism of SSB lies behind both the J-T effect and superconductivity, it 
entails that both phenomena must be described by similar mathematical equations, cf. the 
presentation given in the previous section. It is therefore somewhat surprising that Bersuker 
ignored this fact accepting the Cooper pair based explanation for superconductors. In his book 
[112] he suggests further efforts to find a bridge between J-T distortions and Cooper pairing 
citing: „However, the electron–phonon coupling is not the only factor that influences the 
superconductivity, and it does not determine the SC transition temperature directly. The path 
from local JT distortions to formation of polarons via lattice dynamics, to formation of 
Cooper pairs, their density, stability, and mobility, temperature dependence, to perfect 
diamagnetism, to structural phase transition, and finally to SC, is very long and thorny, and 
therefore a comprehensive JT theory of this important phenomenon has not yet been 
accomplished.” 
In this connection it should be worth recalling Newton's second antimetaphysical rule 
[113]: „Hypoth. II. Ideoque effectuum naturalium ejusdem generis eædem sunt causæ. Uti 
respirationis in Homine & in Bestia; descensus lapidum in Europa & in America; Lucis in 
Igne culinari & in Sole; reflexionis lucis in Terra & in Planetis.” It means that to the same 
natural effect the same causes must be assigned. Hence J-T distortions are the common causes 
of both phenomena, the J-T effect and superconductivity, which are observed on systems with 
B-O degenerate ground states and broken symmetries. Then it is not necessary to prompt the 
"very long and thorny path" from J-T distortions to the formation of Cooper pairs. In order to 
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improve the understanding of the identity of these two phenomena, we will concentrate on 
their common cause, i.e. the J-T distortions, and especially on their underlying intrinsic 
concepts, the B-O approximation and the SSB, which both need to be carefully revised.  
Starting first with the SSB and the problem of broken symmeties in the early period of 
classical physics, it led to a theological controversy about the question of its origin, between 
Newton and Leibniz. Hermann Weyl in his book [114], describes the conflict in detail: „The 
net result is that in all physics nothing has shown up indicating an intrinsic difference of left 
and right. Just as all points and all directions in space are equivalent, so are left and right. 
Position, direction, left and right are relative concepts. In language tinged with theology this 
issue of relativity was discussed at great length in a famous controversy between Leibniz and 
Clarke, the latter a clergyman acting as the spokesman for Newton [115]. Newton with his 
belief in absolute space and time considers motion a proof of the creation of the world out of 
God's arbitrary will, for otherwise it would be inexplicable why matter moves in this rather 
than in any other direction. Leibniz is loath to burden God with such decisions as lack 
"sufficient reason." Says he, "Under the assumption that space be something in itself it is 
impossible to give a reason why God should have put the bodies (without tampering with 
their mutual distances and relative positions) just at this particular place and not somewhere 
else; for instance, why He should not have arranged everything in the opposite order by 
turning East and West about. If, on the other hand, space is nothing more than the spatial 
order and relation of things then the two states supposed above, the actual one and its 
transposition, are in no way different from each other... and therefore it is a quite inadmissible 
question to ask why one state was preferred to the other."” 
Weyl attempts to reconcile these opposite views from a new perspective of the theory of 
relativity after three centuries: „If nature were all lawfulness then every phenomenon would 
share the full symmetry of the universal laws of nature as formulated by the theory of 
relativity. The mere fact that this is not so proves that contingency is an essential feature of 
the world. Clarke in his controversy with Leibniz admitted the latter's principle of sufficient 
reason but added that the sufficient reason often lies in the mere will of God. I think, here 
Leibniz the rationalist is definitely wrong and Clarke on the right track. But it would have 
been more sincere to deny the principle of sufficient reason altogether instead of making God 
responsible for all that is unreason in the world. On the other hand Leibniz was right against 
Newton and Clarke with his insight into the principle of relativity. The truth as we see it today 
is this: The laws of nature do not determine uniquely the one world that actually exists, not 
even if one concedes that two worlds arising from each other by an automorphic 
transformation, i.e., by a transformation which preserves the universal laws of nature, are to 
be considered the same world.” 
Does Weyl's statement hold in universally physics? In classical physics including 
Einstein's relativity, we need not have to care about Leibniz' principle of sufficient reason, 
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since this principle is of teleological origin. We have also seen that in the classical solution of 
superconductivity this principle is hidden behind a multiplicity of solutions, the first one 
leading to ideal conductivity and the second one to superconductivity, in full agreement with 
Weyl's interpretation. However, this construal is not valid in quantum physics, since quantum 
physics is causal and hence cannot observe teleological phenomena. After a rigorous use of  
Goldstone’s theorem, we have obtained a superconducting ground state, which is identical to 
the ground states of insulators with J-T distorted nuclear positions. This is of course not 
enough for a quantum explanation of superconductivity. The quantum nature of Leibniz' 
principle must be first discovered, and only then might the quantum essence of 
superconductivity and all other teleological phenomena be revealed and seriously discussed. 
This evokes the question: Does there exist a general formulation of the relationship 
between broken symmetries and the respective physical phenomena, valid both in classical 
and quantum physics? Pierre Curie proposed already in 1894 a formulation [116], fully based 
on causality, predating an analysis, which according to Bohr’s principle of correspondence 
would apply to an extension from classical to quantum physics. The English translation of 
Curie's formulation with further extensive analysis can be found in the book of Brading and 
Castellani [117]. We quote here only the essential part: „Curie was led to reflect on the 
question of the relationship between physical properties and symmetry properties of a 
physical system by his studies on the thermal, electric and magnetic properties of crystals, 
these properties being directly related to the structure, and hence the symmetry, of the crystals 
studied... His conclusions, systematically presented in his 1894 work “Sur la symétrie dans les 
phénomènes physiques”, can be synthesized as follows: 
(a) A phenomenon can exist in a medium possessing its characteristic symmetry or that of one 
of its subgroups. What is needed for its occurrence (i.e. for something rather than nothing to 
happen) is not the presence, but rather the absence, of certain symmetries: “Asymmetry is 
what creates a phenomenon”. 
(b) The symmetry elements of the causes must be found in their effects, but the converse is 
not true; that is, the effects can be more symmetric than the causes. 
Conclusion (a) clearly indicates that Curie recognized the important function played by the 
concept of symmetry breaking in physics (he was indeed one of the first to recognize it). 
Conclusion (b) is what is usually called “Curie’s principle” in the literature, although one 
should notice that (a) and (b) are not independent of each other.” 
One might observe that Curie uses solely the pair of concepts: symmetry - asymmetry, 
and does not explicitly speak about SSB. Therefore Curie's formulation reveals only half of 
the truth about SSB, i.e. it deals only with causal phenomena arising from the multiplicity of 
asymmetric solutions of physical equations. It says nothing about the teleological 
phenomenon descending from the transitions between these asymmetric states. As an example 
the causal effect, related to ferromagnetism, is well explained in quantum physics. On the 
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other hand, the associated teleological Einstein-de Haas effect has no quantum physical 
explanation, even if it was well described in the framework of classical physics in 1915 [118], 
before the concept of the electron spin was known, leaving only Ampère's hypothesis that 
magnetism is caused by microscopic circular motions of electric charges as a sufficient 
background. Superconductivity is an another example: Quantum physics can only solve the 
causal condensation of a conductor to the superconducting phase with multiple asymmetric 
ground states, but the explanation of the teleological transition between these ground states 
lies beyond the limits of quantum physics. 
The SSB is primarily associated with two phenomena, i.e. one causal and one 
teleological. Curie's formulation deals with the first one. The phenomena in question 
corresponds to the following symmetry argument that was formulated by van Fraassen [119]: 
„There are two forms of argument which reach their conclusion ‘on the basis of 
considerations of symmetry’. One, the symmetry argument proper, relies on a meta-principle: 
that structurally similar problems must receive correspondingly similar solutions. A solution 
must ‘respect the symmetries’ of the problem. The second form, rather less important, 
assumes a symmetry in its subject, or assumes that an asymmetry can only come from a 
preceding asymmetry. Both exert a strong and immediate appeal, that may hide substantial 
tacit assumptions.” 
The first part of van Fraassen's argument is quite clear and there is full agreement in the 
scientific community regarding its interpretation. Even if we get several asymmetric states as 
solutions of symmetric equations, i.e. if the original symmetry is broken, the asymmetric 
states together form a set which respects the original symmetry of the problem. However, the 
second form is not clear at all, and there is no unified view how to interpret it. One group of 
physicists attempts to explain it within the causal laws of physics. Usually imperfections and 
random fluctuations are taken into account. Stewart and Golubitsky in their book [120] 
describe the role of imperfections as follows: „We've said that mathematically the laws that 
apply to symmetric systems can sometimes predict not just a single effect, but a whole set of 
symmetrically related effects. However, Mother Nature has to choose which of those effects 
she wants to implement. How does she choose? The answer seems to be: imperfections. 
Nature is never perfectly symmetric. Nature's circles always have tiny dents and bumps. 
There are always tiny fluctuations, such as the thermal vibration of molecules. These tiny 
imperfections load Nature's dice in favour of one or other of the set of possible effects that the 
mathematics of perfect symmetry considers to be equally possible.” 
There is no doubt that imperfections play an important role in macroscopic objects. The 
Norton dome is a nice example of this. Nontheless, Norton emphasises the difference between 
the real and ideal dome [121]: „However, we do not even have a falsified prediction. The 
dome is not intended to represent a real physical system. The dome is purely an idealization 
within Newtonian theory. On our best understanding of the world, there can be no such 
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system. For an essential part of the setup is to locate the mass exactly at the apex of the dome 
and exactly at rest. Quantum mechanics assures us that cannot be done. What the dome 
illustrates is indeterminism within Newtonian theory in an idealized system that we do not 
expect to be realized in the world.” 
Such idealizations are of course not convincing enough for many physicists to take the 
Norton dome seriously, particularly when there are no applications to the real world. Norton 
reckons all objections against the dome and the indeterminism in classical physics [121]: 
„What’s wrong with the dome? Many believe that the dome somehow lies outside what is 
proper in Newtonian theory. Three distinct bases for this judgment are described below, along 
with my reasons for finding them unconvincing. 1. Does the dome employ an incomplete 
formulation of Newtonian physics? 2. Is the dome “unphysical”? a) Unphysical as gauge 
(over-description). b) Unphysical as false. c) Unphysical as pathological. d) Unphysical 
through under-description. 3. Does the dome use inadmissible idealizations?” 
Although Norton disproves very carefully the above mentioned objections, a curious 
situation arises: On one hand Norton is correct in his arguments against his opponents, but on 
the other his opponents are right about the determinism of classical physics. Malament [122] 
has expressed this quandary in a very elegant way: „But I am not sure that the full complexity 
and interest of the breakdown is adequately captured by saying, either, “Newtonian particle 
mechanics is an indeterministic theory” (full stop) or “Norton’s example is not a well-defined 
Newtonian system” (full stop). Indeed, I am not convinced we have clearly posed alternatives 
here – because we do not have a sufficiently clear idea in the first place what should count as 
a “Newtonian system” (or count as falling within the “domain of application” of Newtonian 
theory). My inclination is to avoid labels here and direct attention, instead, to a rich set issues 
that the example raises.” 
In order to gain a deeper insight into this problem one should look for analogies such as 
the Norton dome. A historical review of comparable examples was written by van Strien. In 
her article "The Norton Dome and the Nineteenth Century Foundations of Determinism" 
[123] she says: „Lipschitz-indeterministic systems played an important role in the work of 
Boussinesq, who, in 1878, discussed several such systems, one of which was similar to the 
Norton dome [124].” This paper contains also an observation of an unexpected importance: 
„Though determinism as a general metaphysical principle was seldom doubted, it was not 
necessarily founded on a physical theorem about the uniqueness of solutions to certain 
differential equations.” 
It's quite astonishing to notice the difference in the way 19th century scientists were 
thinking! Maxwell, in his letter to Darwin's half-cousin Galton (quoted in the section 7), being 
fascinated by the works of Boussinesq & al., does not speak about the problem of 
indeterminism in classical physics at all. Yet he mentions "some determining principle which 
is extra physical (but not extra natural)" instead. It indicates that Maxwell was well aware of a 
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missing law of nature, when he continues: „Boussinesq's method is a very powerful one 
against metaphysical arguments about cause and effect and much better than the insinuation 
that there is something loose about the laws of nature, not of sensible magnitude but enough 
to bring her round in time.” 
It appears that Norton already used the correct word "acausal" in his first paper dealing 
with the dome [52]. Using the word "acausal" as a proper opposite to the word "causal" is to 
be preferred, because it leaves the door open for teleological phenomena. Any attempt to 
analyse indeterminism on the classical level is meaningless since classical physics is unable to 
deal with it, perhaps at best can somehow "tolerate" it as in the case of Norton’s dome. We 
may not even need to discuss the problem of Lipschitz continuity: the Mexican hat in the 
Ginzburg-Landau equations has no such discontinuity at the apex and, after all, we observe 
the same type of double solutions for the Norton dome and ideal conductors (first solution) 
and superconductors (second solution) the latter leading to the Meissner effect. Classical 
physics is able to describe the Norton dome as well as the Meissner effect, but is unable to 
determine what evoked the phenomenon.  
If we take into account all the known examples of SSB in classical physics, i.e. the 
Mexican hat, Norton’s dome, or the systems discussed by Boussinesq, we conclude in relation 
to the SSB archetype, forming the "falling down from the apex" in the classical physics, that 
the trigger of falling down is unknown. According to Maxwell's contemporary, mathematician 
and philosopher Peirce, no physics based on a corpuscular philosophy can solve the problem 
of the SSB trigger [125]: „Now I maintain that the original segregation of levo-molecules, or 
molecules with a left-handed twist, from dextro-molecules, or molecules with a right-handed 
twist, is absolutely incapable of mechanical explanation... The three laws of motion draw no 
dynamical distinction between right-handed and left-handed screws, and a mechanical 
explanation is an explanation founded on the three laws of motion. There then is a physical 
phenomenon absolutely inexplicable by mechanical action. This single instance suffices to 
overthrow the Corpuscular Philosophy.” 
Although these lines were written in the era of classical physics, Peirce's argument is 
applicable to quantum physics as well: It is built on the atomic ideas of Democritus, with the 
same corpuscular philosophy as in classical physics. It means that quantum physics in its 
Copenhagen interpretation is incapable of solving the problem of the SSB trigger. As we have 
realized this is a teleological issue, related to Leibniz' principle of sufficient reason, the 
second form of van Fraassen's argument, and Peirce's corpuscular philosophy argument, 
which can be fully ignored in classical physics. Unfortunately physicists usually ignore this 
difficulty also in quantum physics, and this attitude is a mistake, since it is motivated by the 
incorrect belief, that quantum physics employs the same SSB archetype as the classical one. 
On the quantum level, physical systems can be described in a dual way: either 
mechanically or as a field system, in accordance with the Weinberg's statement [126]: „If it 
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turned out that some physical system could not be described by a quantum field theory, it 
would be a sensation; if it turned out that the system did not obey the rules of quantum 
mechanics and relativity, it would be a cataclysm.” Note that we demonstrated a similar 
picture in section 11 particularly for condensed matter cases (molecules and crystals): Side by 
side the precise Monkhorst's quantum mechanical approach to the solution of the Schrödinger 
equation we present the true quantum field solution fully respecting the Goldstone theorem. 
We are now in the position to ask whether this dual description of physical systems 
would lead to the same result. The answer is certainly not, because different results obtain for 
symmetry broken states. Quantum mechanics admits the superposition of multiple degenerate 
states, while Weinberg, on the other hand, has proven their orthogonality for quantum fields 
within the infinite volume limit. The Weinberg's argument is often quoted by various authors, 
e.g. in the article of Brading and Castellani [127]: „In quantum physics SSB actually does not 
occur in the case of finite systems: tunnelling takes place between the various degenerate 
states, and the true lowest energy state or “ground state” turns out to be a unique linear 
superposition of the degenerate states. In fact, SSB is applicable only to infinite systems — 
many-body systems (such as ferromagnets, superfluids and superconductors) and fields — the 
alternative degenerate ground states being all orthogonal to each other in the infinite volume 
limit and therefore separated by a “superselection rule” (see for example Weinberg, 1996, pp. 
164–165).” 
Though this citation reflects Weinberg’s opinion, one can also find other interpretations, 
emphasizing the difference between the mechanical and the field descriptions, rather than the 
condition of the volume infinity of fields, as e.g. in the paper of van Dam [128]: „For the SSB 
in the rod and in the ferromagnet two comments were made that apply equally to this case: 
each of the ground states has an equal chance to be the ground state of the physical system, 
and the ground states are related to each other by the U(1) symmetry of the Lagrangian. 
Relating this situation to quantum mechanics might provoke suspicion: through tunnelling the 
real ground state could surely be a superposition of the individual ground states, which would 
not be degenerate. But although such a situation could occur in ordinary quantum mechanics, 
it does not apply to quantum field theory. The fields live in an infinite volume and thus have 
infinitely many degrees of freedom. Tunnelling cannot happen in this case. All vacuum states 
are orthogonal. This is extensively discussed by, for example, Weinberg [111, pp. 163-167].” 
The results presented in the previous section, testify in favour of van Dam's 
interpretation: there is no SSB in quantum mechanics, it can solely be described in quantum 
field theory. Moreover, one might not need to rely on Weinberg's proof, which is valid only 
for infinite-volume fields, since the Goldstone boson, associated with broken translational and 
rotational symmetries, earlier in this work called translons and rotons [107], is responsible for 
singularities at symmetric points. Hence the manifestation of SSB, in order to avoid these 
singularities, does appear for any system, regardless of the system being finite or infinite. 
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As a matter of fact, if we have two legitimate physical descriptions, the quantum 
mechanical and the quantum field one, these two formulations must necessarily yield the 
same energies for the system under examination. Therefore the classical SSB archetype, here 
denoted as "falling down from the apex", is not workable for quantum systems. Quantum 
physics can only calculate the symmetry broken states, while the SSB transition must 
somehow follow from the transitions between the mechanical and the field states of the 
system proceeding without any energy gain or loss, since symmetrical mechanical points and 
symmetry broken field points represent two descriptions with the same energy. A new law of 
nature is indispensable for this purpose, since this type of transitions has no support within the 
Copenhagen interpretation. As a consequence, from this new law, the origin of asymmetry 
must emerge, and evidently, according to the second form of the van Fraassen's argument, this 
asymmetry cannot arise ex nihilo.  
So where should one start searching for this new law of nature? One way would be to 
focus on the simplest cases of SSB. We will, however, not start with complex nonadiabatic 
phenomena such as superconductivity or the J-T effect, nor with the adiabatic, but infinite 
systems like ferromagnets. The simplest example of SSB for our purpose would be small 
adiabatic systems such as the formation of isomers. The exact quantum mechanical solution, 
according to the Monkhorst-Cafiero-Adamowitz approach [6,9], cannot lead to isomerism. 
The latter appears only after the introduction of the B-O approximation, or the clamped-nuclei 
concept. It seems like this approximation somehow mimics the quantum field properties 
where SSB can only appear. This is probably why Sutcliffe and Woolley, see section 2, have 
put questions related to the transition from the isolated to the individual systems on the list of 
unsolved problems in quantum theory. In fact the solution of this problem, as presented here, 
is the key to providing a description of the SSB archetype on the quantum level. 
As stated here the application of the classical SSB, i.e. the Mexican hat, to quantum 
equations, such as the J-T effect, superconductivity or the Higgs mechanism, is a disparity. 
This results in a misinterpretation of related phenomena, and it reminds of the reincarnation of 
the notorious medieval puzzle, namely how many angels can dance on the apex of a needle, 
i.e. a comparable mismatch by combining a material piece of a needle with the spiritual world 
of angels. Consequently quantum equations, grounded on the classic SSB, lead to a 
paradoxical situation. Hence the scientific community appears divided in regard to the 
question whether SSB is presently accounted for or not. According to Bersuker, the J-T effect 
is a unique mechanism of all existing SSBs in condensed matter, while, according to 
Weinberg, quantum mechanics cannot lead to any SSB. Bardeen, Cooper and Schrieffer did 
not find any SSB in their theory of superconductivity, yet Weinberg wondered how they 
could miss it. In standard text books, the Higgs mechanism is described as a SSB mechanism, 
but gradually a strong opposition against this view has emerged, usually quoting the Elitzur's 
theorem [129], maintaining that local gauge symmetries cannot be spontaneously broken. The 
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tip of the iceberg is the statement by Anderson, that ferromagnetism is not a case of SSB. His 
opinion was condemned by Peierls and Kaplan, see their discussions in Ref. [130]. 
Finally, Unzicker in his book "The Higgs Fake: How Particle Physicists Fooled the 
Nobel Committee" [131] quotes the prophetic pronouncement of Rudolf Clausius: „Once the 
error is based like a foundation stone in the ground, everything is built thereupon, nevermore 
it returns to light.” In the following section we will return to the beginning of the many-body 
treatment in quantum physics, revealing an overlooked secret regarding the B-O 
approximation. Here one may anticipate the starting point of the whole inconsistent chain that 
culminates in the uncertainty of many physicists, which phenomenon is of the SSB type and 
which one is not. 
 
 
13. The paradox of one Bohr complementarity 
 
We begin by looking more carefully at the qualitative nature of the B-O approximation. 
Even if it has been successfully proven in most molecular many-body calculations as well as 
its accuracy verified times and again, it is nevertheless a very non-standard approximation. In 
its original derivation, via the m/M (electron mass/nuclear mass) series expansion, it is unique 
in the sense that no competing series exists, cf. the Brillouin-Wigner or the Rayleigh-
Schrödinger perturbation theories. In contrast to the latter, the B-O approximation is not only 
the basis of almost all molecular quantum chemical calculations, but it provides also a 
fundamental concept for molecular structure [132]. Since one knows that physical quantities, 
such as mass, charge, energy, momentum etc., need exact definitions, how is it then possible 
that molecular and crystalline structures are defined by an approximation. The latter must 
either be erroneous or alternatively not principally an approximation at all, hiding a precise 
and fundamental meaning. One reason for accepting the second choice, would be the 
argument by Sutcliffe and Woolley, see the section 2, regarding the simplest case of broken 
symmetries. For instance the Monkhorst-Cafiero-Adamowitz approach, dealing with isolated 
molecules, does not recognize any isomerism. They appear only on the B-O level, that deals 
exclusively with individual molecules. The conclusion is clear, no approximation will lead to 
new phenomena such as symmetry violations or even to making an ontological shift from 
isolated to individual order of the systems under investigation. Quoting again the challenge by 
Sutcliffe & Woolley, see section 2: „The interesting question is how to get from the quantum 
theory of an Isolated Molecule to a quantum theory of an individual molecule by rational 
mathematics.”  
Pioneering quantum mechanics, describing a system of nuclei and electrons, cannot 
answer the abovementioned dilemma. We need a field theoretical description of the fermions 
as renormalized electrons and the nuclei replaced by Goldstone bosons as vibrational, 
rotational and translational modes. As was shown in section 11, the field Hamiltonian (11.33) 
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satisfies this request finally resulting in the clamped-nuclei concept, the first step of the B-O 
approximation, yielding all the equations known from this approximation, such as those of 
Pople for the ab-initio calculation of vibrational frequencies (11.40,11.41) and the Born-
Huang ansatz (11.49). However, the clamped-nuclei concept is a contradictio in adjecto. For 
instance either one keeps the nuclei in mind, which can never be "clamped" since the nuclear 
positions do not commute with the total Hamiltonian, or one becomes fixed on the adjective 
"clamped", emphasizing instead of nuclei rather to speak about some traces or footprints, such 
as e.g. traces of electrons on the screen or traces of photons on a photographic plate. In a 
previous paper [108] I did introduce the notion of property-object dualism as follows: In 
quantum mechanics, nuclei and electrons represent objects to be described on an equal 
footing, and the vibrational modes are their common property. On the other hand, in quantum 
field theories the objects are represented by electrons and the Goldstone bosons, and "nuclear" 
positions or "clamped nuclei" are properties of the pertinent field equations. 
As far as adiabatic systems are concerned, we have shown a proof of the equivalency 
between the field equations and the mechanical equations based on the B-O concept. What 
happens for nonadiabatic systems? While the practice of the B-O model is limited to adiabatic 
systems, there are no such limitations for the field equations. They are valid on the whole 
scale from adiabatic to nonadiabatic. For example we proved in section 11 how the true field 
equations, based on Goldstone’s theorem, do lead to symmetry broken ground states with the 
degeneracy removed on the one-particle level in both J-T systems and superconductors. In 
contrast the B-O approach to nonadiabatic systems leads to metaphysical solutions that are 
based on linear combinations of degenerate states. For the case of an infinite number of 
degenerate states the B-O concept gives rise to Mexican hats and the Berry-phase problem in 
so-called J-T molecules, see Bersuker [112]: „…one of the simplest JT E Ä e problems with 
linear vibronic coupling yields an APES (Adiabatic Potential Energy Surface) in the form of a 
‘‘Mexican hat’’… For a long time, up to the last decade, not very much attention was paid to 
these conical intersections; rather they were viewed largely as a ‘‘theoretical curiosity.’’ This 
perception changed recently in view of the latest achievements in the treatment of such 
systems. One of these achievements is a generalization directly related to the JTE and now 
known as the topological (geometric) phase, or the Berry-phase problem… An important 
feature of the Berry-phase implications in JT problems is that the peculiar phase factor that 
changes the sign of the electronic wavefunctions and makes the ground vibronic state 
degenerate occurs only when one or an odd number of conical intersections are encircled, 
while it retains the same sign if an even number (including zero) are encircled. This was 
shown by direct calculation of the phase in the E Ä e problem. In fact, the phase is f0 = np, 
where n is the number of conical intersections encircled; for n = 0, 2, 4, ... the sign of the 
wavefunction does not change.” 
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The Berry-phase was mentioned above. The exact definition can be found in Berry’s 
original paper [133]: „A quantal system in an eigenstate, slowly transported round a circuit C 
by varying parameters R in its Hamiltonian H(R), will acquire a geometrical phase factor 
exp[ig (C)] in addition to the familiar dynamical phase factor… If C lies near a degeneracy of 
H, g (C) takes a simple form which includes as a special case the sign change of 
eigenfunctions of real symmetric matrices round a degeneracy.” However, there is a problem, 
since the Berry-phase, based on the definition above, cannot be applied to J-T molecules at 
all. For instance the B-O approximation can either be derived as a result of the m/M expansion 
or in an equivalent form using the hierarchical quantization process, i.e. first quantize the 
electronic motion at fixed classical nuclear positions and then a posteriori  quantize the 
nuclear motion. Applying the Berry-phase to J-T molecules is just a product of this type of 
hierarchical quantization. A more exact simultaneous quantization method, i.e. Monkhorst's 
approach, see section 2, or the quantum field approach using the full set of Goldstone bosons, 
presented here section 11, can never lead to a meaningful Berry-phase in J-T systems. 
In section 12 we mentioned the often quoted Weinberg attitude to the occurrence of 
SSB: Only infinite many-body systems and fields can be spontaneously broken, whereas 
finite systems due to the possible tunnelling between degenerate states cannot. But from the 
perspective of our analysis this attitude does not reflect the whole truth. Physicists often reject 
considerations that has even if only a little sniff of chemistry and do not realize that the 
simplest examples of SSB, such as isomerism arising on the platform of quantum chemistry in 
finite systems and that a revealing of the true nature of the B-O approximation is the correct 
response to a correct understanding of SSB. In fact, fields with infinite degrees of freedom are 
not necessary for SSB occurance at all.  
We have here argued that a field theoretical formulation are valid for molecules with 
finite degrees of freedom as well. Moreover, this theory is able to describe isomerism, i.e. 
SSB. On the other hand, many-body quantum mechanical applications, regardless of being 
finite or infinite, can never lead to any SSB. Based on Monkhorst's quantum mechanical 
approach, fully ignoring the B-O concept, one concludes that there is no isomerism, no 
ferromagnetism, no J-T effect, and no superconductivity. Ferromagnets, in calculations 
similar to those of Cafiero and Adamowitz, would look like giant molecules with full 
spherical symmetry and therefore without any SSB. J-T molecules would look like any other 
molecules with a non-degenerate electronic spectrum and superconductors looking like 
insulators. Only after the introduction of the B-O approximation, here a "dirty trick", the 
isomerism appears, and we can construct the simplest Heisenberg model of ferromagnetism. 
But this simplification makes only sense for adiabatic systems. However, in cases such as J-T 
molecules and superconductors, it yields ontologically incorrect results and here field 
methods based on the full set of Goldstone bosons must be applied. 
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In agreement with Weinberg's statement that every quantum system can be described by 
two profoundly different descriptions, either as a mechanical system or as a field system, and 
that only the second one recognizes SSB, one may ask if these two descriptions are still 
equivalently valid or whether only one of them is fundamentally correct. There is also the 
temptation to believe that the field approach supersedes the mechanical one, i.e. that the 
quantum field description should be seen as a generalization of quantum mechanics in the 
same way as general relativity becomes a generalization of special relativity. But listen to 
what Einstein said about this topic [18]: „Newton's theory deserves the name of a classical 
theory. It has nevertheless been abandoned since Maxwell and Hertz have shown that the idea 
of forces at a distance has to be relinquished and that one cannot manage without the idea of 
continuous "fields." The opinion that continuous fields are to be viewed as the only acceptable 
basic concepts, which must also be assumed to underlie the theory of the material particles, 
soon won out. Now this conception became, so to speak, "classical"; but a proper, and in 
principle complete, theory has not grown out of it. Maxwell's theory of the electric field 
remained a torso, because it was unable to set up laws for the behaviour of electric density, 
without which there can, of course, be no such thing as an electro-magnetic field. 
Analogously the general theory of relativity furnished then a field theory of gravitation, but 
no theory of the field-creating masses.” 
Einstein’s quote above indicates that we must accept both the mechanical- and the field 
description as equally valid. However, the mechanical description pictures every system as 
isolated with no SSB, while the field formulation allows SSB at the same time being 
responsible for the individual character of the system. The question becomes whether there is 
any mathematical transformation between them, as inquired by Sutcliffe & Woolley. This 
reminds on the first stage of the development of quantum physics, when it turned out that 
elementary entities had both mechanical properties (particles) and field properties (waves). 
Even if Bohr had introduced the concept of complementarity into physics, some physicists 
developed a negative attitude towards it and attempted to find direct transformations between 
particles and waves without the need for any complementarity, such as Einstein or de Broglie. 
In analogy with just how a century ago the different aspects of the mechanical and the field 
descriptions of elementary entities led to Bohr’s concept of complementarity, we are now in a 
similar situation with respect to the descriptions of the many-body system. Hence a second 
type of Bohr complementarity for the many-body level is requested.  
This suggestion does not sound weird, since a second type of complementarity was 
already requested a long time ago by one of the co-founder of quantum mechanics Pascual 
Jordan. In his now almost forgotten paper [134] he wrote: „We assume here an idealised 
photographic plate: Each photon hitting it will be absorbed, and a single photon will with 
certainty activate a certain silver grain... If we assume the exposed silver grain to be indeed in 
a state of well-defined decision as to its developability, then we must conclude that it is not 
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merely voluntary resignation on our part if we do not describe the silver grain in terms of 
wave functions of its single atoms. Doing so would entangle us in contradictions, as we have 
already seen above. Therefore the physical situation itself must contain guarantees that such 
contradictions cannot take place - and only a second type of complementarity can give this 
guarantee. There must exist in the silver grain a certain situation by which its description in 
terms of atomic wave functions is made impossible - only in this manner can the grain 
function as it does... It is then apparent that the situation - though it is clear to a certain extent 
- does not allow a complete and final analysis; there remain open certain questions. For one 
cannot avoid the difficulties merely by describing the silver grain (or an analogous part of any 
observational instrument) as a "mixture" of the form of the statistical matrix; this would not 
help us much, for it cannot describe an increase of entropy any better than the Schrödinger 
equation of a "pure case." It seems to me that entirely new conceptions are necessary.” 
This infers an extra quality of complementarity imparting a new type of quantum 
transitions on the many-body level, which cannot be deduced from any known rules of 
quantum physics. It entails a new axiom, and this axiom was requested by Jordan in the same 
paper [134]: „This leads us to acknowledge that it is both possible and necessary to formulate 
a physical axiom not formulated hitherto. Above we held it to be part of the definition of 
macrophysics, to show no complications in the manner of complementarity, but to allow a 
complete "objectivation" of phenomena in space and time. But usually one defines 
macrophysics only by stating that it deals with great numbers of microphysical individuals - 
and this is another and a different definition. We need therefore a special axiom to express the 
empirical fact that these two definitions define the same thing - that really each large 
accumulation of microphysical individuals always shows a well-defined state in space and 
time - that a stone never, unlike an electron, has indeterminate coordinates. One often vaguely 
believes this to be guaranteed already by Heisenberg's Δp·Δq > h; but in fact this relation only 
provides a possibility and not a necessity for the validity of our axiom. Let us assume that, in 
our experiment involving the photon, the photographic plate be removed, but that we have an 
arrangement whereby a macro-physical stone will fall according to the decision of the photon. 
Then, if we strictly assume v. Neumann's view, the stone comes to possess a wave function 
which makes it undecided whether it does fall or does not, and an observer has the 
opportunity to compel the stone to a decision by the mental process of forgetting that 
interference between the two wave functions of the falling stone would be possible. 
Schrödinger's famous cat is another illustration of this point. I think we can summarize the 
situation by saying that indeed a new feature - to be formulated by a new axiom - lies in the 
fact that such things do not happen; all formulations of quantum mechanics hitherto given do 
not suffice to exclude them. We are unable to make a clock with a hand which does not 
always point to a definite figure on the dial. This is a well-known fact, but a fact of which 
present theory gives no sufficient account.” 
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The suggested axiom above, is in our case relevant to describe quantum jumps between 
the isolated and individual characteristics of the many-body system, and provides a response 
to the request of Sutcliffe and Woolley. There is, however, one main obstacle regarding the 
definition of an isolated system. Every finite isolated system is subjectively defined and since 
transitions between isolated and individual systems are in principle immeasurable, one must 
necessarily exclude the subjectivity of the observer. As a consequence the isolated system 
must be identical with the whole Universe, with the individual systems then identical with its 
fragmentations. We have arrived at the problem of fragmentation and wholeness, cf. how it 
was framed by Bohm in the 3rd statement quoted in section 4. The second complementarity, 
embracing the whole Universe, is the megascopic mirror of the first Bohr microscopic 
complementarity. We have just touched ancient knowledge, i.e. presenting the Universe as a 
mosaic where the smallest one resembles the Greatest One. 
The new axiom presented here is necessary for the justification of quantum jumps of the 
Universe. From its state of total wholeness to its total fragmented states and vice versa, it 
certainly goes beyond the scope of the Copenhagen interpretation. Yet it neither contradicts 
nor denies this interpretation, but rather appears to be its natural extension. Then again, 
acceptance of this axiom implies the end of Everett's MWI (discussed in section 7). The MWI 
was promoted as a deterministic theory for the physical Universe and attempted to explain 
why a world appears to be indeterministic for human observers. The basic stipulation of MWI 
was to represent the whole Universe by a deterministic wave function. Although still popular, 
many physicists now have doubts about the completeness of such a description. Vaidman 
comments on this problem, i.e. whether the wave function is or not sufficient, in the following 
way [135]: „As mentioned above, the gap between the mathematical formalism of the MWI, 
namely the wave function of the Universe, and our experience is larger than in other 
interpretations. This is the reason why many thought that the ontology of the wave function is 
not enough. Bell 1987 (p.201) felt that either the wave function is not everything, or it is not 
right. He was looking for a theory with local “beables” [136].” 
Surely, the ontology of the wave function is not enough. It does not mean that it is not 
right, since no known experiment is in conflict with it. In fact the wave function is an 
incomplete description of the Universe. Most probably the protagonists of the MWI never 
gave a thought to the ontological problem of the B-O approximation, and therefore do not 
realize that their wave function is unable to describe real objects like molecules or solids, but 
only the subjectively defined isolated objects of different ontological meanings, where, 
according to the language of Cafiero and Adamowitz, instead of individual molecules one has 
only molecular atoms or atomic molecules, and instead of crystals only crystalline atoms or 
atomic crystals. 
However, the incomplete character of the wave function of the Universe should not set 
us off to look for some local “beables”. As we have seen, there is a complementary field 
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description of the Universe, leading ultimately to real objects, the symmetries of which can be 
broken. The second complementarity has an original significance for a proper understanding 
of all SSB phenomena. These processes have a sign of complexity and emergence, and 
therefore one must ask which fundamental principle lies behind. Rowlands has adequately 
formulated this request [137]: „This is symmetry, which we see all about us in the laws of 
physics, the fundamental interactions and the fundamental particles. Finding symmetries can 
help us to decomplexify our explanations, and, if we can understand where symmetry comes 
from, lead to more profound understanding. We should also note that some symmetries are 
broken; that is, what is fundamentally symmetric appears, under certain conditions, to display 
some asymmetry. The reason for this cannot be arbitrary, and if we can discover it, along with 
the reason for symmetry, this will be a big step in our understanding of the foundations. One 
thing it can’t be is fundamental because nature never acts in such an arbitrary way. It has to 
be, in some way, a sign of complexity or emergence.” 
With the up till now known laws of quantum physics one can simply only arrive at a 
mechanical many-body description with no symmetries violated and a field description 
exhibiting possible broken symmetries. But to suggest an explanation for the broken 
symmetry, understood as a transition from unbroken to broken states, on needs to accept the 
new axiom. We continue quoting Rowlands giving his opinion [137]: „Again, if we decide 
that simplicity is to be preferred over complexity, we should be looking for something that is 
staggeringly simple, yet somehow capable of generating complexity. If we think our basic 
idea is a complicated construction, say a 10-dimensional space-time, then we have no way of 
knowing how this breaks up into the simpler component parts that must exist because we have 
no fundamental mechanism for doing this. We should certainly take notice of what the string 
theorists say about the symmetries required by nature, and we should expect to find them, 
even those expressed in 10 dimensions, but we should expect to find them by working out 
how such a complex idea emerges from simpler ones, in which the structures of the 
components reveal them as diverse in origin, the ‘brokenness’ of the larger symmetry coming 
from its inherent complexity, not by some arbitrarily-imposed concept of ‘symmetry-
breaking’. Broken symmetries are a sure signature of complexity, not of simplicity.” 
In the above citation Rowlands has touched upon the crucial problem how symmetry 
breaking is comprehended today as some arbitrarily imposed conception. Yet if the second 
complementarity is original, then every SSB is an emergent process, i.e. the succession of 
events, appearing either on the microscopic or the macroscopic level, as a consequence of the 
perpetual sequence of megascopic quantum jumps between states that represent the wholeness 
and the fragmentation of the Universe. 
Unfortunately megascopic quantum jumps are not measurable. This fact is reflected in 
emergent SSB phenomena, such as superconductivity and the J-T effect being the best-known 
examples. Knowing, that the density and velocity of superconducting carriers are non-
 74 
measurable in principle, see section 9, Bersuker describes a similar situation in J-T systems 
[112]: „Among other things Van Vleck [138] wrote that “it is a great merit of the J-T effect 
that it disappears when not needed.” This declaration reflects the situation when there was 
very poor understanding of what observable effects should be expected as a consequence of 
the J-T theorem. The point is that the simplified formulation of the consequences of the J-T 
theorem as “spontaneous distortion” is incomplete and therefore inaccurate, and may lead to 
misunderstanding. In fact, there are several (or an infinite number of) equivalent directions of 
distortion, and the system may resonate between them (the dynamic J-T effect)... It does not 
necessarily lead to observable nuclear configuration distortion, and this explains why such 
distortions often cannot be observed directly... Even in 1960 Low in his book [139] stated that 
“it is a property of the J-T effect that whenever one tries to find it, it eludes measurements.”” 
Bersuker's countering argument against Van Vleck and Low can only be acceded from 
the point of view of the microscopic origin of the J-T effect. But as we have realized, the J-T 
effect is a megascopic phenomenon. Any other attempt to explain this effect microscopically 
leads inevitably to paradoxes. From a microscopic perspective quantum tunnelling between 
differently distorted J-T states restores the original symmetry provided one considers a 
sufficiently long period of time. And this opens directly the problem discussed at the end of 
the previous section, i.e. is there any SSB or not. Moreover considering the simplest 
microscopic example of quantum tunnelling, the particle in a box, divided into two parts by a 
barrier. If the particle is initially located in the first part, after an extended time period it will 
be found with the same probability in both parts. But in the case of the J-T effect, there is no 
observer who selects one of the possible distorted J-T states. Therefore the microscopic 
concept of quantum tunnelling cannot be applied to the J-T effect, and Van Vleck and Low 
were absolutely right, when they challenged its direct measurability. Incidentally microscopic 
processes are causal, while megascopic ones are teleological. Teleology interpreted as the 
final cause can be then understood as downward causality, descending from the Greatest One, 
the whole Universe, in contrast to the upward causality, ascending from the smallest entities, 
the elementary particles. In this way teleology finally gains a primary significance, as it was 
requested by Bohm, quoted in his 1st statement in section 4. Causality in physics has its well-
established empirical basis, but the principal non-measurability of megascopic phenomena 
might perhaps be the main reason why teleology is not till now explicitly incorporated in the 
exact sciences. 
Approaching the next questions, i.e. what identifies the probabilities of megascopic 
quantum jumps, and what are the megascopic mirrors of the microscopic projection and the 
Born rule, Bohm in his 5th cited statement, see above, speaks about projections and 
injections. Indeed the latter phrase agrees perfectly with a requested megascopic mirror of the 
former. One can observe in various international forums that some scientists do feel that there 
is a connection between the mechanism of SSB and Zurek's einselection, but that no one 
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knows exactly how the latter might explicitly be incorporated. The quantum decoherence 
program is focused on replacing the Born rule by einselection and entirely removing the von 
Neumann - Wigner rule, see section 7. This program, however, was inspired by Universal 
Darwinism, and Darwin was himself a teleologist, with a telic notion of adaptation. Therefore 
an environmentally induced superselection rule must be of teleological origin and co-exists 
with the Born law being its megascopic mirror. 
Unlike the Born rule einselection is not defined by some simple formula. If the 
environmental perturbation is negligible, the probability of transition into each of the n 
distorted J-T states equals 1/n. Alternatively, if we have an isomer with two possible 
configurations, e.g. a right-handed and left-handed molecule, and the environmental influence 
prefers the right-handed one, then the transition probability for the latter equals one and for 
the other equalling zero. In superconductors transition probabilities between distorted ground 
states are given by the magnitude of the external magnetic field.  
Note that Bohm's 2nd statement, implicates a limited world view, based on microscopic 
quantum physics, dealing with elementary particles as 'basic building blocks' out of which 
everything is made, but it also promotes an image of the old materialistic idea of Democritus. 
In contrast, megascopic quantum phenomena can be seen as reflections of Plato's Forms. As  
recognized, the world of Plato and his a-spatial and a-temporal Forms are transcendental to 
our own world of substances, i.e. space and time respectively. It is superordinate to matter.  
Since megascopic quantum jumps are not directly measurable, one may wonder whether 
the claim has any meaning at all. For instance do they proceed at some given time as a 
microscopic quantum jump or is there any relationship to time at all? An answer might 
emerge by looking carefully what the attribute "a-temporal" in world of Plato exactly means: 
A Form does not exist within any time period, rather it provides the formal basis for time. 
One should perhaps ask whether quantum physics uses a similar time concept as 
classical/relativistic physics. Here is the view of Lee Smolin on the nature of time [141]: „ 
More and more, I have the feeling that quantum theory and general relativity are both deeply 
wrong about the nature of time. It is not enough to combine them. There is a deeper problem, 
perhaps going back to the beginning of physics.” In other words it means going back to Plato 
and Aristotle. In Plato's Forms we will finally find the true relationship between megascopic 
quantum jumps and time, i.e. these jumps do not proceed in time, rather time is created by 
them. At the megascopic level this gives rise to the concept of quantum of time, which 
otherwise is unreachable at the microscopic level. Microscopic quantum theory yields quanta 
of energy, momentum, angular momentum etc., but never a quantum of time or of space. 
Different objects have different energies, momenta etc., but the Universe is one, the time is 
one, and the space is one. In this sense megascopic quantum jumps are the true clock of the 
Universe. 
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Focusing now on the relationship time - events. In Newtonian physics time is 
foundational, and events that can happen at any moment of time are subordinate. Despite the 
fact that microscopic quantum physics shares the concept of time with classical physics, 
events do not play the subordinate role there, but are original as well as time and independent 
on it. On one hand we have time evolution of the wave function, representing only 
Aristotelian potentiality, and on the other we have reality created during the measurement 
process by timeless events - microscopic quantum jumps. And just this separation of the 
events from time is the source of almost all philosophical problems of contemporary quantum 
physics. Bell wrote a very poignant parody relevant to this topic [136]:  „It would seem that 
the theory is exclusively concerned with "results of measurement" and has nothing to say 
about anything else. When the "system" in question is the whole world where does one find 
the "measurer"? Inside, rather than outside, presumably. What exactly qualifies some 
subsystems to play this role? Was the world wave function waiting to jump for thousands of 
millions of years until a single-celled living creature appeared? Or did it have to wait a little 
longer for some more highly qualified measurer - with a Ph.D.? If the theory is to apply to 
anything but idealized laboratory operations, are we not obliged to admit that more or less 
"measurement-like" processes are going on more or less all the time more or less everywhere? 
Is there ever then a moment when there is no jumping and the Schrödinger equation applies?” 
Bell was certainly correct in his view regarding "measurement-like" processes above. 
Our “megascopic quantum jumps” do correspond to Bell's request, and since the origin of 
time is rooted in megascopic events, we are able to finally reunite time and events on the 
quantum level. However, unlike events on the classical level those in the quantum case will 
be foundational and time subordinate. This idea, in fact, goes back to ancient times. Aristotle 
expressed this opinion in his Physics, Book I, Part 14, where he defined time as "the number 
of movement in respect of before and after". Thus it cannot exist without a succession, and it 
does not exist on its own rather it is relative to the motions of things [142]. Moreover, 
Aristotle's concept of time is more suitable for quantum theory than Newtonian classical 
mechanics, when he says that time, in order to exist, requires the presence of a soul capable of 
"numbering" the movement. This statement complies with the von Neumann - Wigner rule. 
One might wonder why the Newtonian and Aristotelian concepts of time are so 
different. Pondering this issue, one must not forget that the Greek language has two 
expressions for time: χρόνος, chronos, and καιρός, kairos, while the Latin language only one 
expression tempus. Our way of thinking is to a large extent influenced by our spoken 
language. The Newtonian time concept is basically pragmatic, but it is unable to explain the 
time arrow problem (see section 3). If we accept the premise that all processes in the Universe 
consist only of microscopic and megascopic events and therefore that irreversibility is  
foundational, then the arrow of time naturally develops from Aristotle's definition of time as 
"the number of movement in respect of before and after". Emergent time reversibility can 
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only appear in subsystems with no SSB (mostly adiabatic systems), where a one-to-one 
correspondence between the mechanical and the field states holds. These subsystems can then 
be described by reversible evolution as formulated by the Schrödinger equation. This 
contradicts Santilli’s claim, see section 3, since irreversibility in the Universe has its origin in 
irreversible microscopic and megascopic events.  
Before ending this section we will focus on the second Bohr complementarity asking: 
why did only Jordan called for it and not Bohr himself? Actually, Bohr did put forward 
another type of complementarity between observational conditions of animate and inanimate 
nature [61]: „In this promising development we have to do with a very important and, 
according to its character, hardly limited extension of the application of purely physical and 
chemical ideas to biological problems, and since quantum mechanics appears as a rational 
generalization of classical physics, the whole approach may be termed mechanistic. The 
question, however, is in what sense such progress has removed the foundation for the 
application of so-called finalistic arguments in biology. Here we must realize that the 
description and comprehension of the closed quantum phenomena exhibit no feature 
indicating that an organization of atoms is able to adapt itself to the surroundings in the way 
we witness in the maintenance and evolution of living organisms. Furthermore, it must be 
stressed that an account, exhaustive in the sense of quantum physics, of all the continually 
exchanged atoms in the organism not only is infeasible but would obviously require 
observational conditions incompatible with the display of life.” 
This can undoubtedly be understood as the third complementarity, which, although 
Bohr mentions here teleological (finalistic) arguments, has nothing to do with the second one. 
Life is a mystery, and no hitherto available knowledge, as e.g. the discovery of DNA, and no 
finalistic arguments are sufficient to explain it. However, Bohr becomes here aware of the 
teleological origin of Darwinian adaptation, in stark contrast to his contemporary quantum 
scientists who did not see it at all. He, on the other hand, was convinced that teleological 
adaptation only appeared in living organisms and he never considered the possibility of its 
occurrence in inanimate matter, such as in all SSB phenomena. Yet by realizing the 
distinction between causal and teleological phenomena, Bohr was very close to formulating 
the second kind of complementarity [61]: „In biological research, references to features of 
wholeness and purposeful reactions of organisms are used together with the increasingly 
detailed information on structure and regulatory processes that has resulted in such great 
progress not least in medicine. We have here to do with a practical approach to a field where 
the means of expression used for the description of its various aspects refer to mutually 
exclusive conditions of observation. In this connection, it must be realized that the attitudes 
termed mechanistic and finalistic are not contradictory points of view, but rather exhibit a 
complementary relationship which is connected with our position as observers of nature.” 
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Bohr states correctly, that attitudes termed mechanistic (causal) and finalistic 
(teleological) are not contradictory, but fails, in my opinion, when saying that they are in a 
complementary relationship. Actually there is no complementarity between them because 
they do co-exist side by side. Summarizing, the first complementarity represents a causal 
microscopic relationship between mechanical and field descriptions of elementary entities 
(the particle-wave dualism), the second complementarity epitomizes the teleological 
megascopic relationship between the mechanical and the field descriptions of the whole 
Universe, where these two descriptions deal with the centre of gravity in different ways. This 
conclusion is a direct consequence of the Goldstone theorem, proved by Goldstone, Salam, 
and Weinberg, incidentally in the same year when Bohr died. Unfortunately, as already 
pointed out, a year later the Goldstone theorem was misconstrued by Anderson, see section 
10, and as a result there appeared an inconsistent Higgs mechanism, which would never 
reveal a second complementarity. 
 
 
14. The second quantum floor 
 
The transition from classical to microscopic quantum physics is nicely distinguished if 
one compares the Rutherford and the Bohr atomic models. In the former an electron needs to 
accelerate its movement in order to achieve a higher energy level around the nucleus. In the 
Bohr model there is no need for any movement or acceleration; all electrons occupy certain 
quantum states and transitions to another level occur by way of quantum jumps. 
In addition to the microscopic quantum domain, mentioned above and which we name 
the first quantum floor, one also has the whole scale of megascopic phenomena, operating on 
a second quantum floor. Surprisingly we are here in a similar situation compared to a century 
ago. The microscopic quantum description all of a sudden has become insufficient. Note that 
we have repeatedly discussed this issue in previous sections, e.g. for transitions between 
isomers and distorted J-T states in molecules, and in superconductors, and found that 
microscopic tunnelling, represented by the direct movement of elementary particles, is 
entirely outside the scope of the given problem. We need an additional concept of megascopic 
quantum jumps appearing either on the microscopic or the macroscopic level, which is in a 
similar relation to microscopic tunnelling as the concept of microscopic quantum jumps, in 
the Bohr model, relates to the classical electronic movement in the Rutherford model. 
Concentrating briefly on superconductivity and its megascopic origin, we recapitulate 
the three main reasons why superconductivity does not have any microscopic explanation, see 
also sections 9 and 11: 
1) Every microscopic theory must result in Born’s rule for the probabilities related to 
the density and the velocity of the superconducting carriers, and these quantities have to be 
experimentally measurable. But as we know, they are in principle non-measurable. 
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2) No microscopic theory allows us to avoid the universal concept of Bloch states for 
the description of superconducting carriers. It means that the carrier mass must take the 
effective mass of the electrons into account. This, however, is in direct contradiction with 
measurements of the London moment, where only bare electronic masses are reported.  
3) According to the second form of van Fraassen's argument, asymmetry cannot arise ex 
nihilo. Although we know that the original asymmetry around the superconductor can be 
present in the form of an external magnetic field, no microscopic theory is able to explain the 
Meissner effect mechanism, when the superconductor is cooled below the critical temperature 
and the constant magnetic field cannot bring about any acceleration of the superconducting 
carriers. It means that a microscopic theory is unable to implement the original asymmetry, 
and this fact contradicts the mentioned second form of the van Fraassen argument. 
Nevertheless, superconductors can be described macroscopically on the quantum level. 
The concept of macroscopically-occupied quantum states was proposed by London [66]. The 
macroscopic wave function obtains as 
 
 (14.1) 
with the phase θ and the amplitude Ψ0 characterizing the density, ns, of the superconducting 
carriers. From this equation, using the well-known relation between the kinetic and the 
canonical momentum, one gets the expression for the velocity of superconducting carriers 
 
 (14.2) 
and after taking the curl of the velocity 
 (14.3) 
and substituting from (9.1) one finally obtains the phenomenological London equation (9.5). 
It is interesting to note that from London’s macroscopic wave function (14.1) one can derive 
Josephson’s equations [143]. Hence in this formulation one does not need any microscopic 
concepts of superconductivity, as was already shown by Feynman [144]. Considering the 
solution of an easier case of a SIS (Superconductor-Insulator-Superconductor) junction, both 
“superconductor bodies” start to 'feel' each other at a certain distance, e.g. of the order of 
nanometres, because of the estimated coherence length consistent with their wave functions. 
Feynman proposed two coupled time dependent equations 
 
 (14.4) 
where K is a phenomenological parameter which describes the properties of the insulating 
barrier. From the Eqs. (14.1) and (14.4) one simply obtains the first Josephson equation 
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 (14.5) 
and the second Josephson equation 
 (14.6) 
where U(t) and I(t) are the voltage across and the current through the Josephson junction, θ2 - 
θ1 is the phase difference across the junction, and Ic is a phenomenological constant, 
representing the "critical current" of the junction. 
One should observe that the ground and the excitation states of the superconductors 
have a microscopic explanation, as well as all solids etc. Previously we have derived the J-T 
distorted ground state of superconductors, represented by the Eq. (11.52), and their excited 
states, Eqs. (11.54,55). However, superconductivity itself, as caused by the transitions 
between distorted J-T states, has no microscopic explanation. At this point microcosm and 
megacosm does shake hands. 
Whereas Eqs. (11.52,54,55) are of the Bloch type, the transitions between the distorted 
J-T states, the Fourier mirror of the Bloch functions - the Wannier functions - is more 
transparent. From the Bloch functions 
 (14.7) 
and after the application of the Fourier transformation we get the Wannier functions 
 (14.8) 
where N is the number of primitive cells in the crystal and R is any lattice vector. There is one 
Wannier function for each Bravais lattice vector. The sum on k includes all the values of k in 
the Brillouin zone. The Wannier functions fulfil the relation 
 
 (14.9) 
Using Wannier functions instead of the Bloch ones, the electronic wave function can be then 
rewritten as 
 (14.10) 
In this notation the spin orbitals I (or orbitals i and spins σ) are related to the lattice vectors R. 
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Fig. 1 shows two microscopic solutions for the superconductor ground state: the 
mechanical one based on the Monkhorst-Cafiero-Adamowitz approach with no broken 
symmetry and the same lattice constant a as in the conducting state above the critical 
temperature; and the field one with J-T broken symmetry and the lattice constant 2a. As said 
in previous sections, one needs a new rule allowing direct transitions from a mechanical state 
reflecting the whole Universe, into the field states that descends from the fragmentation of the 
Universe – and vice versa. During these megascopic quantum jumps the electron pairs, 
valence orbitals occupied by two electrons with opposite spins (no Cooper pairs) have the 
chance either to be relocated in the right or left directions, or to return into their original 
position, depending on the external magnetic field that determines the einselection factor µ. In 
the simplest one-dimensional case there are only three possible discrete values of µ, namely -
1, 0 and 1. 
In passing we note that only the idea of megascopic quantum jumps is able to overcome 
the three abovementioned main problems regarding any attempt to explain superconductivity 
microscopically. First, immeasurable megascopic quantum jumps imply non-measurability of 
the density and the velocity of superconducting carriers. Second, the "teleportation" of 
superconducting carriers, a new kind of non-local quantum phenomenon, guarantees the bare 
electronic mass in the London moment measurements. Third, only the holistic incorporation 
of the environment by way of megascopic einselection is capable of responding to the 
asymmetry in the form of an external magnetic field. Henceforth there is also no contradiction 
to the second form of van Fraassen's argument, and the Meissner effect can thus be explained. 
Returning to the field solutions of Fig. 1, depicting distorted nuclear positions with the 
adequate electronic redistribution one realizes that the electrons form some kind of "chemical 
Quantum mechanical original symmetry
Quantum field symmetry breaking
µ = -1
µ = 0
µ = 1
FIG 1: Megascopic quantum jumps between the quantum
mechanical and quantum field states of the Universe, leading
to the megascopic tunnelling of superconducting carriers.
nuclei with electronic core
valence electrons in symmetric quantum mechanical and
asymmetric quantum field positions
einselection (environment-induced superselection) factor
original lattice constant before the symmetry breaking
µ
a
2 a
a
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bonds" occupied by two electrons with opposite spins. As it was explained in the previous 
section, megascopic quantum jumps do not occur in time, but time is created by them. 
Denoting the quantum time scale as τ, the time t = nτ will be understood as the interval of n 
megascopic events, i.e. n transitions from the field state to the complementary mechanical 
state and back. After two megascopic events, considering only a one-dimensional chain, the 
valence orbitals occupied by the two electrons will be relocated to new positions, which are in 
the following relation to the original positions 
 
 (14.11) 
 
Here the phase θ appears at the macroscopic level, reflecting the "teleportation" of 
superconducting carriers, i.e. the valence orbitals occupied by two electrons. In our 
megascopic interpretation, unlike the BCS theory which associates this phase with the motion 
of carriers in Bloch’s k space, the phase is associated with the macroscopic l space, 
orthogonal to the Bloch k space: 
 (14.12) 
This equation gives us a relation between the macroscopic momentum, and the carrier mass 
and the velocity. The carrier mass corresponds to the double valued electronic mass, as well 
as the carrier charge to the double valued electronic charge. The superconducting carriers 
appears without the mentioning of Cooper pairs; they are identical with the smallest relocated 
entities - double occupied valence orbitals. Using Eq. (14.9) one gets 
 
 (14.13) 
and after two megascopic events Eq. (14.10) transforms into the new expression: 
 
 (14.14) 
 
Finally generalizing Eq. (14.13) for an arbitrary time t = 2nτ and to the three-dimensional 
case, where instead of discrete values of the einselection factor we have the real interval 
, one obtains the relations 
 
 (14.15) 
 
Note that Eq. (14.14) can be generalized for arbitrary times, meaning, that in this way we 
have arrived at London’s macroscopic wave function (14.1). 
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There arises an interesting question, whether the quantum of time from the Eq. (14.12) 
can be measured. Since we do not know the value of the einselection factor µ, an extremely 
large magnetic field should be necessary in order to achieve the maximal value of µ, i.e. -1 or 
1. Unfortunately there is a limit for the magnitude of applied external magnetic fields, because 
the induced field destroys the superconducting state above the critical value of the current. 
This critical value is certainly much smaller than the one given by the maximal value of the 
einselection factor µ. 
We should perhaps salute Peirce's prophetic statement, see section 12, regarding 
classical mechanics and symmetry breakings, namely that the three laws of motion draw no 
dynamical distinction between right-handed and left-handed screws, and that there are 
physical phenomena, standing entirely beyond all corpuscular philosophy, yet absolutely 
inexplicable by mechanical action. Though his claim dates back to the pre-quantum era, it is 
surprisingly still valid for microscopic quantum physics, based on Bohr’s correspondence 
principle. Therefore contemporary quantum physics has never succeeded to explain the 
Meissner effect, and if not the Meissner effect, it also concerns superconductivity. Any 
attempt to find their microscopic solutions inevitably implicates the breakdown of Bohr’s 
correspondence principle, see section 9. Thus the BCS theory and all theories, based on the 
microscopic dynamics of the superconducting carriers, whatever these carries may be, 
whether unpaired or Cooper paired electrons, polarons, bipolarons etc., are still inadequate. 
Only a holistic megascopic quantum theory is able to overthrow the traditional corpuscular 
philosophy, and to explain the Meissner effect and superconductivity. 
Most physicists agrees, that superfluidity should have an analogous explanation as 
compared to superconductivity. However if superconductivity has no microscopic 
explanation, superfluidity does not, too. Superfluidity shares with superconductivity the 
macroscopic wave function (14.1). In a similar way, cf. Eq. (14.2), follows from (14.1) in the 
case  of superconductors, that we can write  
 
 (14.16) 
where the magnetic field A is not present as in Eq. (14.2) and the superconducting carrier 
mass ms is replaced with the superfluid particle mass Ms. This leads to the quantization of the 
superfluid hydrodynamic circulation κ: 
 (14.17) 
By analogy physicists attempt to see the common feature of both phenomena employing 
some type of Bose-Einstein condensation, involving atoms or pairs of atoms or pairs of 
electrons. In this way the interpretations of superfluidity in helium-4 and helium-3 atoms 
differ: The first one is treated as a direct Bose-Einstein condensation of bosonic particles, 
whereas the latter one deals with the formation of bosons only by pairing of two fermionic 
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atoms similar to the BCS mechanism of electronic Cooper pairing. This sounds a bit odd - 
why should the different isotopic number change the whole mechanism of superfluidity? 
We may actually impose a stronger requirement for superconductivity and superfluidity: 
Let they have, not only a common explanation, but let they also be two manifestations of the 
same phenomenon. Superfluids consist of two components - normal and superfluid. Let us 
suppose that the latter can form microscopic superconducting grains. Consider a model of a 
caterpillar truck. The superconducting carriers - "teleported" valence orbitals are temporarily 
"glued" on the surface of tube or capillary, exactly like the caterpillar on the ground. The 
nuclei then act like the truck. It is all about the relative relocation of the nuclei with the 
electronic core and the superconducting carriers: In superconductors the nuclei with the 
electronic core are macroscopically in rest and the superconducting carriers are relocated. In 
superfluids the opposite is true. 
Let us now discuss other megascopic phenomena. Ferromagnetism can be understood as 
a macroscopic analogy of microscopic isomerism. Both phenomena have a microscopic 
quantum explanation. But the tunnelling between different isomers and between ferromagnets 
with different spin orientation is of megascopic origin and has no microscopic clarification. 
The latter case is known as the Einstein-de Haas effect [118] or Richardson effect [145]. 
Richardson was the first to conclude, from the principle of the conservation of angular 
momentum that the change in the magnetic moment of a free body causes this body to rotate. 
At that time no electron spin was known, so Richardson derived a prequantum relation 
between the magnetization Mo and total orbital angular momentum Jo of the motion 
 (14.18) 
where e and m stand for electron charge and mass. But as soon as the electron spin was 
discovered in 1925, it was clear that its contribution to the Einstein-de Haas effect in 
ferromagnets significantly predominates over the contribution of the angular momentum. So 
instead of Eq. (14.18) one has 
 (14.19) 
with a gyromagnetic factor equal to 2. For deeper insight into the exact value of the 
gyromagnetic factor, see e.g. Maruani's article [146]. The similarity between Eqs. (14.18) and 
(14.19) demonstrates that the spin momentum should be of the same nature as the angular 
momentum of rotating bodies as conceived in classical mechanics. Quoting Maruani 
regarding the explanation he says in his work [147]: „The Dirac equation, which was derived 
by combining the relativistic invariance condition with the quantum probability principle, 
showed its fecundity by explaining the half-integer spin of fermions and by predicting 
antiparticles. In previous papers, we conjectured that the spinning motion of the electron was 
that of a massless charge moving at light velocity, this internal motion being responsible for 
the electron rest mass involved in external motions and interactions.” 
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Proceeding further to non-equilibrium phenomena with the focus on chemical reactions. 
Quantum chemists usually and successfully formulate the problem and solve them with the 
help of microscopic quantum physical equations often without further thinking. They 
calculate potential energy surfaces (PES) of interacting molecules finding energy landscapes 
including energy minima and maxima, construing their results to interpret the investigated 
chemical reactions. This concept, however, does not answer the question, what a chemical 
reactions really amounts to. The critical point comes when PES’s cross. This metaphysical 
concept is a fundamental consequence of the application of the B-O approximation, exactly as 
the misunderstood J-T effect. True quantum mechanical solutions, treating electrons and 
nuclei on the same footing, never lead to any symmetry breaking in J-T systems, as well as to 
any chemical reactions, since they do not recognize the individuality of molecules and their 
constituents. Only the true field solution based on the Goldstone theorem implies symmetry 
broken J-T states and recognizes the individual reacting molecules. If we have a reaction of 
the type A + B ←→ C (in both directions), then the left side contains nA + nB - 12 phonons, 6 
rotons and 6 translons, and the right side nC phonons, 3 rotons and 3 translons. The number of 
Goldstone bosons during the reaction is preserved, and the chemical reaction happens only if 
3 rotons and 3 translons are annihilated and 6 phonons are created, or vice versa. This is a 
megascopic irreversible process - a quantum jump from the fragmented Universe, containing 
individual molecules A and B, into the whole Universe, where the molecular individuality is 
lost, and then again in the fragmented Universe with the molecule C of the same energy as 
that of A + B in the same configuration at which the reaction proceeds, or vice versa. 
We know well the irreversible nature of chemical reactions, and Santilli was a half 
century ago absolutely right with his "no reduction theorem", see section 2. It means, that 
contemporary quantum physics with its reversible equations can never justify this 
irreversibility, and therefore is unable to explain a single chemical reaction. It is able to 
explain only the physical pre- and postprocesses occurring during reactions, but not the 
chemical reactions themselves. Santilli still believes in the microscopic explanation of 
chemical reactions, and has proposed an irreversible mathematical framework for physical 
equations. We have shown that chemical reactions belong to the group of megascopic 
phenomena, where irreversibility descends from the megascopic quantum jumps, and thus no 
irreversible equations are necessary. 
If physical entropy is assigned to the multitude of equivalent isomeric molecular ground 
states there appears another paradox of residual entropy arising from chemistry. One of the 
first examples of residual entropy was already pointed out by Pauling to describe water-ice 
[148]. In water, each oxygen atom is bonded to two hydrogen atoms. For a large number of 
water molecules in this configuration, the hydrogen atoms have a large number of possible 
configurations that meet the 2-in 2-out rule, since each oxygen atom must have two 'near' (or 
'in') hydrogen atoms, and two far (or 'out') hydrogen atoms. This freedom exists down to 
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absolute zero. The existence of these multiple configurations amounts to randomness, or in 
other words, entropy. Thus systems that can take multiple configurations at or near absolute 
zero are said to have residual entropy. Of course, residual entropy is in strong contradiction 
with the third law of thermodynamics that states: the entropy of a perfect crystal of any pure 
substance approaches zero as the temperature approaches absolute zero. Here one might 
suggest a megascopic solution to this paradox. Realizing, that possible tunnelling between 
different isomeric configurations of ice is of megascopic origin, i.e. microscopically 
inaccessible, then it is convenient to introduce a separate "chemical" entropy for megascopic 
processes, so that the physical third law of thermodynamics remains still valid. 
A second example of the illusive violation of the third law of thermodynamics is the 
liquid–glass transition with actually a negative residual entropy. There are several differences 
between liquid-crystal and liquid–glass transitions. In the first case the arrangement of atoms 
and molecules differs from that of a liquid, but in the second case this arrangement is 
indistinguishable from it. In the first case there is a first-order phase transition involving 
discontinuities in thermodynamic and dynamic properties such as volume, energy (latent 
heat), and viscosity. This is a transition between states of thermodynamic equilibrium at a 
single, well-defined temperature and is time reversible. In the second case there is no first-
order phase transition, no latent heat and no well-defined temperature: the slower the cooling, 
the lower the transition temperature. This is a non-equilibrium and irreversible process 
forming a quenched disorder state, kinetically locked. Its entropy, density and structure 
depend on the thermal history. By extrapolating the heat capacity of the supercooled liquid 
below its glass transition temperature, it is possible to calculate the Kauzmann temperature 
[149] at which the difference in entropy between the liquid and solid phase becomes zero. 
Cooling below this temperature leads to the Kauzmann paradox: A supercooled liquid 
displays a lower entropy than the crystal phase. This paradox was not resolved till now, 
although there are several proposals how to deal with it. Kauzmann himself postulated that all 
supercooled liquids must crystallize before the Kauzmann temperature is reached. But the 
scientific community has no unique opinion. 
The most striking enigma of the liquid–glass transition is this: If we use classical 
physics for its calculation, i.e. classical thermodynamics and thermodynamics of irreversible 
processes, we end up with the Kauzmann paradox and the negative residual entropy at 
absolute zero. But on the other hand if we perform the computation of energy landscapes 
based on the concept of broken ergodicity in the configurational phase space with an entropy 
loss, a glass does not appear to have any residual entropy at absolute zero. Anderson was 
inspired by this controversy so utterly that he wrote [150]: „The deepest and most interesting 
unsolved problem in solid state theory is probably the theory of the nature of glass and the 
glass transition.” 
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Different results from macroscopic and microscopic calculations imply that the physical 
microscopic description in this case does not reveal all facts about the macroscopic world. 
Simply the macroscopic and microscopic entropies are not the same. The irreversible and the 
non-equilibrium processes behind the glass transition are chemical reactions, giving rise to the 
creation of anisotropic covalent bonds in polymorphic forms of glass. Analogous to the case 
of Pauling's ice, we need here a separation of the physical microscopic entropy from the 
megascopic chemical one, in order not to violate the third law of thermodynamics. 
Another paradox arises from the query: do chemical reactions exist on the macroscopic 
level? A nice example of the type C → A + B is brittle fracture. Unlike ductile fracture this 
effect has no microscopic quantum explanation and is described phenomenologically only by 
classical physics. Once a crack starts to propagate in a brittle solid its velocity may quickly 
reach unbelievable several thousands of m/s [151], whereas in ductile fracture there is only a 
slow propagation of the crack. Further differences are [152]: Ductile material fractures after 
plastic deformation and its surface obtained at the fracture is dull or fibrous in appearance. A 
ductile crack will usually not propagate unless an increased stress is applied and generally 
cease propagating when loading is removed. On the other hand, brittle fractures are 
characterised as having little or no plastic deformation prior to failure and the fracture surface 
of a brittle failure is usually reasonably smooth. The cracks that propagate in a brittle material 
will continue to grow once initiated. Although brittle fracture has no microscopic explanation, 
there are nevertheless two categories of cracks from the microscopic perspective [152], (i) a 
crack that passes through the grains within the material undergoing transgranular fracture, (ii) 
a crack that propagates along the grain boundaries termed an intergranular fracture. 
The most interesting fracture feature process is a ductile to brittle transition. At low 
temperatures some materials that would be ductile at room temperature become brittle. It 
means that at higher temperatures the fracture is of microscopic origin, but under the critical 
temperature it is of megascopic origin. Compare for instance the relation as microscopic 
normal conductivity under the critical temperature becomes megascopic superconductivity. 
This similarity is certainly not accidental, since materials that usually fracture in a brittle 
manner are glasses, ceramics, and some polymers and metals. This also explains why good 
superconductors are usually formed with brittle ceramics on the verge of rupture. 
 
Table 1:  Megascopic phenomena 
megascopic 
phenomena 
equilibrium processes non-equilibrium 
processes adiabatic systems non-adiabatic systems 
microscopic level isomeric transitions Jahn-Teller effect chemical reactions 
macroscopic level Einstein-de Haas 
effect 
superconductivity 
and superfluidity 
brittle fracture 
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In Table 1 we have summarized the mentioned teleological megascopic phenomena, 
appearing on both the microscopic and the macroscopic level. This can be considered the 
fulfilment of Norton's request to overcome the restricted domain of contemporary physics that 
concentrates solely on causal processes [52]: „In the physical sciences, an important reason 
for choosing a restricted domain is to fence off processes that are acausal. A second reason to 
which I gave less attention, is that different domains manifest different sorts of causes... I 
expect the case of final causes to be prevalent in chemistry and non-physical sciences - that 
the restriction to different domains will divide different types of causation, as opposed to 
fencing off acausal processes.” 
This is also a fulfilment of Jordan's request, see section 13, to introduce the second 
complementarity in order to explain classicality. Megascopic chemical processes are 
responsible for the quantum decoherence of the wave function, and the classical appearance 
of the silver grain on the photographic plate follows accordingly. From the same reason 
Schrödinger’s cat can never be in some state of superposition. Either the irreversible 
megascopic event, representing the chemical reaction between the poison and the cat happens 
or it does not, and nothing in between. 
To conclude, this might also be an answer to von Weizsäcker's problem, cited in section 
6, where he correctly recognized irreversibility as a necessary condition for classicality, but 
left open the question of sufficiency. We know now, that this condition is not fulfilled in the 
framework of the microscopic Copenhagen interpretation, but within the conception of 
megascopic irreversible processes it is fully sufficient. 
 
 
15. Matter-mind dualism 
 
We start with a short recapitulation of the megascopic mirrors of the microscopic 
quantum concepts and associated rules as they were introduced in section 13. 
1. The first complementarity versus the second: while microscopic quantum theory is 
based on Bohr’s complementarity between the mechanical (particle) and field (wave) picture 
of elementary entities, megascopic quantum theory is founded on two megascopic 
complementary accounts of the whole Universe, namely the mechanical description 
representing its total wholeness, and the field formulation representing its total fragmentation. 
The implementation of a second complementarity was for first time requested by Jordan. 
2. Causality versus teleology: microscopic quantum physics inherits causality (or 
upward causality) from classical physics due to Bohr’s correspondence principle. Its 
megascopic mirror is teleology (downward causation or the final cause), mentioned already 
for first time by Maxwell, see section 7, as it proceeds from a principle that is extra physical, 
but not extra natural, and is acting without exerting any force or spending any energy. 
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3. Projections versus injections: transitions between different states in microscopic 
quantum physics are expressed as vector projections in Hilbert space. The megascopic mirror 
of these projections is represented by injections, the latter responsible for the transitions from 
the fragmented Universe into its wholeness and vice versa. It was proposed for the first time 
by Bohm. 
4. The Born rule versus the einselection rule: The probability of transitions based on 
microscopic projections is calculated by means of Born’s law. Its megascopic mirror is the 
einselection rule, which takes into account the influence of all environments. The concept of 
einselection was originally coined by Zurek in his quantum decoherence program with the 
aim to replace the Born rule. As we have shown in the section 7, it cannot be replaced, and in 
section 13 we also revealed the true meaning of einselection as the megascopic counterpart of 
the microscopic Born rule. It means that the latter remains to be tied to the microscopic 
projections, while the einselection principle determines the probabilities of the megascopic 
injection transitions. 
The abovementioned four concepts and rules form, in the microscopic world, the basic 
axioms of the Copenhagen interpretation of quantum physics. But one axiom is still missing, 
i.e. the von Neumann - Wigner rule. At this point we have reached a very important but most 
commanding point: What is its megascopic mirror? Before we try to respond to this 
challenge, one must first deliberate more deeply on the problem of the matter-mind dualism 
that is necessary for the understanding of the von Neumann - Wigner rule. The matter-mind 
dualism had a most significant historical development after the Cartesian split. Heisenberg 
paid special attention to this problem in the Chapter 5 entitled "Die Entwicklung der 
philosophischen Ideen seit Descartes im Vergleich zu der neuen Lage in der Quantentheorie" 
in his book "Physik und Philosophie". Quoting directly the original version in German [153]: 
„Der Ausgangspunkt der cartesianischen Philosophie ist völlig verschieden von dem der 
antiken griechischen Philosophen. Hier wird nicht mit einem Grundprinzip oder einem 
Grundstoff begonnen, sondern mit dem Versuch, ein grundlegendes, unbestreitbares Wissen 
zu erwerben. Descartes erkennt, daß unser Wissen über unser eigenes Denken sicherer ist als 
unser Wissen über die äußere Welt. Aber schon seine Ausgangsposition mit dem Dreieck: 
Gott, Welt und Ich vereinfacht die Grundlage für das weitere Philosophieren in einer 
gefährlichen Weise. Die Spaltung zwischen Materie und Geist oder zwischen Körper und 
Seele, die mit Platons Philosophie begonnen hatte, ist jetzt vollständig. Gott ist sowohl vom 
Ich als auch von der Welt getrennt. Gott wird tatsächlich so hoch über die Welt und die 
Menschen erhoben, daß er schließlich in der Philosophie des Descartes nur als ein 
gemeinsamer Bezugspunkt erscheint, der die Beziehung zwischen dem Ich und der Welt 
herstellt.” 
The Cartesian split affected the progress of the whole of classical physics. Heisenberg 
writes: „Andererseits war diese Spaltung in der Naturwissenschaft für einige Jahrhunderte 
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außerordentlich erfolgreich. Die Newtonsche Mechanik und alle anderen Teile der klassischen 
Physik, die nach ihrem Vorbild aufgebaut waren, beruhten auf der Annahme, daß man die 
Welt beschreiben kann, ohne über Gott oder uns selbst zu sprechen. Diese Möglichkeit galt 
beinahe als eine notwendige Voraussetzung für alle Naturwissenschaft.” 
Quantum mechanics, however, is entirely different from classical physics: We have first 
of all to overcome the Cartesian split. Heisenberg comments on its consequences on the ways 
many physicists think, and that this prevent them to fully understand the Copenhagen 
interpretation: „Wenn man an die großen Schwierigkeiten denkt, die selbst so bedeutende 
Naturwissenschaftler wie Einstein bei dem Verständnis und der Anerkennung der 
Kopenhagener Deutung der Quantentheorie hatten, so kann man die Wurzeln dieser 
Schwierigkeit bis zur cartesianischen Spaltung verfolgen. Diese Spaltung ist in den drei 
Jahrhunderten, die auf Descartes gefolgt sind, sehr tief in das menschliche Denken 
eingedrungen, und es wird noch lange Zeit dauern, bis sie durch eine wirklich neue 
Auffassung vom Problem der Wirklichkeit verdrängt ist.” 
For the Copenhagen (and the von Neumann-Wigner) interpretation the conscious mind 
has a special relevance, but the Cartesian split also imparts consequences for the 
understanding of the unconscious mind. In Whyte's 1960 book "The Unconscious Before 
Freud" dealing with the history of ideas about the unconscious mind, he defines the words 
"conscious" and "unconscious" [154]: „Conscious will be used to mean directly present in 
awareness (or "immediately known to awareness"). This adjective will be applied only to 
discrete aspects or brief phases of mental processes. No distinction will be made between 
"conscious" and "aware". Except for a few doubtful extreme cases (e.g., processes of logical 
or mathematical deduction) there appear to be no causally self-contained processes of which 
all aspects directly enter awareness. "Conscious" is a subjective term without, as yet, (i) 
interpretation in terms of physiological structure, or (ii) explanation of its function.” 
And further: „Unconscious, in the term "unconscious mental processes" will be used to 
mean all mental processes except those discrete aspects or brief phases which enter awareness 
as they occur. Thus "unconscious mental processes" (or the "unconscious", for short) is here 
used as a comprehensive term including not only the "subconscious" and "preconscious", but 
all mental factors and processes of which we are not immediately aware, whatever they be: 
organic or personal tendencies or needs, memories, processes of mimicry, emotions, motives, 
intentions, policies, beliefs, assumptions, thoughts, or dishonesties.” 
Whyte describes Descartes' philosophical motivation: „Descartes recognized that the 
"union of soul with body" is intuitively known, and that their pervasive connections are a 
matter of everyday experience. However, in his doctrine these connections are not ones of 
true causation, but an illusion resulting from some kind of parallelism between the two modes 
of being. It is therefore, in Descartes' view, abortive to study these connections in detail.” 
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The basic comparison of different attitudes towards the unconscious mind from the 
positions of materialism, idealism and the Cartesian school follows: „During the late 
seventeenth century three main attitudes dominated European philosophical thought, 
corresponding to three interpretations of the nature of existence. Materialism treated physical 
bodies and their motions as the primary reality; idealism took it to be spirit or mind; while 
Cartesian dualism postulated two independent realms: the mental res cogitans and the material 
res extensa. For the first two schools there was no difficulty in recognizing unconscious 
mentality, though under other names... But to the third, Cartesian, school the admission of the 
existence of unconscious mental processes presented an acute philosophical challenge, for it 
demanded the discarding of the original conception of the dualism as one of two independent 
realms, matter in motion and mind necessarily aware. For those who were loyal to Descartes, 
all that was not conscious in man was material and physiological, and therefore not mental.” 
Whyte continues with the post-Cartesian chronology of the conceptual development of 
the unconscious mind up to Freud: „As often happens in the history of thought, an idea may 
be fashionable and even transform society before it is properly understood... The unconscious 
mind, in the post-Cartesian sense, was discovered around 1700; it is now transforming 
Western thought; who would dare to claim that its basic laws are yet understood?... I have 
given sufficient evidence to show that the general conception of unconscious mental 
processes was conceivable (in post-Cartesian Europe) around 1700, topical around 1800, and 
fashionable around 1870-1880. ...when Freud was forty-two he was unaware that at least fifty 
writers (probably many more) had been developing similar assumptions for over two hundred 
years. Finally in 1925, at the age of sixty-nine, Freud wrote: "The overwhelming majority of 
philosophers regard as mental only the phenomena of consciousness. For them the world of 
consciousness coincides with the sphere of what is mental." This curious mistake shows how 
narrow his reading had been, and how wrong a conception he must then have had of his own 
originality. The inference is that not only Freud but most of us are largely unaware of what 
has made us what we are and led us to think as we do, and it is sometimes as well that we 
should be ignorant.” 
From the above quote it is apparent that Freud might have been overemphasized at the 
expense of other researchers. His famous psychoanalysis is claimed to be a method for the 
treatment for mental-health disorders, but does actually in many cases also become 
misinterpreted disrupting individuals, families and societies. 
Unfortunately Whyte's book ends up with Freud leaving out Jung, who in his later life 
opposed Freud. His primary disagreement with Freud stemmed from their differing 
conceptions of the unconscious, but also Freud's anti-religious attitudes mattered. Whereas 
Freud conceived the unconscious solely as a repository of repressed emotions and desires, 
Jung called this limited model "personal unconscious", and proposed the existence of a 
second, far deeper form of the unconscious underlying the personal one. In his work "The 
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Archetypes and the Collective Unconscious" Jung explains the difference between personal 
and collective unconscious [155]: „A more or less superficial layer of the unconscious is 
undoubtedly personal. I call it the "personal unconscious". But this personal layer rests upon a 
deeper layer, which does not derive from personal experience and is not a personal acquisition 
but is inborn. This deeper layer I call the "collective unconscious". I have chosen the term 
"collective" because this part of the unconscious is not individual but universal; in contrast to 
the personal psyche, it has contents and modes of behaviour that are more or less the same 
everywhere and in all individuals.” 
The final definition of the collective unconscious acquiesces from the same work [155]: 
„My thesis then, is as follows: in addition to our immediate consciousness, which is of a 
thoroughly personal nature and which we believe to be the only empirical psyche (even if we 
tack on the personal unconscious as an appendix), there exists a second psychic system of a 
collective, universal, and impersonal nature which is identical in all individuals. This 
collective unconscious does not develop individually but is inherited. It consists of pre-
existent forms, the archetypes, which can only become conscious secondarily and which give 
definite form to certain psychic contents.” 
On one hand the collective unconscious dictates how the structure of the psyche 
autonomously organizes experience, and on the other hand the collective unconscious collects 
and organizes those personal experiences in a similar way for all members of a particular 
species. This finding, due to Jung, appears particularly important for us as physicists. In 
addition to the Schrödinger cat paradox, resolved by the introduction of megascopic quantum 
jumps, the Copenhagen interpretation suffers from yet another conundrum - the paradox of 
Wigner's friend, see section 6. The Copenhagen view that the quantum state represents 
available knowledge to a community of communicating observers was set ad hoc and does 
not follow from any of the basic axioms of the Copenhagen interpretation. We live today in 
the time of Internet and mobile phones, and we can be proud of how ingeniously we are all 
connected. But this is a special type of connection mediated by the material world. If we 
accept that we are parts of the material world and communicate via this world, then Wigner’s 
conclusion that each conscious being is able to collapse one single objective quantum state, 
regardless of whether the information is actually physically shared, is correct. Therefore 
Wigner looked for a way out of the crisis with his "desire for a less solipsistic theory". Only if 
we accept Jung's concept, we will understand that our conscious minds are all primarily 
connected in this Jung-like collective unconscious entirely outside the external material 
world, and this explains and provides the legitimacy of the shared knowledge of a community 
of communicating observers. 
Incidentally sharing the knowledge of a community of communicating observers is not 
just one single form of sharing that descends from the collective unconscious. The 
communication and sharing of our discoveries is a similar case. Whyte presents a motto due 
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to Goethe in his book [154]: „No one can take from us the joy of the first becoming aware of 
something, the so-called discovery. But if we also demand the honour, it can be utterly 
spoiled for us, for we are usually not the first. What does discovery mean, and who can say 
that he has discovered this or that? After all it's pure idiocy to brag about priority; for it's 
simply unconscious conceit, not to admit frankly that one is a plagiarist.” 
However, many of Jung's works relates to alchemy, though his interests were focused 
only on its arcane aspects. According to Linden [156], esoteric aspects of alchemy prevailed 
among psychologists, spiritual and new age communities, hermetic philosophers, and 
historians of esotericism, while exoteric aspects occurred among historians of the physical 
sciences, who did examine subjects in terms of protochemistry, medicine, and charlatanism. 
In this sense Jung's ideas and inspirations are full of occultism, gnosticism and spiritism. On 
the other hand, if we extract the scientific truth from the Jung's considerations, we 
immediately recognize that Jung was correctly aware of the collective unconscious as a mind 
component of alchemy, after the Cartesian split, whereas classical chemistry became a matter 
component. Wikipedia, in the year 2018, speaks about the origin of chemistry in this way: 
„Chemistry was preceded by its protoscience, alchemy, which is an intuitive but non-
scientific approach to understanding the constituents of matter and their interactions... 
Chemistry as a body of knowledge distinct from alchemy began to emerge when a clear 
differentiation was made between them by Robert Boyle... Chemistry is considered to have 
become an established science with the work of Antoine Lavoisier...” 
The comments above raises one of the most important questions of this article: is 
chemistry, as we know it today, the only true matter branch of alchemy after the Cartesian 
split? Looking first at the customary definition of chemistry, see e.g. Wikipedia, 2018: 
„Chemistry is the scientific discipline involved with compounds composed of atoms, i.e. 
elements, and molecules, i.e. combinations of atoms: their composition, structure, properties, 
behaviour and the changes they undergo during a reaction with other compounds. Chemistry 
addresses topics such as how atoms and molecules interact via chemical bonds to form new 
chemical compounds.” By tradition, science dealing with material objects from elementary 
particles up to atoms is called physics, and from atoms up to molecules it is chemistry, 
however, from molecules up to the macroscopic level of fluids and solids it is shared with 
(condensed matter) physics again. At the quantum level the first and third parts essentially 
form quantum physics, and the second part mostly quantum chemistry. In this way quantum 
chemistry is a result of an embedding of post-Cartesian classical chemistry ideas into the pre-
Cartesian quantum physics.  
As Boyle and Lavoisier were fathers of classical chemistry, Löwdin is often regarded as 
father of quantum chemistry. A recent biography of Per-Olov Löwdin, see Brändas [157], 
describes his significant achievements for the development of the new sub-discipline of 
quantum chemistry. Assessing the new field and its specific goals it was stated: „He [Löwdin] 
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referred to a so-called pure theory in a restrictive sense, ‘if it derives for instance chemical 
data from the knowledge of only the physical values of the electronic mass and charge, 
Planck’s constant, the atomic numbers and the form of the Schrödinger Equation, which itself 
represents the quintessence  of a great deal of physical experience’…”. Löwdin was of course 
well aware of the impossibility to derive the Coulomb Hamiltonian from first principles as 
well as of other limitations and possibilities offered by a structural approach. Even if the 
concepts of quantum chemistry is very expedient and practical, it does not, as already stated, 
give any answers to the Sutcliffe-Woolley clamped-nuclei paradox, see section 2, and to the 
Santilli's "no reduction theorem" paradox, see section 3. Authentic pre-Cartesian quantum 
chemistry differs from the pre-/post-Cartesian mix, i.e. standard quantum chemistry. The 
former deals with teleological megascopic phenomena, and in addition to chemistry and 
chemical reactions, it also comprises such phenomena that have no quantum physical 
explanation, such as the Einstein-de Haas effect and the brittle fracture phenomenon and those 
with false microscopic interpretation, like superconductivity and superfluidity. 
Standard quantum chemistry has encouraged the idea that after centuries of progress 
physics and chemistry can finally ‘sit under one roof’ in the sense that these two disciplines of  
natural sciences refer to the same microscopic quantum laws. In contrast, however, authentic 
pre-Cartesian quantum chemistry forms a megascopic complement to microscopic quantum 
physics. Metaphorically, one might aver: what elementary particles and the conscious mind 
mean for pre-Cartesian quantum physics, is analogous to what the whole Universe and the 
collective unconscious mean for pre-Cartesian quantum chemistry. In the material world, 
elementary particles represent the smallest one and the Universe the Greatest One. There is a 
parallelism in the mind world: Observers' conscious minds represent the smallest one and the 
collective unconscious the Greatest One. 
In microscopic quantum physics the von Neumann - Wigner rule binds together 
elementary particles with the conscious mind, and the megascopic rule binds together the 
whole Universe with the collective unconscious. An observer's activity, i.e. a measurement, 
causes microscopic quantum jumps and hence a discontinuity of the deterministic 
Schrödinger equation. All events in our world must have a reason. Therefore it is reasonable 
to postulate a similar megascopic analogy: the existence of megascopic "measurements" as an 
activity of the collective unconscious must cause megascopic quantum jumps. Due to Jung's 
celebrated formulation of the concept of the collective unconscious, we might venture to call 
the megascopic mirror of the von Neumann - Wigner rule as the Jung rule. Having finally 
found the last requested megascopic mirror, the Jung rule, we can summarize all mirrors in 
Table 2. 
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Table 2:  Microscopic-megascopic mirrors 
First quantum floor: 
microscopic quantum physics 
Second quantum floor: 
megascopic quantum chemistry 
first complementarity second complementarity 
causality teleology 
projections injections 
Born rule einselection rule 
von Neumann - Wigner rule Jung rule 
 
From our previous thoughts about the free will, formulated in section 8, two additional 
mirrors can be revealed, namely the reflections of microscopic quantum physical laws in the 
collective unconscious and the reflections of megascopic quantum chemical laws in the 
observer's conscious mind constituting a form of free will decisions. They will be called the 
crosswise-law mirrors. The first mirror, mentioned above, is supported by physicists such as 
Poincaré, Penrose and Compton, i.e. Poincaré's unconscious disorder born on chance, 
Penrose's largely unconscious 'putting-up', first phase of the two-stage model, and Compton's 
relationship between free will and quantum indeterminism and the randomness on the first 
phase of the two-stage model. 
The second mirror is not apparent until we have introduced megascopic quantum 
chemistry. For instance, Doyle's concept of "adequate determinism" in his Cogito model, 
attempting to explain free will only on the basis of quantum physics, cannot be right. The 
physicist Compton and psychiatrist Flanagan were right in claiming that quantum physics is 
insufficient for the justification of free will. Compton argued that freedom involves an 
additional determining factor of choice, about which science tells us nothing. Moreover 
Flanagan stated that free actions need to be caused by me, in an undetermined and non-
random manner. The combination of non-determinism and non-randomness follows only 
from the megascopic einselection processes of quantum chemistry, and not from microscopic 
physical processes that are indeterministic and random. 
Moreover, the crosswise-law mirrors follow directly from the two-stage model 
formulated by Eccles and Popper, see section 8, which unifies nature’s laws of biology (the 
matter world) and psychology (the mind world). All six mirrors, two microscopic-
megascopic, two matter-mind, and two crosswise-law mirrors are pictured in Fig 2. 
 96 
 
The crosswise-law mirrors have tremendous impact on our choice of the correct 
interpretation of quantum theory. They rule out all "objective" interpretations. The matter-
mind dualism can never be removed and replaced by materialistic monism.  Megascopic 
quantum chemistry adds "unconscious" measurements to "conscious" measurements as is 
known from microscopic quantum physics and this fact disqualifies the MWI interpretation, 
see section 7, and the arguments of its advocates, such as those of Zeh [158]: „He who 
considers this conclusion of an indeterminism or splitting of the observer’s identity, derived 
from the Schrödinger equation in the form of dynamically decoupling (‘branching’) wave 
packets on a fundamental global configuration space, as unacceptable or ‘extravagant’ [159] 
may instead dynamically formalize the superfluous hypothesis of a disappearance of the 
‘other’ components by whatever method he prefers, but he should be aware that he may 
thereby also create his own problems: Any deviation from the global Schrödinger equation 
must in principle lead to observable effects, and it should be recalled that none have ever been 
discovered [160]. The conclusion would of course have to be revised if such effects were 
some day to be found.” 
One can also find a nice response to this problem, i.e. of our false impression that all 
processes in the material world must be measurable, Norton [52]: „It has long been 
recognized that human action is the prototype of cause and effect. At its simplest, we identify 
processes as causal if they are sufficiently analogous... Using human action as a prototype, we 
identify terms in the cause and effect relation whenever we have one that brings about or 
produces the other; and we identify the process of production as the causal process... We 
restrict a science to some hospitable domain.” 
Norton's view is correct. If we confine our knowledge of the material world to causal 
quantum physics and fully ignore teleological phenomena, then we have restricted science to 
‘some hospitable domain’. From all known interpretations only the Copenhagen view has the 
ability to incorporate teleological phenomena via a megascopic mirroring of each of its basic 
axioms. 
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16. The Emerald Tablet 
 
It is worth pointing out that important contributions to the concept of the collective 
unconscious of Jung and those of Darwin to the teleological concept of biological adaptation 
were not motivated by some true authentic science, but by esoteric occult ideas preserved 
since ancient times in various clandestine masonic, theosophical and new age societies. 
Predominantly in these societies, the ancient Emerald Tablet of Hermes Trismegistus has 
always drawn attention in special ways. Darwin did fulfil his grandfather's wish to apply the 
content of the Emerald Table to biological processes. From Mackey's Encyclopedia of 
Freemasonry we can cite this information [161]: „Before coming to Derby in 1788, Dr. 
[Erasmus] Darwin had been made a Mason in the famous Time Immemorial Lodge of 
Cannongate Kilwinning, No. 2, of Scotland. Sir Francis Darwin, one of the Doctor's sons, was 
made a Mason in Tyrian Lodge, No. 253, at Derby, in 1807 or 1808. His son Reginald was 
made a Mason in Tyrian Lodge in 1804. The name of Charles Darwin does not appear on the 
rolls of the Lodge but it is very possible that he, like Francis, was a Mason.” 
Most biologists believing that Darwinian evolution is a scientific theory, do not know 
that it originated in occultism in the disguise of a scientific theory. Applications of occultism, 
without a firm scientific background, is of course vulnerable to misunderstandings and 
misinterpretations of all kinds. There was no quantum physics at the time of Darwin, to e.g. 
vindicate random mutations, and even if Darwin was right with his teleological interpretation 
of the process of adaptation, the problem of teleology has not been resolved to this day. One 
might study how the central characters of Darwinian evolution, such as Mayr or Madrell, see 
section 7, have advanced the meaning of teleology, not in full accord with Darwin. The same 
applies to protagonists of quantum decoherence who attempt to replace the causal Born rule 
by a teleological einselection rule. They were all inspired with Universal Darwinism, but they 
must also realize that animate nature obeys the laws of inanimate nature and not conversely. It 
means that the Darwinian adaptation process must be first revealed in inanimate nature with 
the possibility of a consequent application to living organisms. 
Philosophers like Popper regarded Darwinism as a tautology. Popper changed his mind 
after he had noticed similar patterns, see section 8, in the two-stage model, applicable both to 
biology and the psychology of free will. Maybe such arguments are convincing for 
philosophers, but not for physicists, since the latter will always look for primary patterns in 
inanimate nature. We have nevertheless shown that microscopic quantum physics and 
megascopic quantum chemistry form together the same two-stage model as was applied to 
biology and psychology by Eccles and Popper. 
Note that once we have incorporated teleology into megascopic quantum chemistry, the 
Darwinian adaptation process becomes identical to megascopic quantum jumps that represent 
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transitions between different symmetry broken states, i.e. between different Platonic Forms, 
see section 13. This view is synoptic with the prevailing view of Western biologists and 
philosophers until the 19th century, i.e. that the differences between individuals of a species 
are uninteresting departures from their Platonic idealism of created kinds. In this way the true 
Darwinian evolution can be applicable only to questions like why we have so many races of 
cats and dogs, but the cat will be forever a cat and the dog will be a dog. Darwin himself was 
aware of the problem of missing transitional forms [162]: „Why, if species have descended 
from other species by insensibly fine gradations, do we not everywhere see innumerable 
transitional forms? Why is not all nature in confusion instead of the species being, as we see 
them, well defined?... But, as by this theory innumerable transitional forms must have existed, 
why do we not find them embedded in countless numbers in the crust of the earth?... Why 
then is not every geological formation and every stratum full of such intermediate links? 
Geology assuredly does not reveal any such finely graduated organic chain; and this, perhaps, 
is the most obvious and serious objection which can be urged against my theory.” 
A few decades later Darwin was brainwashed by the illusory "success" of his own 
theory when he said [163]: „At some future period, not very distant as measured by centuries, 
the civilized races of man will almost certainly exterminate, and replace, the savage races 
throughout the world. At the same time the anthropomorphous apes... will no doubt be 
exterminated. The break between man and his nearest allies will then be wider, for it will 
intervene between man in a more civilized state, as we may hope, even than the Caucasian, 
and some ape as low as a baboon, instead of as now between the Negro or Australian and the 
gorilla.” 
Today these lines are far from being politically correct particularly since history has 
demonstrated for us the danger of disgusting “ape theories” and sickening pagan concepts. 
Returning instead to a closer look at the Emerald Tablet, Darwin's inspiration. It contains 14 
verses but only two of them are relevant for an alignment with our current knowledge of 
natural sciences, i.e. the second and eighth ones. Citing the English translation of the standard 
1613 Latin Beato's Aurelium Occultae Philosophorum [164]. 
Verse 2: Whatever is below is similar to that which is above. Through this the marvels 
of the work of one thing are procured and perfected. 
Verse 8: This ascends from the earth into the sky and again descends from the sky to the 
earth, and receives the power and efficacy of things above and of things below. 
Verse 2 seems to be intelligible and conceivable for us as physicists. Maruani [147], see also 
papers quoted therein, compares the microcosm and the macrocosm, and excerpts the same 
two verses from a similar 1680 Newton's translation and discusses some interesting relations 
between microphysics and astrophysics, electromagnetism and gravitation, and the "magical" 
relations between the fundamental physical constants. 
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Verse 8, on the other hand, has no support in contemporary quantum physics. Yet, 
based on this verse, Darwin proposed his two-stage model, and even if this proposition was 
successful, it is still occultism, since there is no scientific base, and hence we do not know the 
range, the limitations and the critical points of its applicability. But, if comparing verse 8 with 
Table 2, depicting microscopic-megascopic mirrors of all basic axioms, it is obvious that we 
may identify a decrypted version of the Emerald Tablet, expressed in terms of a clear and 
unambiguous language of quantum theory. 
One might ask where such a magnificent wisdom of the Emerald Tablet comes from. 
We do not even know whether Hermes Trismegistus was a real person or only the name of the 
book dealing with the ‘Emerald Tablet’. Most probably this is only a torso of some higher 
knowledge of antediluvian origin. There is a Jewish testimony of Flavius Josephus who in his 
Antiquities, Book I, Ch. 2: Concerning the Posterity of Adam, and the Ten Generations from 
Him to the Deluge [165], wrote about the significant discoveries of the descendants of Adam's 
son Seth that had survived the flood: „And that their inventions might not be lost before they 
were sufficiently known, upon Adam's prediction that the world was to be destroyed at one 
time by the force of fire, and at another time by the violence and quantity of water, they made 
two pillars, the one of brick, the other of stone: they inscribed their discoveries on them both, 
that in case the pillar of brick should be destroyed by the flood, the pillar of stone might 
remain, and exhibit those discoveries to mankind; and also inform them that there was another 
pillar of brick erected by them.” 
The philologist and historian van Bladel [166] also mentions an Arabic testimony in 
which Hermes Trismegistus is identified with Idris, which is the Arabic name of Enoch from 
the bloodline of Adam's son Seth, mentioned in the Bible for first time in Gen 5:18–24, and 
then in 1Ch 1:3, Luk 3:37, Heb 11:5, Jud 1:14-15, and Sir 44:16,49:14. We can assume that 
Enoch indeed fully understood the content of his teachings, which was part of the true original 
religion given to the first man by God. After the confusion of tongues in Babel, the Emerald 
Tablet became a source of occultism in many secret societies, since the key to its 
understanding has been lost. 
It is interesting that this occultism has influenced not only secret societies, but also Folk 
sayings. One simple example: from all the megascopic phenomena summarized in Table 1, 
one of them, the brittle fracture, has been familiar with the whole population throughout the 
history of mankind. And each of us has been subject to attendant negative experiences in 
everyday life, such as broken dishes, china, porcelain, window glass, etc. However, there is a 
Folk saying, expressed by the same words in all Central European languages, entirely in 
opposition to impairments due to brittle fracture. In Czech this saying sounds: Střepy přinášejí 
štěstí, in German: Scherben bringen Glück, and the English literal translation is: Shards bring 
luck. Actually, brittle fractures are nightmares for mechanical and building engineers. It 
caused the loss of  Titanic in 1912, the 1962 King Street Bridge collapse in Melbourne, and 
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the 1967 Silver Bridge collapse in West Virginia, all resulting from the brittle fracture effect. 
There is a riddle: how can shards bring any luck? 
No one knows the origin of this Folk saying, except that our pagan ancestors threw 
shards to drive off evil spirits, or that it was a heathen ritual of shattering the holy altars of 
clay after completing a sacrifice to the gods. All traces end in ancient Greek and Roman 
coffin tombs where often find shards donated to the deceased. In verse 8 of the Emerald 
Tablet, we have used the word "sky" as the English translation of the Latin "coelum". It could 
also be translated as "heaven", used e.g. in Newton's version. One should here be aware of the 
danger of capitalizing of the letter "h". Originally brittle fracture was understood as a 
"consecration of heaven", i.e. a megascopic effect. But after the confusion of tongues in 
Babel, when the key to the Emerald Tablet was lost, future generations explained it as a 
"consecration of Heaven", i.e. a supernatural or at least a preternatural phenomenon that 
brings the blessings of gods. In this way occultism infiltrates Folk sayings. 
 
 
17. Conclusion 
 
The core of this work originates in an independent proof of Goldstone’s theorem [91] 
for molecules and solids. To better explain the significance of our message, assume at the 
outset that we have no prior knowledge of this theorem, simply rewriting the total molecular 
Hamiltonian of interacting nuclei and electrons into quantum field form. Instead of the usual 
formulation of the original electrons and the associated nuclear vibrational modes/phonons, 
we will introduce a new set of fermionic and bosonic operators in the most general way, and 
then optimizing the total transformed Hamiltonian. We have put forward five sets of well-
known equations as limiting cases of the resulting equations of our procedure; a test that our 
solutions must pass and exactly agree with each other  
 
1) Pople's equations for ab-initio calculations of vibrational frequencies [103] 
2) Fröhlich's expression for the correction of the ground state energy [104,105] 
3) Fröhlich's effective two-electron interaction [105] 
4) Lee-Low-Pines’ polarons and their self-energy [106] 
5) Born-Huang’s ansatz [7] 
 
Starting from the field electron-vibrational (electron-phonon) Hamiltonian [101,102], 
only the first four sets pass the test successfully. For instance, in small molecules such as H2 
one obtains only a fragment of the whole contribution from the Born-Huang ansatz, and this is 
a major failure that unfortunately is not well-known in quantum chemistry and solid state 
physics. In quantum chemistry field methods are not often used, and usually only on the 
electronic level [98-100]. However, in solid state physics electron-phonon field mechanisms 
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are frequently employed, and in most cases the contribution of the Born-Huang ansatz is 
negligible to such an extent that many physicists do not even realize any differences between 
the Born-Oppenheimer (B-O) and the adiabatic approximations and mistakenly even regard 
them as synonyms. 
Hence the concept of the electron-vibrational field theory is clearly insufficient, and it 
must be replaced by a more rigorous field theory comprising two major upgrades [107,108]: 
 
a) Together with the phonons two new types of quasiparticles appear: rotons and translons 
descending from rotational and translational degrees of freedom. The contribution from the 
roton and the translon quanta occurs even if the molecule as whole does not rotate nor move. 
b) In analogy with Lorentz covariance, binding together space and time coordinates, a new 
covariance is necessary, binding together internal and external degrees of freedom, without 
the centre-of-mass (COM) separation, which normally applies in both classical and quantum 
mechanics. 
Let us compare these results with the content of Goldstone’s theorem [91]: „The 
spontaneous breaking of a continuous symmetry can be associated with a massless and 
spinless particle“. According to this theorem there are three types of broken symmetries in 
molecules and crystals, composed of N nuclei (3N degrees of freedom): the Galilean 
associated with 3N-6 phonons (or 3N-5 for diatomic molecules), translational associated with 
3 translons, and rotational associated with 3 (or 2) rotons. Unfortunately the scientific 
community does not seem to be aware of this fundamental fact with its origin in the 
Goldstone theorem, cf. the picture reflected in the (2018) Wikipedia phrase "Goldstone 
boson" that states the following incongruity: „In solids, the situation is more complicated; the 
Goldstone bosons are the longitudinal and transverse phonons and they happen to be the 
Goldstone bosons of spontaneously broken Galilean, translational, and rotational symmetry 
with no simple one-to-one correspondence between the Goldstone modes and the broken 
symmetries.” 
First of all the Goldstone theorem is a complement to the first Noether theorem where a 
one-to-one correspondence between the conservation laws and associated symmetries always 
exists. Therefore the unique and unambiguous one-to-one correspondence between the 
Goldstone modes and spontaneously broken symmetries in solids must necessarily exist as 
well. It means that vibrational modes/phonons in molecules/solids do not represent the full set 
of Goldstone bosons. The errors caused by disregarding the rest of the Goldstone modes are 
usually negligible in adiabatic cases, but in non-adiabatic situations they might lead to fatal 
consequences, i.e. an deficient view of spontaneously broken systems on the quantum level. 
We have demonstrated that a field theory based only on phonons is not sufficient for the 
description of Born-Oppenheimer (B-O) degenerate states, such as Jahn-Teller (J-T) systems 
and superconductors, where a general field COM covariant theory incorporating all Goldstone 
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bosons, i.e. phonons, rotons and translons is unavoidable. We have derived the formulae for 
the ground state energy and the excitation spectra of B-O degenerate quantum chemical and 
solid state systems together with a complete set of Goldstone bosons. 
Within this background the Born-Huang ansatz plays the same role for the field COM 
covariance as Maxwell’s equations for Lorentz covariance. Even though we have here only 
presented a special proof of the Goldstone theorem for interacting systems of electrons and 
nuclei, based on the field COM covariance resulting from the Born-Huang ansatz, we have 
nonetheless arrived at the correct set of Goldstone bosons. However, the general Goldstone-
Salam-Weinberg proof [92] of Goldstone’s theorem, based on the conserved currents of the 
first Noether theorem, appears not transparent enough in the case of a correct identification of 
the Goldstone bosons. The physicists inaccurately identify them only with phonons. 
In fact this mistake has led to unfortunate consequences, i.e. an inadequate BCS theory 
[78] using only the electron-phonon interaction which has never been revisited. Moreover, 
Anderson in his article [95] added to this misunderstanding claiming that "the solid crystal 
violates translational and rotational invariance, and possesses phonons". This paper soon 
became a fateful marker, leading to the ‘celebrated’ Higgs mechanism, that was incorporated 
in the Standard model attempting to explain, how particles in the electro-weak interaction 
gain the mass. Higgs named his Nobel lecture "Evading the Goldstone theorem" [97]. This 
was alas no ‘evading’, but rather a misrepresentation of the theorem, since Goldstone bosons 
cannot after all be suppressed. We have summarized Comay's work [88], where he, after a 
careful analysis of Higgs’ equations, did come to the conclusion that they do violate Bohr’s 
correspondence principle, and therefore cannot be approved as valid equations of quantum 
physics. 
Goldstone bosons, arising as the result of symmetry violations, i.e. from rotons and 
translons, produce singular behaviour in the original symmetrical positions. The system is 
forced to avoid them by removing the degeneracy, and after apt one-particle transformations, 
finding itself in new asymmetric positions. This principle unifies the formation of ground 
states of J-T molecules and superconductors. It should be noted how the quantum field 
formulation deals with the virtual degeneracies originating from approximative B-O solutions. 
They are profoundly different from the real degeneracies, where the quantum principle of 
superposition takes place, after being removed by some external perturbation, such as the 
Stark or the Zeeman effect. The quantum field simply does not share the centre of mass, 
defined in standard quantum mechanics, rather it solves the problem of the centre of gravity 
"in its own way". 
We have also offered a reformulated version of the J-T theorem as it follows directly 
from the Goldstone theorem. Molecular and crystalline entities in a particular geometry of an 
electronically degenerate ground state are unstable except for the case when all matrix 
elements of electron-rotational and electron-translational interactions equal zero. This is a 
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striking result, as it shows how a true quantum field, respecting fully the Goldstone theorem, 
copes with B-O degenerate systems, such as J-T molecules and superconductors. The 
superposition principle for the removal of the degeneracy is simply bypassed, since the rotons 
and the translons are actually responsible for the violation of symmetry. For instance in a 
superconductor, the symmetry breaking produces several geometrically different symmetry 
broken states, splitting the original half-occupied conducting band of the conductor into two 
bands, one fully occupied valence band and one empty conducting band, in such a way that 
the original conductor under the critical temperature becomes a multi-ground-state insulator. 
 The results discussed above clearly disqualify all theories based on B-O degeneracies, 
such as the usual solutions of the J-T effect [11,12] and the BCS theory of superconductivity 
[78]. Their validity was never justified from simple reasons, i.e. one query of extraordinary 
importance was never answered, cf. the question of Sutcliffe & Woolley [4]: „The interesting 
question is how to get from the quantum theory of an Isolated Molecule to a quantum theory 
of an individual molecule by rational mathematics.” We have further concluded that quantum 
mechanics describing a system of nuclei and electrons can never resolve this task. The 
quantum theory of an Isolated Molecule is quantum mechanics with a solution avoiding the 
B-O concept, and this is the method of Monkhorst [5,6] that "takes a very atomic view of a 
molecule: instead of fixing the nuclei as in the BO approximation, the electrons and nuclei are 
both described quantum-dynamically within a centrosymmetric shell structure." Unfortunately 
this approach leads neither to any B-O degenerate states nor to any symmetry breaking. 
A valid quantum theory of an individual molecule should be a true quantum field theory 
of fermions represented by renormalized electrons and Goldstone bosons standing for 
vibrational, rotational and translational modes, i.e. a system where nuclei from the mechanical 
description are replaced by the Goldstone bosons in the field description. This means, that 
true quantum mechanics deals solely with isolated systems, while true quantum field theory 
works with individual systems. Only a quantum field formulation can produce symmetry 
broken states and, unlike the B-O model, removing degeneracies bypassing the superposition 
principle. 
Returning to the question of teleological principles in science, one might first deliberate 
over how classical physics copes with the spontaneous symmetry breaking (SSB). In the 
classical phenomenological picture of superconductors, the Ginzburg-Landau equations [77] 
exhibits quadratic and biquadratic functions of the order parameter, forming the well-known 
Mexican hat. We have also discussed similar Mexican hat-like situations, i.e. the Norton 
dome [52] and the hydrodynamic problem of Boussinesq [124]. These three cases have one 
thing in common, viz. the solutions of the corresponding equations are not unique. However, 
in addition to the standard causal solution also a teleological one is permitted. Maxwell was 
impressed by the third case of Boussinesq to such an extent that he for the first time spoke 
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about teleological principles that exist outside the known laws of physics and called it [51] 
"some determining principle which is extra physical (but not extra natural)". 
Physicists, contrary to biologists, usually abandon the teleological principle as 
unscientific, and they do therefore not agree with the problem raised regarding the classical 
description of the Meissner effect and its relation to the phenomenon of superconductivity. 
One discerns two camps of physicists. The first camp, following Meissner [64] and London 
[66], claims that superconductivity unlike ideal conductivity has no classical explanation, and 
that quantum physics is necessary in order to explain it. The second camp following Cullwick 
[71] identifies superconductors with perfect conductors. But they cannot both be right. 
Superconductors are not identical to perfect conductors and quantum physics (BCS theory) 
does not explain the Meissner effect, without properly explaining superconductivity first. 
Electromotive forces, described by Faraday's law of induction, are equal to zero in the 
stationary conditions of the Meissner effect, whereas existing theories do not suggest any 
other electric forces needed to accelerate the electrons until the steady state supercurrent is 
achieved. From the view of telicity, one concludes that classical physics provides two 
solutions, one for perfect conductors and one for superconductors. Undeniably classical 
physics can formulate, but not explain superconductivity. According to Peirce's philosophical 
analysis [125], that no physical theory based on corpuscular philosophy can solve the problem 
of the SSB bootstrap. Even if this analysis was written before the era of quantum physics, 
Peirce's argument is also applicable today. It builds on Democritus’ atomic ideas, which is 
essentially the same corpuscular idea as in classical physics. It means that quantum physics in 
the Copenhagen interpretation is incapable of solving the problem of the SSB trigger. As we 
have seen, the teleological problem, which relates to Leibniz' principle of sufficient reason 
[114], to the second form of van Fraassen's argument [119], and Peirce's corpuscular 
philosophy argument [125], can be discounted in classical physics. Unfortunately quantum 
physicists usually ignore this problem. But this attitude is uncalled for, since it is motivated 
by the conviction, that quantum physics uses the same SSB archetype as the classical one. 
In comparing classical and quantum physics, we conclude: classical physics does not 
distinguish superconductors from ideal conductors and sees them as one system with two 
possible solutions, one teleological and one causal, while quantum physics does recognize the 
difference, but, on the other hand does not separate them from multi-ground-state insulators, 
i.e. is only able to describe the ground states of superconductors, but never superconductivity 
itself, since the Bohr’s correspondence principle does not account for teleological phenomena. 
Hence the application of the classical SSB, i.e. the Mexican hat, to quantum equations, the J-T 
effect, superconductivity or the Higgs mechanism becomes a mismatch. Quantum equations, 
based on a classical SSB, lead to paradoxical situations. With reference to SSB, the scientific 
community is again divided, i.e. whether SSB here is really present or not. We have, in this 
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work, discussed the arguments both for and against in connection with the J-T effect, 
superconductivity, the Higgs mechanism and ferromagnetism. 
From the addition of the lost Goldstone bosons, rotons and translons, found to be fully 
responsible for the mechanism of forming quantum states with spontaneously broken 
symmetries, it follows that the spontaneous symmetry breaking (SSB), only described 
phenomenologically at the level of classical physics, becomes misinterpreted on the quantum 
level, where every physical system can be described dually, either as a mechanical system or 
as a field theoretical system, in accordance with Weinberg's statement (repeated again) [126]: 
„If it turned out that some physical system could not be described by a quantum field theory, 
it would be a sensation; if it turned out that the system did not obey the rules of quantum 
mechanics and relativity, it would be a cataclysm.” For molecules and solids treated 
equivalently, we have presented true quantum field solutions fully respecting the Goldstone 
theorem. 
In a previous paper [108] I introduced the notion of property-object dualism: in 
quantum mechanics, nuclei and electrons represent objects, and vibrational modes are their 
common property. In quantum field objects, however, they are represented by electrons and 
Goldstone bosons, and the "nuclear" positions or "clamped nuclei" are properties of the 
pertinent field equations. We are now in a similar situation, with the description of the whole 
many-body system, as one was a century ago regarding the different aspects of a mechanical 
formulation and a field theory description of elementary entities that finally led to Bohr’s 
complementarity. Obviously one needs a second type of Bohr complementarity on the many-
body level as was already requested a long time ago by one of the co-founders of quantum 
mechanics, Pascual Jordan [134], even though, from a different reason, the Copenhagen 
interpretation based on the first Bohr complementarity, cannot explain classicality as an 
emergent property. 
Linking Sutcliffe's and Woolley's [4] problem of transitions between an isolated and the 
individual systems with Bohm's [15] question of fragmentation and wholeness, implies that 
the second complementarity, embracing the whole Universe, is the megascopic mirror of the 
first Bohr microscopic complementarity. We have just touched upon an ancient knowledge, 
presenting the Universe as a mosaic where the smallest one resembles the Greatest One. We 
need to postulate a new axiom that is necessary for the justification of the quantum jumps of 
the Universe from its state of total wholeness to its total fragmented states and vice versa. 
This request certainly goes beyond the scope of the Copenhagen interpretation. It neither 
contradicts nor denies this interpretation, but rather appears to be its natural extension. 
While microscopic processes are causal, megascopic phenomena are teleological. 
Teleology as the final cause can then be comprehended as downward causality, descending 
from the Greatest One - the whole Universe, in contrast to upward causality, ascending from 
the smallest entities, the elementary particles. The first complementarity represents the causal 
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microscopic relationship between the mechanical and the field descriptions of elementary 
entities (particle-wave dualism), and the second complementarity represents the teleological 
megascopic relationship between the mechanical and the field descriptions of the whole 
Universe, where these two descriptions in particular deal with the centre of gravity in 
different ways. 
Whereas microscopic quantum physics, dealing with elementary particles as 'basic 
building blocks' out of which everything is made, reflects the ancient materialistic ideas of 
Democritus, megascopic quantum phenomena can be seen as a reflection of Plato's Forms. In 
the latter one can finally find the true relationship between megascopic quantum jumps and 
time: these jumps do not proceed in time, but time is created by them. At the megascopic 
level this gives rise to the concept of quantum of time, which otherwise is unreachable at the 
microscopic level. In this sense megascopic quantum jumps are a true clock of the Universe. 
Restating that on one hand we have time evolution of the wave function, representing 
only Aristotelian potentiality, and on the other reality created during the measurement process 
by timeless events, i.e. microscopic quantum jumps. This separation of events from time, as a 
classical entity, is the source of almost all philosophical problems of contemporary quantum 
physics, and since the origin of time is rooted in megascopic events, we are able to finally 
reunite time and quantum events, but in contrast to processes on a classical level these case 
events will be foundational and time subordinate. This idea goes back to Aristotle who 
defined time as, we repeat, "the number of movement in respect of before and after". Since it 
cannot exist without succession, it does not exist on its own but only relative to the motions of 
things. 
To complete the formulation of megascopic quantum theory one needs to identify 
megascopic mirrors of all basic axioms of the microscopic quantum theory in its Copenhagen 
interpretation. There are five fundamental micro-megascopic mirrors: 
1. First complementarity versus the second: While microscopic quantum theory is 
founded on Bohr’s complementarity between mechanical (particle) and field (wave) 
descriptions of elementary entities, megascopic quantum theory is based on two megascopic 
complementary descriptions of the whole Universe, namely a mechanical one representing its 
total wholeness, and the field one representing its total fragmentation. The implementation of 
the second complementarity was for the first time mentioned by Jordan [134]. 
2. Causality versus teleology: Microscopic quantum physics inherits causality (or 
upward causality) from classical physics due to the Bohr principle of correspondence. Its 
megascopic mirror is teleology (or downward causality or final cause), mentioned for the first 
time by Maxwell [51] as resulting from a principle which, quote, unquote “is extra physical 
but not extra natural, and is acting without exerting any force or spending any energy”. 
3. Projections versus injections: Transitions between different states in microscopic 
quantum physics are expressed as vector projections in Hilbert space. The megascopic mirror 
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of these projections is represented by injections that are responsible for the transitions from 
the fragmented Universe into its wholeness and vice versa, a statement given for the first time 
by Bohm [16]. 
4. Born rule versus einselection: The probability of transitions based on microscopic 
projections is calculated from the Born rule. Its megascopic mirror is einselection, taking into 
account influences from all environments. The concept of einselection was originally coined 
by Zurek [45] in his quantum decoherence program aimed to replace the Born rule. As we 
have shown, the Born law cannot be replaced, and we have revealed the true meaning of 
einselection as the megascopic counterpart of the microscopic Born rule. It means that the 
latter remains tied with the microscopic projections, while einselection determines the 
probabilities of the megascopic injection transitions. 
5. von Neumann - Wigner rule versus Jung’s rule: In microscopic quantum physics the 
von Neumann - Wigner rule binds together elementary particles with the conscious mind, and 
its perfect megascopic analogy must exist as well, binding together the whole Universe with 
the collective unconscious. An observer's activity, i.e. a measurement, causes microscopic 
quantum jumps and hence a discontinuity of the deterministic Schrödinger equation. Since all 
events in our world must have their reason, it is reasonable to postulate a similar megascopic 
analogy: the existence of megascopic "measurements" as the activity of the collective 
unconscious causing megascopic quantum jumps. Due to Jung's success formulating the 
concept of the collective unconscious [155], we have suggested to call the megascopic mirror 
of the von Neumann - Wigner rule as the Jung rule. 
We have also applied the abovementioned megascopic rules to superconductivity, and 
we will give three main reasons why superconductivity (BCS) will not provide a microscopic 
explanation:  
1) Every microscopic theory must result in the Born rule for estimating the probabilities 
of the density and the velocity of superconducting carriers, i.e. demonstrate that these 
quantities have to be experimentally measurable. But as we know, they are in principle non-
measurable. 
2) Microscopic theories do not allow us to avoid the universal concept of Bloch states 
for the description of superconducting carriers. It means that the mass of the carriers must 
take the effective mass of electrons into account. But this is in direct contradiction with 
measurements of the London moment, where only the bare electronic mass and not the 
effective one is reported.  
3) According to the second form of van Fraassen's argument, asymmetry cannot arise ex 
nihilo. We know that the original asymmetry can be present in the form of an external 
magnetic field around the superconductor, but no microscopic theory is able to explain the 
mechanism of the Meissner effect, when a superconductor is cooled below the critical 
temperature. Moreover, a constant magnetic field cannot cause any acceleration of the 
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superconducting carriers. It means that no microscopic theory is capable to implement the 
original asymmetry, contradicting the second form of van Fraassen's argument. 
Nevertheless, superconductors can be, and have been, described macroscopically on the 
quantum level. Such a wave function representing macroscopically-occupied quantum states 
was proposed already by London [66], from which one could derive the Josephson equations 
[143] without the need for any microscopic concept of superconductivity, as it was also 
shown by Feynman [144]. Only the ground state and the excitation states of the 
superconductors have a microscopic explanation, in the same way as all solids must be 
microscopically described. However, microscopic theory yields merely the symmetry broken 
states but not transitions between them. We therefore need the concept of megascopic 
quantum jumps appearing either on the microscopic or the macroscopic level, standing in the 
same relation to the microscopic tunnelling as the concept of microscopic quantum jumps in 
the Bohr model stands to the classical electronic movement in the Rutherford model. 
During these megascopic quantum jumps the pairs of electrons (valence orbitals 
forming some kind of "chemical bonds" occupied by two electrons with opposite spins) have 
a chance either to be relocated in diverse directions, or to return into their original position, 
depending on the external magnetic field that determines the einselection factor. The 
superconducting carriers do not recognize Cooper pairing; they are identical with the optimal 
transformed doubly occupied valence-like orbitals. Unlike BCS theory, which associates this 
phase with the motion of carriers in Bloch’s k space, our megascopic interpretation associates 
the phase with the macroscopic l space, orthogonal to Bloch’s k space. 
Hence it is evident that a microscopic theory (BCS), based on the microscopic dynamics 
of  superconducting carriers, whatever these may be, and whether unpaired or Cooper paired 
electrons, polarons, bipolarons etc. – is, in view of our megascopic interpretation, wrong. To 
overthrow the corpuscular philosophy in the Peirce's argument, and to explain the Meissner 
effect and superconductivity a holistic megascopic quantum theory is necessary.  
In addition to superconductivity and superfluidity, we have also analysed other 
megascopic phenomena on both the microscopic and the macroscopic levels, taking into 
account equilibrium processes of both adiabatic and non-adiabatic systems as well as non-
equilibrium processes, see e.g. the complete list in the Table 1: isomeric transitions, the Jahn-
Teller effect, chemical reactions, the Einstein-de Haas effect, superconductivity and 
superfluidity, and the brittle fracture. 
Note that post-Cartesian classical chemistry deals with material objects from atoms up 
to molecules, while standard quantum chemistry is a result of an implantation of post-
Cartesian classical chemistry ideas into pre-Cartesian quantum physics. On the other hand, 
one can alternatively build an authentic pre-Cartesian quantum chemistry on quantum 
megascopic axioms, embracing in addition to chemistry and chemical reactions also all the 
above mentioned megascopic phenomena.  
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Furthermore, the concept of megascopic quantum jumps resolves many of the 
paradoxes of quantum physics: accepting that all processes in the Universe consist of only 
microscopic and megascopic irreversible events and that the origin of time is rooted in 
megascopic events, then the problem of the arrow of time is automatically solved. Emergent 
reversibility can only appear in subsystems with no SSB (most adiabatic systems) where a 
one-to-one correspondence between the mechanical and the field states holds, with the result 
that these subsystems can be fully described by the time-reversible Schrödinger equation. 
This is commensurate with the answer to von Weizsäcker's problem [26], where he correctly 
recognized irreversibility as a necessary condition for classicality, but he left open the 
question if this condition is also sufficient. We know now, that this condition is not sufficient 
in the framework of the microscopic Copenhagen interpretation, but is fully sufficient after 
the inclusion of megascopic irreversible processes. 
This establishes also a fulfilment of Jordan's request [134] to introduce a second 
complementarity to explain classicality. Megascopic chemical processes are responsible for 
the decoherence of the wave function, and the classical appearance of the silver grain on the 
photographic plate, discussed in Jordan's article, ensues. On the same basis Santilli's "no 
reduction theorem" [13] paradox is explained and Schrödinger’s cat can never be in some 
state of superposition: Either the irreversible megascopic event representing the chemical 
reaction of the poison with the cat's body happens or does not, and nothing in between. 
We also know that our conscious minds are all primarily connected in Jung's collective 
unconscious entirely outside the external material world, explaining the legitimacy of shared 
knowledge of a population of communicating observers resolving the paradox of Wigner's 
friend [37]. 
Finally we have also discussed the paradox of the residual entropy arising in chemistry, 
if physical entropy is assigned to the multitude of equivalent isomeric molecular ground 
states. We have quoted two examples of residual entropy: the first one pointed out by Pauling 
[148] to describe water-ice, and the second one, the Kauzmann paradox [149], related to the 
liquid-glass transition with actually negative residual entropy. One needs here to introduce a 
separation of the physical microscopic entropy from the megascopic chemical one, in order to 
avoid violating the third law of thermodynamics. 
A microscopic, ductile to megascopic, brittle transition is analogous to a transition 
between microscopic normal conductivity and megascopic superconductivity under critical 
temperatures. Materials that usually fracture in a brittle manner are glasses, ceramics, and 
some polymers and metals. This also explains why good superconductors are usually formed 
with brittle ceramics on the verge of rupture. 
The most interesting result of the present work is the aspect that microscopic quantum 
physics and megascopic quantum chemistry together form a two-stage model, ontologically 
compatible with the two-stage model formulated by Eccles and Popper [60], which unifies 
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nature’s laws of the material world of biology with the mind world of psychology. One can 
now perform a unification of this two-stage model that embraces the realm of inanimate 
nature, the realm of animate nature, and the realm of psychology. 
Moreover, we have revealed the crosswise-law mirrors that follow directly from the 
two-stage model formulated by Eccles and Popper, namely the reflections of microscopic 
quantum physical laws in the collective unconscious and the reflections of megascopic 
quantum chemical laws in the observer's conscious mind, the latter in a form sustaining his 
free will decisions. The crosswise-law mirrors have a tremendous impact on our choice of a 
correct consistent interpretation of quantum theory, disqualifying all "objective" 
interpretations. Basically, matter-mind dualism cannot be removed and replaced by 
materialistic monism. Megascopic quantum chemistry adds "unconscious" measurements to 
the "conscious" ones known from microscopic quantum physics, eliminating also Everett's 
interpretation [41], since its basic stipulation presupposes a deterministic quantum mechanical 
wave function of the whole Universe. The Bohm - de Broglie interpretation [14] was already 
outdated by Bohm himself, when he formulated several additional requirements [15,16] that a 
true quantum interpretation must fulfil. 
So the final verdict reads: From all the known conceptions of microscopic theories of 
nature only the Copenhagen interpretation has the ability to incorporate teleological 
phenomena via the megascopic mirroring of each of its basic axioms, and in that way 
squaring up with all the universal paradoxes discussed here. 
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